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**KOMMUNIST**  
*No 7, July 1990*

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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## KOMMUNIST

No 7, May 1990

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

### The Discussion Continues

905B0022A Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7, May 90 (signed to press 20 Apr 90) pp 3-4

[Text] This KOMMUNIST issue—one of the three pre-congress issues—begins with an article entitled “To Find the Bold and Honest Answer....” These words, borrowed from a 1943 letter written by A. Spunde could, according to the editors, become the political epigraph for each of the precongress journal issues, for the main task of the forthcoming congress is to find daring, honest and maximally accurate answers to questions pertaining to our past, present and future. The debate which has developed in society and in the party helps us in seeking the answer to these questions.

Its origins may be traced to long-gone decades; it was never interrupted, even during the most difficult of times, when it seemed as though all thoughts were aimed at rallying absolutely all forces of the party, society and the state to withstand, to survive, and to win a victory in the conflict with fascism. The fact that asking oneself difficult questions and seeking principled answers to them was by no means within the strength of everyone is a different matter. However, in the same way that it would be wrong to think that the history of mankind was made only by military leaders in their innumerable battles and not by the toiling and thinking and frequently suffering people, it is an error to assume that the strength of the party could be found only in its fictitious or even its truly monolithic nature; it could be found also in the creative potential of its best representatives, in their occasionally painful search for answers to the questions raised by an increasingly agitated social life.

For that reason perestroika matured not only in the heads of various political and intellectual leaders, as is sometimes presented in the press; its nature was found in the creative efforts of millions of Soviet people, both communists and nonparty members.

Perestroika emancipated the minds of the people. From the small urban and rural kitchens the debate spilled over to the public squares; from “samizdat” almanacs and pamphlets, the multiplicity of human voices moved to the press. Today our country is experiencing an amazing period when, one may think, everyone can not only offer to society his own answers to the most complex and topical problems but also invent his own question and “cut down to size,” as Shukshin’s character said, any intellectual, any editorial board, or any party or other type of committee.

Under such circumstances, words tested by scientific theory and practical experience, a conscientious argument, become all the more substantive. Conclusions supported by the honest and scrupulous analysis of facts become all the more valuable, and a hypothesis with stipulated limits within which it could be accurate and the conditions of the accuracy itself become all the more reliable.

These were the considerations which the editors had in mind in putting together the precongress issues of this journal. Our sections duplicate, in a certain sense, those of the CPSU Central Committee Platform, “For a Humane and Democratic Socialism.” However, we have tried not to limit ourselves to comments on the document itself. Both editors and authors of this journal see it as their task to offer the readers new viewpoints on the problems which are so extensively and tempestuously debated today within society. Let us hope that among the numerous suggestions, views, critical remarks and alternate approaches, the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress will single out the main, the essential, those which, in the final account, should constitute the bold and honest answer to even the most burning problems of our present life.

Does this mean that a party-wide debate will stop the moment the congress ends its proceedings? Naturally, it does not. The age-old wisdom that truth is born in the course of an argument has been finally accepted by us not as an abstract formula. A scientific debate, a creative search, a sharp comradely discussion indeed become the rule of life in a political party. At the same time, however, naturally, in our practical work we must also make extensive use of that which has been developed in the course of the debates and the organized (as well as creative!) implementation by the party members of the party’s resolutions.

That is why we shall avoid to squeeze within the precongress debates incomplete, “raw,” or hasty ideas and suggestions. The main task at present is to achieve in the best possible way all that has become ripe for constructive social action, and to consolidate in social and political practices the valuable features which were developed in the course of perestroika, and thus raise the debate to a new level, to broaden its horizons, and to create more civilized and higher standards for it.

In presenting to the readers this and the subsequent precongress issues, we do not wish to create the impression that the previous KOMMUNIST issues were saturated with materials which were not all that worthy of debate. Such is not the case: throughout the recent years the editors have deemed it their first duty to do everything possible to contribute to the development of social thinking, which is impossible without debate. Now, however, we would like to focus the attention of the readers on problems which, in our view, will find themselves in the center of attention of the delegates to the forthcoming congress, problems about which, already now, not only is an honest and principled debate taking

place, but also about which political passions are seething. If we are to expect from the debates a growth in the creative potential of perestroyka, we should consider politically uncontrollable emotions and the involvement in the debate of ever new social groups a dangerous factor which would make perestroyka more difficult.

And so, the precongress discussion is entering its final, its most responsible stage. At this stage all of its participants must display maximal constructiveness and the sincere wish of opponents to understand the essence of each other's views and arguments, and a readiness to synthesize conclusions which would enable the congress to formulate a program for the party's consolidation, a consolidation which would make it possible confidently to advance toward a humane and democratic socialism.

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### PERESTROYKA'S IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

'Find a Daring and Honest Answer...'; Topical 50-Year Old Letter

905B0022B Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7, May 90 (signed to press 20 Apr 90) pp 5-7

[Letter by A. Spunde; publication prepared by I. Braynin]

[Text] The age of Stalinist dictatorship has left us extremely little of the epistolary legacy of critically thinking people. Miraculously, the letters of Aleksandr Petrovich Spunde (1892-1962), who was a personal acquaintance of Lenin's, and who held senior governmental and party positions, have been preserved.

"Spunde is an honest and smart man," was the way Vladimir Ilich characterized him (LENINSKIY SBORNIK XXXVIII, p 419). The fact that he was a communist with a gift of prophecy and civic courage is confirmed, in particular, by his letter to his wife Anna Grigoryevna Kravchenko; his correspondence with her, which is of major social interest, will be assembled in a book "Samo Proshedsheye, Kak Ono Bylo..." [The Past, as It Was...], which is being prepared by Politizdat for publication. It will include the letter which follows.

Molotovsk (Today Nolinsk, Kirov Oblast), 28 December 1943

Anya, I got up, I dressed, I sat behind my desk and I am trying now to write this long-considered "message."

You were quite hurt by my negative reaction to your intention to write a work which would try to make "Anti-Duhring" more understandable to the young, and break the ice of the widespread indifference toward this work. Indeed, it is a masterpiece of dialectical philosophy. It is alive or, in church terms, dead only depending (on) whether it will help the young to find a

daring and honest answer to the questions and contradictions of present life, such as:

Why is it that the bolsheviks, the fighters and organizers of the Soviet state, which gave the people exceptionally broad scope, why is it that those same bolsheviks (although, true, not only those who consider themselves bolshevik) initially broke up the soviets by transferring in 1934 officially the power from the soviets to the party committees<sup>1</sup> and who then, with the 1936 Constitution, finished off the Soviet system, i.e., why is it that they themselves sunk in the general political area, below the level of the best bourgeois states, although for fraudulent purposes, kept the soviets in name only?

Why did the following contradiction take place? Socialism, Marx, Engels and Lenin and all bolshevik collectives were conceived in terms of the broadest possible blossoming of human activity and initiative. The completion of the process of economic socialization should have eliminated the obstacles created by all mercenary class forces, although it is the opposite that actually happened. When we socialized industry alone, this freed the initiative of the masses and when, additionally, we also created a social agriculture, the strangling oppression of the state apparatus reached limits familiar only to the extremely reactionary periods of feudalism while under capitalism this took place in such an extreme form only during brief historical periods.

Why did the bolsheviks (illegible word—author), who clearly realized that the true joy and upsurge of the people can be attained only by following the steep road of the achievements of independent forces and demands formulated from below (did not follow this path)? The "Bismarck" type of development<sup>2</sup> (Ivan the Terrible, Peter, Bismarck, etc.) meant replacing the obsolete burden with a new and progressive but essentially not an easier one; why did the bolsheviks sing the praises of Peter, Ivan the Terrible, Bismarck, and so on, and so forth?

Why is it that roughly until 1934 the bolsheviks, who were sincerely pursuing a policy of peace, became direct coparticipant in promoting wars and direct participants in the commerce in living peoples, like cattle at a meat market?

Life raised dozens and hundreds of such questions. To some of them reality has already given material for analysis of the reason for which this occurred, while for other such material is still lacking. In your work, philosophical in particular, you do not even hint at them. If such is the case, you will be contributing to the deification (or turning into a corpse) of "Anti-Duhring." This is a good booklet, read it boys, get excellent grades. It is not a book aimed exclusively at the past (for even when it was written it was already dealing with the historical past); it will turn you into parroting "scientists," with excellent grades and a cozy job, etc., for you would thus even become familiar with Engels!

I have started discussing with you the topic of making an initial attempt at writing the history of the Soviet school. I shall return to this later.

Ever since Stolypin's times, the Marxists realized that if not the revolutionary (in the sense of a profound people's revolution) but the Bismarckian way prevailed, it was inevitable and necessary for consistent revolutionaries to plunge into "ordinary" work. That was a salvation. Any conspiracy or "heroic" attempts on the part of small clusters of people to accelerate, through an artificial convulsion, heroically, the course of history is unquestionably doomed to failure. It is a pity that many people who realized this in 1907-1910 no longer understood it in 1931-1935. What does this specifically mean?

Have our people lost faith in themselves? The view is widespread that the cruel and uncontrolled rulers need this, for otherwise, it is claimed, there will be "no progress." When the heroes of NARODNAYA VOLYA died in 1881 and when the heroic NARODNAYA VOLYA itself died, thousands of intellectuals went into zemstvo work. They developed zemstvo medicine and zemstvo schools (quite decent, compared with the church-parish system); they created the then unique zemstvo statistics, which was the basis for Lenin's "Development of Capitalism" and his works on agrarian topics.

These people looked in the wrong direction. However, their unquestionably subjective honesty left deep traces in history. Today we sensibly criticize their pitiful and helpless political opportunism. However, through Lenin we gave them their due for their titanic efforts to study and enlighten the countryside. With these efforts they laid a big brick in the foundations of the Marxist labor movement.

Today the situation is quite similar. It is more likely that our socialism, if we dare call it such, is nothing but the Bismarckian variant; in real life, however, it is just as firm in claiming that everything must be subject to harsh and not ready-made (albeit Marxian or Leninist) prescriptions, and that once again everything must be checked. Are we not repeating the tragedy of the ideological inspirers of the French Revolution?<sup>3</sup> Is voluntary labor possible? Is the tightening net of state officialdom an objective necessity, not anticipated by Marx and Lenin, who were unable to project the future beyond their own age?

I still think that such is not the case, but today simply proclaiming all of this without another new and most scrupulous investigation means nothing but idle talk, if not worse. What does the history of schools have to do with this?

A real, a conscientious history of our work is needed desperately in each sector of activities. It is needed by the masses as well. In such a work an incredibly large number of facts could be cited and all the questions raised by life may be discussed. If we have strength enough, the contrast between two decades—1917-1927

and 1927-1937—would be extremely valuable. The greatness of the first would appear in its full magnitude. However, this would be useful only if works dealing with the initial decades would indicate, without the slightest possible restraint, the weak areas because of which the entire building collapsed, although it was erected as a sincere, an honest effort to fulfill the pledges given to the people in October.<sup>4</sup> We would determine what survived in this collapse and whether the foundations have crumbled totally or whether, perhaps, a new variety of the old law is growing under the ruins.

Specifically, whatever they may have done with the archives of the People's Commissariat of Education during the worrisome months of 1941, we have more material available than we need. Take merely four oblasts (Kirov—peasant, which did not experience the rule of the White Guards; Yenisey-Krasnoyarsk, which was a peasant area, which experienced 1 year of White Guard rule; the possibility exists of comparing, with materials covering a long period of time, Soviet and White Guard schools). Use the same principle in the study of two worker oblasts (Ivanovo and Perm, for instance), and you would find more material than you need for writing perhaps the clearest possible history of the school.

This would be an exceptionally thankful work both from the viewpoint of the present current tasks and the future.

Give it another thought.

S.

Let me only add the following: In Yash<sup>5</sup>, in the course of our work in Moscow accurate facts from our economy and way of life were cited (I did not speak from memory but precisely quoted documents), frequently the effect was one of an exploding bomb.

How greatly slandered our recent history appears as presented in all those "Short Courses."

I have quoted here only a minor part of my arguments, for otherwise I would have needed not five but at least 25 sheets.

Perhaps, nonetheless, we shall eventually discuss this topic.

#### Footnotes

1. The political departments which were set up at the start of the 1930s in the machine tractor stations, in transportation, and elsewhere, as well as the institution of party organizers of the Central Committee, significantly reduced the role of the soviets.

2. Having failed to suppress the German labor movement with the help of the emergency law passed against the socialists, in the mid-1870s, Chancellor Bismarck presented a demagogical social legislation program. Lenin wrote about the petit bourgeois socialists (Lassalle and the Lassallians) who were pursuing a "flexible

tactic" of adaptation to Bismarck's hegemony, that "their errors could be reduced to the slant adopted by the workers party toward a Bonapartist-governmental-socialist path" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, p 366).

3. In speaking of the ideological inspirers of the French Revolution, Spunde had in mind Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other French enlighteners of the 18th century, whose ideals about the prosperity and equality of all were utopian. In his "Anti-Dühring," Engels wrote: "A state of reason—Rousseau's social contract—proved to be and could turn into practice only as a bourgeois democratic republic" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch. [Works], vol 20, p 17).

4. In his memoirs, A.P. Spunde wrote the following on the second day of the revolution: "On 26 October I walked for a long time along the streets of our Petrograd. I wanted to be alone with my thoughts. I was happy in my heart but, at the same time, also concerned. Shall we have enough strength, reason, ability and skill to fulfill our pledges? Shall we justify the hopes of those who had given us the power and those who had died before the victory? (NOVYY MIR, No 10, 1967, p 189).

5. Yakov Aleksandrovich Spunde (born 1918) is A.P. Spunde's son. He is a doctor of technical sciences and a professor.

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### **Socialism Yesterday and Tomorrow: Same or Different?**

905B0022C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7, May 90 (signed to press 20 Apr 90) pp 8-19

[Article by A. Volkov, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and Yu. Krasin, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, rector, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences]

[Text] The years 1989-1990 will enter history as years of unexpected and major changes. With stunning speed the seemingly impregnable bastions of authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes crumbled. In a number of countries, slogans calling for the renovation of socialism were quickly replaced by other slogans in which the minus sign preceded the word "socialism." "Never again socialism!" "Freedom and not socialism!" "No socialist experiments!" Such are the slogans with which rightist and centrist forces in the Eastern European countries are taking votes away from communists and socialists. What is this? Is it a collapse of the idea of socialism? Or is it a temporary "allergy" to antidemocratic regimes which called themselves socialist?

In interpreting such events we must give priority to reason over emotion, for otherwise it becomes easy to yield to panic, which is what happened with some defenders of socialism, whose speeches sound the alarm

expressed on the subject of the collapse of its foundations in our society and other countries. What foundations are being wrecked? We are being told that a "capitalizing" of the economy is taking place, that "efforts are being made to introduce" private ownership, and "restore capitalist production," that the "party... is withdrawing itself from economics;" not only informals but also communist deputies are beginning to criticize the high authorities. They have even gone so far as to reject the class nature of international relations.

Having heard more than enough this kind of speeches, one indeed becomes concerned. However, it is a concern not for the future of socialism but for the possible consequences of the words and actions of the defenders of yesterday's socialism, a socialism which is withdrawing from the historical arena. They appeal as follows: firmly rebuff those who encroach on the foundations of socialism, cleanse the party, and start the political certification of its members.... The question, however, is who is to be considered a "pillar," and who will determine that? Who will carry out this "political certification" and on the basis of what criteria will the party be cleansed?

Again and again, the question urgently arises about what is socialism, what is socialist and what is not socialist, and the question, as we can see, is by no means academic. A great deal has already been written on this subject. However, one could definitely say that there is no answer acceptable to all. It is hardly possible to provide such an answer instantly. Obviously, we must experience a period of constructive pragmatism and, as long as suitable experience has not been acquired, theory cannot acquire the clarity of abstract definitions. However, nor could it terminate its restless work. It is exceptionally important to discuss and seek a broad consensus as to how and where perestroika is leading us, and on the basis of what guidelines, to check its development.

Society cannot just be advancing to nowhere. Even less so can it live with myths after realizing their fictitiousness. The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress is appealing for a socialism of the future as a humane, a democratic socialism. We must determine what distinguishes it from yesterday's, and what makes it more attractive. Furthermore, we must determine whether it is realistic and whether is it not the latest chief popular print, similar to "developed socialism?" In short, we feel a most pressing need for laying the foundations of a contemporary concept of socialism, which could not simply explain the practice of perestroika but also illuminate its path. Let us follow this with the thoughts which have already appeared within the party and the society.

### I

The first question: Why precisely socialism? Could it be, if we sum up historical experience, that we should recognize that Marx, like his predecessors, the utopian

socialists, turned out to be a dreamer who exaggerated the destructive contradictions of early capitalism and reached the revolutionary yet premature conclusion of the need to expropriate the expropriators? Could it be that, in fact, the time has come to abandon the utopias which were born more than 100 years ago and which, to this day, have not brought to the people the expected joys and happiness?

Could it be that socialism, which separated itself in the mid-19th century from bourgeois liberalism, is doomed, by the end of the 20th century, to turn around? Such is the viewpoint, presented with classical simplicity, by F. Fukuyama, the American political expert, in his article "The End of History?", which has become widespread in the West. Did it become popular there only?...

In order to establish the essence of the matter, we must answer, on the scientific level, two questions.

**The first.** To what extent is the idea of socialism objectively determined? Are there contradictions which are insoluble within the framework of liberalism, which required a conversion to a different social system? If not, then there is no objective need for socialism. Or else could this be reformulated differently: can socialism resolve more successfully than capitalism social problems and contradictions and provide greater scope for the development of man? If not, socialism is simply unnecessary and, furthermore, impossible.

**The second.** The socialist idea, which had been attractive and which excited the masses for such a long time, leading them to heroic accomplishments, was initially humanistic and democratic. The founders of Marxism conceived of socialism and communism as a system worthy of man, capable of eliminating alienation in labor and ensuring the free development of the individual. Why do we have to "turn back" socialism to that very meaning of humanism and democracy? Could it be that there was a fault within the idea itself? Could it be that the time simply has not come for its implementation? Could it be that we are experiencing a crisis not of an idea but of historically limited means for its implementation?

Today a characteristic feature of Marxist theory is the aspiration to present the overall concept of socialism, to present its new vision. In describing the features which this social system should have we shall try to find its common definition, briefly formulating the features of its very nature. We believe that in order to achieve this we must remove, in defining socialism, the accretions which mark the specific stages in its establishment and development and are, therefore, historically transient. It would also be useful to turn to the initial meaning of the term "socialism," which was used for the first time, perhaps, by the French socialist Pierre Leroux, investing in it a content which was totally opposite to "individualism," i.e., which was the equivalent of a collectivistic principle in the organization of social life.

Socialism arose from the profound contradiction of bourgeois liberalism, which, having proclaimed the freedom of the individual, in practice turned into social inequality and into the class antagonisms of early capitalist society. It came out that the true freedom of the individual required the freedom of all the members of society. The socialist credo was freedom of the individual in a community of free people or, as the Marxist classics wrote, "the free development of one is a prerequisite for the free development of all." This is the essence of the socialist idea.

At each historical stage, this idea faced specific reality and, naturally, social philosophy has tried to define socialism in concrete terms in the way we define the slave-ownership system as owning a person as a means of production, or capitalism as pitting labor against capital. The characteristic of socialism as a humane and democratic system, which imbues the entire achievements of civilization and raises them to the level of free collectivistic relations, seems inadequate from this viewpoint. A search for a *differentia specifca* of a new social system begins. Marx accomplished this under the conditions of early capitalism, clearly pitting private capitalist ownership against public socialist ownership. Today economists, who try to lay thoughts about socialism on a firm material base, are unable to demarcate between a condition of society about which one could speak as being exclusively capitalist, and the economic system of socialism. In both cases the result is a "mixed economy."

It is hard to disagree with the view that socialism, is a society which is better "ideally" or, more precisely, in terms of the meaning of its existence, which should be humanistic, democratic and turned to man. What is much more important, however, is to clarify precisely the extent to which this is economically possible and necessary under contemporary conditions. It is only the nature of economic relations that can define the main features of the new social system.

The founders of Marxism derived the objective need for socialism above all on the basis of the development of material production, of production forces. What has been proved about this idea, remaining valid to this day, and what has changed and needs reinterpretation?

We can single out in Marx two lines of proof. The first was that the concentration and centralization of capital lead to the socialization of production on a level at which the individuality of producers disappears and, therefore, so does the need for commodity-monetary relations which mediate the exchange of activities among people. A single centralized economic management and its efficient organization become possible and expedient. Such a production socialization "blasts" the capitalist "shell" of production forces (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 23, p 773). The second line in Marx's analysis is related to the development of man as the main production force. Increasingly standing out among the other production forces, in the course of his comprehensive development the subject of the production process

acquires the need to surmount alienation in labor and to master all production means and conditions. The development of man inevitably breaks the forms of production and social relations which fetter him. This is related to the "political economy of labor," the logic of the appearance of the new social system which is based on the merger of labor with ownership, the association of free producers in the labor process. In Marx these two lines of study become organically interwoven or, one could say, merge. It would be useful to separate them with a view to a more specific consideration of their modifications under present circumstances.

In speaking of the prospect of production socialization and the limit beyond which the value relations inevitably disappear while labor becomes directly social, Marx pointed out the conditions under which this could take place. The main feature is that the creation of social wealth will become less dependent on working time and the quantity of invested labor than on other production agents which have an incomparably greater production power (science, technology, etc.). At that point, the determining factor in creation will be the "combination" of all types of activities in which the production process will come closer, in terms of its nature, to the natural process and instead of being the main agent in the production process, man will become its monitor and controller (op. cit., vol 46, part II, pp 212-213).

Is there confirmation of the validity of this trend today? As a whole, as far as the process of development of production forces is concerned, it is confirmed in full. However, production socialization itself develops by no means smoothly, not only toward increased capital concentration and centralization. It is combined with decentralization, with increased complexity of ownership relations and the appearance of small-scale production activities and even their individualization.

In the complex societies of developed capitalism, production socialization does not lead in the least to the formation of some kind of homogeneous ownership which should only be nationalized, after which socialism would come. What develops is an infrastructure of heterogeneous and conflicting economic relations, properly adjusted, interdependent, forming an integral system suitable for public control. By virtue of its heterogeneous nature it cannot be used as a base for direct social labor in its natural form but functions on a commodity-monetary basis within the framework of controllable market relations. The socialization of this system is manifested not in the fact that it becomes increasingly homogeneous but in the fact that its various units act not separately but in a state of organic interconnection.

Gradually, such a production system emerges beyond the limits of classical capitalism, developing features and trends of a socially regulated economy. However, under such circumstances the future of socialist economic and

political relations appears different from what it was in the past, when the statification of everything was the mainstay.

Under the conditions of the technological revolution another trend is manifested with particular emphasis: that of enhancing the role of man in production, turning him from a passive performer into a creative subject and, hence, a change in his status within the system of economic relations. Based on the experience of both socialist and capitalist countries, one can easily see how relevant, not only in the humanistic but in the economic meaning as well, becomes the problem of surmounting the alienation of man from the production process, his interest in the end results of his activities and responsive to his need to influence old conditions governing his labor and assume a worthy position in the production process and in society. The development of science, and equipment and the application of new technologies make the forced inclusion of man in the production process unnatural. Conclusions drawn by researchers in a variety of scientific sectors—by economists, sociologists and social psychologists—confirm the existence of this trend. It is a trend toward the implementation of the ideas of socialism, for its essential feature is related above all to the liberation of labor, to the possibility of "working for oneself" (see V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 196).

This principle was not implemented. It was subjected to distorting deformations. Do we not detect in the course of *perestroyka* the aspiration of collectives of mines, plants and kolkhozes and petty entrepreneurs, cooperatives and lessees and virtually all working people to practice independent economic management, enterprise and self-government?

In his time, Marx noted that "having the tendency of infinitely increasing production forces, capital nonetheless sets one-sided, limits, etc., the main production force—man himself..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 46, part I, p 403). Could it be that under contemporary conditions this is no longer the case? Could it be that the contradiction between the development of the labor subject and the political-economic form of this labor has been resolved within the framework of capitalism? Many other contradictions which seemed explosive in the past have already been resolved.... Some researchers abroad and now, in our country as well, believe this possible. The contemporary worker, they say, employed in the capitalist companies where he performs highly skilled and creative work does not feel himself exploited or alienated. One way or another, he contributes to production management. He may also participate in profits and own stock in his enterprise. His labor is well-paid, protected by the trade unions and the state, and he holds a prestigious position in society. It is even claimed sometimes that the distribution of the results of labor in a developed system of the organization of the labor market is already such that employer and employee act as equal partners and not as exploiter and exploited; the

appropriation of added value by one of the parties is questioned, for accumulation takes place in the interest of both sides.

Obviously, we must acknowledge that changes are indeed taking place along this line, although the extent to which they have advanced may be subject to different assessments and so could the extent to which they apply to all production sectors and to the different categories of working people. This most likely affects the highly skilled workers. However, even those who believe that the "labor-capital" contradiction is no longer the main one and does not play its former role in social relations, most frequently do not tend to reject out of hand this contradiction. For example, the Swedish social democrats, unlike some Soviet writers who have become carried away, do not describe their society as socialist, although it has achieved a great deal. The trends which have been noted and the reality are by no means one and the same. Their confusion has frequently led to serious theoretical and practical errors. The main thing, however, lies elsewhere: if in the process of even a lengthy development capitalism can indeed resolve the "labor-capital" contradiction, it no longer is capitalism, for this contradiction is its birthmark.

Another trend toward the formation and advancement of institutions and forms of social guarantees and social protection of all members of society, including the weakest, those who are incapable of doing first-rate work, is directly related to the development of man as the basic production force. In the capitalist countries, this trend is by no means based on the logic of the functioning and accumulation of capital. Rather, it conflicts with it. However, there also is a logical development of capitalist society which is socially heterogeneous and within which opposing forces operate. It is under the influence of their struggle and interaction that the institutions of the state and the civil society are formed and function not exclusively in the interest of a single class. In this case as well, we see the influence of socialist and collectivistic values on the evolution of capitalist societies toward socialism.

For a long time we underestimated the possibilities of the development of capitalism and its serious quality modifications. In the course of such one-sidedness we failed to notice that within the capitalist system, to use Lenin's words, the "elements" of socialism were taking shape. "...Some basic features of capitalism," Lenin wrote, "have begun to turn into their opposites..." (op. cit., vol 27, p 385). This is even more applicable today, when a headlong transformation of production forces is taking place, and when the social influence on the functioning of capital, and on production and distribution is being increasingly manifested, when democracy is developing and when an internationalization of all aspects of social life is taking place. Combined with the trends we noted, this coincides with our concepts of advance toward socialism.

At this point, however, quite uncomfortable questions arise: What is it that took place in our country? What is it that makes our society different from the type of society which is taking shape within developed capitalism? Could it be that we do not have socialism in our country but merely the approaches to it? Could it also be that all the noted trends in the evolution of capitalist societies indicate a movement not toward socialism but toward something entirely different, toward a different type of social organization dictated by the need of the conversion of the global community to a new level of civilization? Could it be that our profoundly rooted concepts on the change of systems are too rough and simplistic to describe such shifts and the new realities they create? Before discussing this topic, however, let us consider the second question which was raised at the opening of this article: that of the correlation between the socialist idea and reality.

## II

All presocialist social systems developed spontaneously. Although this may have taken place in the course of the clash among ideas, interests and passions, no society as a whole, including capitalism, developed on the basis of some kind of ideal plan. The phenomenon of socialism was born initially in the human mind. It appeared as an ideal, based on a protest against injustice. It was born from the faith of man in the transforming power of his own mind and his ability to ensure an efficient and just structure of social life. Unlike its utopian variants, scientific socialism was "tied" to the real trends of social development in the epoch of early capitalism. It arose as a reflection of a grave conflict within the capitalist production method and the consequent class antagonism between labor and capital. In this case as well, however, taking shape within the mind, the socialist ideal anticipated reality, inevitably separating itself from it and filling the gaps of a limited historical experience with the power of the imagination.

As a whole, as accurately described by T. Mayer in his article in KOMMUNIST No 3, 1990, the history of the socialist idea has been a history of the struggle surrounding alternate paradigms and ways of their implementation, on the one hand, and reality, on the other. The opportunity appeared of making a conscious choice. Let us recall perhaps the clash among the different conceptual approaches at the turn of the century or, even more clearly, that within the labor movement's division in 1917-1919, or else the debates on the "introduction" or "building" of socialism in Russia, which was not all that suitable in terms of the realization of the classical ideal of that country.

The very origins of socialism—initially in the mind (naturally, not groundlessly) and, subsequently, in reality—encompassed both the attractive power of the idea and its, roughly speaking, scourge. Relieved from the burden of ordinary concerns and the "piggish baseness of life," the idea appeared splendid and attractive to the people. It promised them something clean and sensible,

something just and desired by all. However, aimed at the future, this speculative ideal yielded very easily to the influence of those who, occasionally guided by entirely down-to-earth interests, acted as its interpreters. Such an ideal could be handled quite arbitrarily. Stalinist "Marxism-Leninism," which distorted both Marx and Lenin, brought about the separation of the ideal from reality to the point of total absurdity: socialism was presented as some kind of "absolute idea" which operated outside the frames of time and space. History was abused. Reality was being made to fit an ideal, to present it not as it was in fact but as one wished it to be. Life took its revenge with what Hegel described as the "irony of history:" the efforts of the "zealots" yielded the opposite results. Ideological means had to be applied to create myths. The "irony of history" turned into the tragedy of Stalinism and the farce of stagnation.

Drawing lessons from our own history, we have reached the understanding that there can be no kind of eternal and ideal model of socialism. There is a system of socialist values which is historical and which, at each stage in social development, assumes its own specific content, based on the level of maturity reached by social relations and acquired historical experience.

Socialism as an idea is subject to constant changes and develops along with practice. In Marx's words, it is not a condition which is imposed upon reality. It is not an ideal which reality has to take into consideration. It is a real historical movement which rejects the present condition (see K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 3, p 34).

Innumerable ideological arrows were shot at E. Bernstein's formula that "the movement is everything and the final objective is nothing." Ignoring the objections of the author himself, this was interpreted as a rejection of socialism. Yet this formula contained a warning against efforts to separate the socialist ideal from reality. If theory, Bernstein noted in characterizing the outcome of the labor movement, goes beyond defining its essential trend and nature, this must "mandatorily end with a utopian concept and, at one point, become a hindrance and an obstruction to the true theoretical and practical success of the movement" (E. Bernstein, "*A Condition for the Possibility of Socialism and the Tasks of the Social Democrats.*" St. Petersburg, 1906, p 219).

Did we not impoverish ourselves when, having identified social democracy with opportunism, we rejected a constructive dialogue with it on the problems of the correlation between ideal and reality, theory and practice, political objectives and means of achieving them?

Obviously, we should also consider the remark expressed by L. Bloum, to the effect that "socialism is the master of its time," and critically assess the visible manifestations of a nonetheless idealistic approach to the "building of socialism" even in the developing countries which do not have the necessary material and social prerequisites to do so.

Nonetheless, we are continuing to seek the best, the optimal social system under the given circumstances, leading to the combination of ideal with reality. The guarantee provided by idealism and utopian plans lies not in the rejection of the socialist ideal but in its constant correlation with practice and constant correction of the corresponding specific conditions and level of maturity of the mass socialist movement.

Whether this is good or bad no longer matters. It is inevitable. We cannot avoid "modeling." Involved in it are the pragmatists themselves, who call for allowing the free natural development of social processes. Any pragmatist who calls for this immediately begins with the demand, for instance, that private ownership be permitted and that state intervention in various economic areas be prohibited. In other words, he mentally defines the basic parameters of proposed changes.

However, two different approaches could be singled out to modeling the development of society. There are those who conceive of the model of a socialist society as a plan for social structure, attained "at the end of the road." Others proceed from the sum total of socialist values which, in principle, cannot assume the form of any speculative ideal model but simply provide guidelines for the resolution of specific contradictions and problems and themselves change under the influence of specific circumstances. This approach once and for all deprives of meaning the listing of specific "socialist features" (social ownership of means of production, planned organization of the economy, the party's leading role, etc.). In this case the concept of "model" is not suitable, in general. Obviously, it is no accident that another concept has become fashionable: "paradigm," i.e., general conceptual frameworks of socialist theory and policy.

The latter approach is inherent in contemporary social democracy. The German Social Democratic Party made a particularly noticeable contribution to its substantiation at its Bad-Godesberg Congress. Of late, fears concerning the social democratization of our party have been repeatedly expressed, including at CPSU Central Committee plenums, in the course of the reinterpretation of socialist theory and practice. What this implies and why should it frighten us is not made entirely clear. Our time is one of extensive exchange of experience and dialogue in the search of ways of development of socialist movements. There is nothing disgraceful in making use of the theoretical and practical experience of social democracy, looking at it and comparing it to our own reality. We tend to agree with those who believe that we too need a "Bad-Godesberg" of our own, which would provide opportunities for a truly creative interpretation of socialism as a multidimensional historical process, as a real movement, always alive, subject to unexpected twists and unpredictable excesses or temporary retreats and zigzags. Such an interpretation demands the constant attention of theoreticians and politicians, unconventional ways of thinking and making daring decisions.

Unquestionably, the contemporary socialist paradigm will be the result of a choice or several choices among different guidelines and investigations. Many alternatives have become clearly apparent today. Here as well we cannot make eclectic decisions which would force us to follow simultaneously two entirely different directions. As an example of this, in our view, we could take the concept of the "planned-market" economy. Actually, it is being suggested that the establishment of the market itself be initially made to fit (as though we have not had in the past lessons in forcing reality to fit) a planned project, considered from the viewpoint of balancing prices, resources, demand and supply. It is only after accumulating (but where from?) goods and stabilizing (how?) the ruble, it is claimed, that this plan could be "applied" to the economy. Nothing good would result from such eclecticism. The orientation toward a cautious but rapid introduction of market relations should be clear and definite.

Naturally, the market must be regulated. However, market relations could and should be regulated as is being done in all countries on the basis of an actually operating market rather than of tracing models on sand, as the military does in practicing exercises. The fact that initially greater rights could be granted to small enterprises (in the service industry, let us say) and that the population should be psychologically prepared for the market, are different matters. In short, there is no need to reinvent the bicycle. Many countries have acquired experience in organizing market relations. Above all, we must clearly determine the type of "chair" in which we wish to sit. We are well-familiar, from the example of previous reforms, with the eventual efforts mechanically to combine strict centralization with free enterprise, and planning with market relations.

An equally unequivocal choice must be made also as far as other alternatives are concerned. The freedom of handling a product created by an enterprise or else its appropriation by the state in dimensions arbitrarily set by the departments; a differentiation among the incomes of the working people based on their enterprise, inventiveness and zeal or egalitarian distribution. Clear answers to these and similar questions, which are becoming quite specifically demarcated in social debates, define the most essential aspect of socialism: Will man indeed work for himself or will he work for a state behind which stand real individuals using the state as their private property (Marx) or else, finally, will man work simply for the benefit of loafers who, by virtue of the prevalence of egalitarian principles, have enjoyed and are still enjoying in our country privileges, compared to those who work properly? How not to recall at this point Marx's "*The Poverty of Philosophy*," in which he predicted quite accurately the possibility of the appearance of a "society of idleness." The peculiar types and means of exploitation related to this are a danger which is more real to us than the scarecrow of exploitation based on private ownership. To begin with, in our country private ownership is totally undeveloped and in

some areas we even suffer from its absence. Second, the state has a number of economic instruments with which to influence all kinds of ownership. Third, mechanisms for public control over them were found a long time ago and are successfully being applied in democratic law-governed countries.

Naturally, the possibilities of a choice are always limited by life's realities. Something else, however, is unquestionable: such possibilities increase and the choice can be the more successful the more profoundly we understand and realistically assess the processes occurring both within the country and throughout the world. In speaking of the search for a contemporary socialist paradigm and, even in stricter terms, the choice of alternatives in the course of our *perestroika*, we must not consider the development of the country as isolated from global processes. This must not be done not only because global interdependencies are obvious but because many problems have become common to all mankind. Something which makes it necessary thoroughly to reinterpret the very essence, the forms of development and paths of social progress is taking place in the global community. In particular, this is important also from the viewpoint of the future of the two social systems.

### III

"The basic fact of world history today is the deep **division of the world**." These words mark the opening of a collection by N.I. Bukharin entitled "*Etyudy*" [Studies], which came out at the turn of the 1930s (Moscow-Leningrad, 1932, p 9). In developing his idea, the author wrote that the division of the global economy into its capitalist and socialist sectors, which are "mutually exclusive," also means a split in politics, a polarization of classes, a division not only in terms of the "**means of production**," but also in the "**means of presentation**," a division in world culture, an antagonism of outlooks, the shaping of different types of people, and the struggle between two worlds, "**one of which is destined to perish**" (*ibid.*, pp 13, 16). Such was the prevalent view of the world.

The political standards of confrontation imbued social relations in the age of early capitalism. It obtained additional incentives with the conversion to monopoly capitalism, which sharply aggravated class and interimperialist contradictions. It was on the basis of such sociocultural foundations that the conceptual approach which pitted socialism against capitalism as polarized opposites, as a kind of "world" and "antiworld," developed. The direct consequence of this was the tear in the fabric of historical continuity. In plowing under the system of exploiting relations, the plow of the revolution also touched upon the profound strata of social structures and values which had been achieved throughout the entire history of civilization and which, one could say, constituted the general civilization foundation of contemporary societies. This pertains to commodity-monetary relations, the law-governed state, culture and

the arts. Under Lenin, the bolshevik intellectual elite was aware of the danger of a nihilistic radicalism and, to a certain extent, opposed it. Conversely, Stalinism led a parasitical existence based on primitive-radical moods, cultivating them, destroying the general civilizing foundations of socialism and thus undermining its humanistic essence.

However, the layers of the general civilization base of contemporary society are much thicker than the economic, social and political structures which are invalidated by a socialist revolution as a result of the structural changes it creates. Furthermore, as is now becoming clear, the content of the contemporary age is by no means reduced merely to formative changes. The changes themselves occur against the background of and in close connection with the quality changes in the development of civilization, the depth and consequences of which we are only beginning to realize. In any case, it is already obvious that such changes dictate the need for a fundamental reconstruction of the entire global community on a foundation entirely different from the one in the past. This becomes a prerequisite for survival and for the progress of mankind despite its division based on socioclass and national-state features and despite the existence of three different groups of countries: socialist, capitalist and developing.

As a result of the aggravation of global problems and the initiated profound changes a political standard is gradually taking shape, surmounting the former confrontational situation. This is the political standard of consensus in relations among classes, states and nations. In no way does it eliminate the confrontation, for the grounds for such confrontation remain: contradictions among classes, nations and states. The confrontation itself, however, takes place differently and is manifested in different ways: first, in the struggle for consensus, for there are forces which oppose consensus and counteract it; second, in the struggle which is developing within the consensus among its different platforms.

It is from this viewpoint that we must also rethink the question of relations among social systems. Marxist theory abandoned, absolutely accurately, the definition of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle. However, we continue to speak of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry between systems, and retain the "who whom?" formula. In other words, as in the past, we consider that one of the social systems should win, albeit through peaceful means. Is it legitimate today to be guided by this formula borrowed from the past?

No one knows the shape the countries which we today classify as socialist or capitalist will have in entering the 21st century. We are observing their crisis of industrialization, which has triggered the contradictions and paradoxes of our century. However, we also can distinguish the outlines and possibilities of a different development, of a civilization of a new type, based on a combination of

social activities in production and relations among peoples and nations different from those of the past. In developing as a global process and growing on the basis of a changing basis of civilization, socialism enriches the very idea of the new social system. Our understanding of socialism will become richer when we accept man not only as part of his nation, embodying its features and the sum total of its social relations, but also as the "global man," who surmounts the crisis of a civilization of the past and creates the civilization of the start of the third millennium. Perhaps it is precisely now that a change is taking place in all types of the "divided man," replaced by "individuals who are universal-historical, who are empirically universal" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 3, p 34). Perhaps such will be the synthesis of the changes on the scales of civilization and formation.

The group of socialist countries is experiencing a crisis which is assessed by some as the "end of socialism." However, as a global process, socialism is not localized in a given place or embodied in any given standard shape. What the present processes will develop into is difficult to say. We need fundamental studies. It is entirely obvious, however, that we need new concepts and views in describing today's realities. Should we not refine the name of the Marxist theory which studies socialism? When Marx and Engels spoke of "scientific socialism," they pitted their views against utopian concepts. The meaning of their definition was that socialism was established on the grounds of a materialistic understanding of history. Subsequently, the "scientific" concept turned into a barrier which separated the Marxist theory of socialism from the theory and practices of other socialist trends. The great harm which this caused to Marxist socialist thought needs no explanation, for it concealed the claim to holding the monopoly of truth. Respect for the experience of others and the ability to absorb their experience within our own conceptual system are inseparable features of the new way of thinking, without the mastery of which we cannot even think of attaining socialist objectives in today's integral yet conflicting world.

Practical experience of the 1980s proved that a sharp struggle between two systems of values is taking place concerning the consequences of the technological revolution. The first—the neoliberal—relies on economic efficiency, striving to achieve full freedom of entrepreneurial activities. The neoliberal course meets the objective requirements of the technological revolution, for which reason its supporters have been successful. However, this success was achieved at the cost of partially eliminating the social gains of the working people and harming the rights of the poor and deprived population strata. The neoliberal system is opposed by another system of values oriented toward a democratic alternative, organically combining economic efficiency with social justice.

It is precisely in this direction that the search for new ways of social progress is taking place both at home and abroad. In the final account, what matters most is not

how, in what way and through what means this takes place and the words and concepts used to express it. What matters most is that despite all such differences, at the new round of the historical spiral, on an incomparably higher level of development of production forces and, above all, of man, everywhere, naturally, in a new way, the question arises of surmounting the contradictions between "employer" and "employee," and achieving a new combination of labor with ownership and eliminating all forms of exploitation and alienation. Reaching this new level of democracy and humanism would mean the implementation of the ideas of both dreamers and scientists who sought happiness for mankind in socialism.

We find attractive the viewpoint expressed in the manifesto of the initiative group which has launched a new journal, SOTSIALIZM BUDUSHCHEGO, the first issue of which starts with articles by M. Gorbachev and W. Brandt. Somewhat loosely interpreted, the position of the manifesto seems to be the following: Marx's socialism and the socialism of other theoreticians of the past reflected the realities of their time. Today the realities are different. Must we abandon the ideas of socialism if labor has become different, if the working class is changing and if other no less influential social forces have appeared? No, the authors of the document answer. One must simply seriously determine what will be, under the new circumstances, the nature of socialism which has retained its basic values, and what will be the nature of this "other socialism" which will lead us into the future?

In conclusion, it would be proper to go back to the prophecies contained in the "End of History." They agree with the pessimistic views expressed by some of our scientists about the "impasse" in which socialism finds itself today: nothing other than turning back is possible. The inaccurate image of the "impasse" leads to that false prescription. Go back where? To prerevolutionary Russia? To capitalism? If so, to what kind of capitalism: the underdeveloped capitalism of the past or that which today, in terms of many parameters, is ahead of us? Such views are based on a dogmatic understanding of socialism as it had developed yesterday. No, there can be no future in going back. It is more important to look into the new processes which occur on the global scale. The contemporary concept of socialism emerges from the new experience of mankind, an experience which, we are confident, will assume a worthy place in the social philosophy and social movements of the 21st century.

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### Ideology and Politics in Soviet Society

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[Article by R. Medvedev, candidate of pedagogical sciences, USSR Supreme Soviet member]

[Text] Today everyone recognizes the importance of the ideological substantiation of the revolutionary perestroika taking place in the country and the fact that the most important changes in reality within and outside our country are taking place faster and more intensively than are changes in the social sciences and in CPSU ideology. Naturally, this creates several centers of dangerous tension. It hinders the formulation of a practically substantiated policy in decisive areas of social life and sociopolitical progress. How can the contradiction which has appeared between reality and its reflection in the social mind be reduced? This is a difficult question which demands a profound theoretical interpretation.

What is clear is that any truly scientific ideology must be consistent with the realities of life and be comprehensively based on the achievements of an entire set of humanitarian and other sciences in their study of social life and man. In turn, accurately formulated ideological doctrines enable us to develop approaches which are adequate in terms of the social processes and the foreign and domestic policies of the party and the state, policies conceived, in the broad meaning of the term, as a combination of the struggle and cooperation among different classes, strata and social trends and groups within the country and the international arena, on the basis of the consideration of their specific interests and aspirations, and differences in the social system of the various countries and the traditions and history of their development. It is precisely the leaders and the social groups who have mastered to the highest extent this art of political action that should become the nucleus of the political leadership of our state and society. The implementation of this mission requires their ascension to power to pass through maximally free, equal and nationwide elections and be based on democratic methods of struggle.

However, it is just as obvious that in the past 60 years the sensible combination and interaction between reality and science, and ideology and politics was, in fact, turned upside-down. The political struggle, which is inevitable in society, was reduced in terms of its most important aspects, during the years of Stalinism, to an ordinary but extremely fierce and bloody struggle for personal power. Among others, this was the purpose of the deformed ideology which was based, in practical terms, on the falsified history of the party and the exaggerated cult of the leader. All that was left for the social sciences was to comment on the revelations provided by Stalin and his accomplices. Essentially, these sciences became the servants of the laic religion which was created in the country. Deviations from their assigned pitiful role were fiercely suppressed. Actual social processes were somehow made to fit the Procrustean bed of a distorted ideology, as was the case, for example, with the forced collectivization, and the institution of the mandate-command system of industrial production, or else were simply ignored. In the final account, it was precisely the growth, year after year, of contradictions between reality and the real social interests of society and man, deformed to an unrecognizable

extent in the minds of the Soviet people, that brought our country to its present severe crisis.

In order to surmount the protracted crisis we must not only work more and better but take more sensibly into consideration and safeguard the results of social labor, if our society is to develop not spontaneously but on the basis of the conscious activities of the citizens and the skillful management of social processes. Ideology, politics and the social sciences must be returned to their natural place in society and deformations in their development must be corrected. In a number of cases we must even actually recreate some social sciences and restore the authority they have lost as regulators of social life and as the foundations of a scientifically substantiated policy and ideology.

Naturally, although we may wish it, we cannot quickly develop a truly scientific ideology of socialism for the end of the 20th century, a synonym of which is the currently developing new political way of thinking. We cannot immediately shape a system of management of all areas of social activities, truly consistent with the requirements of contemporary science and politics. However, the accurate awareness of the urgency of such tasks will nonetheless help us to accelerate the process of necessary change, for without its renovation our society can simply no longer normally function, not to mention develop.

The various types of ideology (in the guise of religious or philosophical-ethical doctrines) appeared along with the class differentiated society, i.e., much earlier than when the concept itself was defined. For the first time the term began to be used, apparently, only at the end of the 18th century, to identify the science of the origin of ideas. The conflict between Napoleon and a group of French supporters of the new science, who considered themselves liberals and who opposed the despotism of the Napoleonic Empire, provided an impetus for its widespread dissemination. The usurper publicly proclaimed in one of his speeches that "ideologues" are the enemies of society and his personal enemies, and that their science conflicts with religion and law and order, based on the right of ownership. It was thus that through Napoleon's light-handedness the concepts of "ideologue" and "ideology" assumed in the minds of many people of the first half of the 19th century a kind of scornful meaning. The term ideologues began to be applied to people who were incapable of engaging in useful practical activities and to idle doctrinaires alienated from life.

Entering the field of scientific and political activities, Marx and Engels accepted the traditional negative attitude toward this concept. In their statements it sounded as scornful as it was in Napoleon's mouth. This is confirmed by one of the early works of the founders of Marxism, entitled "*German Ideology*," the content of which is related to a false reflection of material reality, idle dreams and total alienation from real life and history which, according to the view of the authors, were characteristic of the liberal German theoreticians. The

same approach was preserved in Marx's works, such as "*Poverty of Philosophy*," and "*Das Kapital*."

Nonetheless, it was precisely Marx and Engels who became the founders of the most widespread and influential ideology of the 20th century. In 1847, having joined a relatively small German revolutionary organization—"The Alliance of Communists"—they drafted an overall program for its action: the "Communist Party Manifesto." This was not only the first programmatic document of the communist labor movement but also the first open appeal by Marxism, of a propaganda nature, which became the main ideological document of the entire socialist revolutionary movement of the 19th century. Even after it, Marx and Engels continued to consider the concept "ideology" as synonymous to a false awareness. In formulating the general principles of scientific and political activities, they did not classify them as ideology (see, for instance, K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 20, pp 97-98), but instead promoted the idea that Marxism, as a scientific theory, is the opposite, the rejection of any ideology.

The Russian scientists and followers of Marx and Engels had a different approach. G.V. Plekhanov, in explaining to the Russian readers the foundations of Marxism, spoke of the "ideological superstructure," which rose above the "economic base," and made a distinction between the "ideology of the first order," which is politics and law, and "ideology of the superior order," which is science, philosophy and art (see G.V. Plekhanov, "*Izbr. Filosofskie Proizvedeniya*" [Selected Philosophical Works], Moscow, 1956, vol 1, pp 647-648). This concept was used in the same sense by the young Lenin as well, who wrote that the main idea of Marxism is the fact that "social relations can be divided into material and ideological. The latter are merely the superstructure of the former, developing regardless of the human will and awareness" (op. cit., vol 1, p 149). Subsequently as well, he made frequent and extensive use of the concept, distinguishing among "petit bourgeois," "philistine," "Black Hundred" ideology and "proletarian" and "scientific" ideology or, in general, "Marxist ideology." The latter, unlike religious ideology, for instance, was, in Lenin's belief, scientific and consistent with objective truth. In other words, he considered religion as well one of the forms of social ideology.

In this case, it would be erroneous to pit the views expressed by Plekhanov and Lenin against those of Marx and Engels. There is no argument here. It is simply that the Russian philosophers classified this concept as part of a broader class of phenomena in social life. Furthermore, the fast development of the social democratic parties and other organizations of the working class and their internationalization (the founding of the Second International), the progress of the old and the formation of new social sciences, the content and conclusions of which exceeded the framework of traditional Marxist views, demanded the development of updated political and scientific and philosophical doctrines, the purpose of which was to substantiate, in accordance with the

tasks of the time, a program and an ideology of the changed parties and to draw lessons from the history of the labor movement in the second half of the 19th century.

The varied and active efforts of the worker parties led to the appearance and strengthening of previously unknown moral values and standards, new traditions, holidays, rituals, styles of behavior and even certain mental features both on the part of the rank-and-file membership and the leaders of the proletarian movement. In this case the labor parties in the different countries were not always guided by the same programmatic principles, forms of organization and work methods, for they developed under specific conditions and were headed by leaders who did not profess the same views. Thus, in Russia for instance, the division between bolsheviks and mensheviks took place by no means only on matters of party discipline and the RSDWP Statutes. There also were major distinctions among the ideological doctrines of a number of other parties within the Second International, although all of them proclaimed their loyalty to socialism.

Naturally, the ideology of bolshevism developed, in the first place, under the influence of Lenin's works and activities. He did not become the author of a new "Communist Manifesto," probably because of the extremely rapid changes in the situation in Russia and throughout the world. However, he exerted significant influence on Marxist ideology. Time had to pass before the extent to which Lenin had intensified and renovated the ideology of scientific socialism became clear. Although Lenin described himself only as a Marxist, occasionally adding words about the "creative development of Marxism," we have long considered Leninism a new stage in the development of socialism, a new communist ideology which became the foundations of the revolutionary activities of the bolsheviks in the October Revolution and was reflected in the establishment of the main institutions of Soviet Russia's social and governmental structures.

Concepts continued to be refined even after Lenin, as confirmed by extensive writings on this problem. Here is something typical: as early as 1922 V. Adoratskiy, the noted theoretician, wrote: "...A way of thinking contaminated by ideologism cannot be scientific. Science is one thing and 'ideology' another... any ideology is harmful because it prevents us from seeing reality.... Marxism is the enemy of ideology" (POD ZNAMENEM MARK-SIZMA, Nos 11-12, Moscow, 1922, pp 209, 208, 202). Today, however, no one shares such a viewpoint and, in any case, not the representatives of Soviet social thinking. Ideology is conceived as the totality of ideas and views which reflect in a more or less systematized theoretical form relations between people and reality and among each other, and which serve to strengthen and develop such relations. It is based on specific social interests. In a class society it has a class nature, reflecting the status of one class or another and is manifested as

political, legal, religious, ethical, esthetic and philosophical views. Ideology includes a presentation of ideas and programs for social activities. It should be distinguished from social psychology ("Filosofskaya Entsiklopediya" [Philosophical Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1962, vol 2, p 229; "Filosofskiy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar" [Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, 1983, p 199).

We shall henceforth proceed primarily from this definition although, in my view, we should not link the concepts of "ideology" and "class" so tightly and directly, for the various segments of a single class or social stratum could hold different ideological positions in some major questions.

Such is the brief history of the development of the theoretical definition, a history which must be comprehensively considered in the study of specific manifestations of ideology and politics in Soviet society.

Even among the ill-wishers of our country, few have denied the power of the Soviet state and the strength and firmness of the social system in the USSR. Naturally, careful researchers (some of them Soviet) have noted some of its weaknesses such as bureaucratism and incompetence on the part of many higher and lower power echelons, great irresponsibility, and a substantial lagging behind the developed capitalist countries in decisive areas of science, technology and production organization, low labor productivity and poor quality of most goods and services. They have noted the monotony of mass culture, obsolete education and health systems, and the low standards and poor quality of life of the overwhelming majority of the population. Nor did they miss the fear manifested by a powerful state and a multimillion-strong party of even the most minor forms of opposition and independent political criticism, the self-isolation of the country from the outside world, the scorning of many democratic rights of the citizens and of social and religious groups and entire nations, as well as the growing indifference of the population toward official slogans and of the young to politics. Although some loyal friends of the Soviet Union tried either not to notice or to belittle our shortcomings, conversely, our opponents presented the USSR as something of a giant with feet of clay, i.e., making the same error which cost Hitler dearly 50 years ago.

Unquestionably, during the period which today is referred to as one of stagnation, the Soviet Union remained a powerful superpower with a great reserve of strength. This enabled our country, despite all the shortcomings, to expand its influence throughout the world. This influence was paralleled by the respect which the USSR continued to enjoy on the part of a substantial number of people and countries. However, it also frequently triggered fear, for the slow and extremely uneven and even conflicting process of development of Soviet society made its policies virtually unpredictable. For that reason the topic of the future USSR and its influence on world affairs remained an item of sharp debates among

political experts and futurologists and anyone who was thinking not only of the present but also of the future. These people asked questions concerning the past and the present of the main sources of strength of the Soviet state.

We shall not discuss here factors, such as the hugeness of territory, the variety of natural resources, the size of the population and the wealth of the cultural legacy of the Soviet nations, acquired through the centuries, i.e., the factors which the USSR inherited from the old Russia. We shall not discuss the large number of scientists and engineering cadres, the high level of defense and space technology, and a powerful "heavy" industry built during the decades of the country's industrialization. In our case we are interested in something else, such as the strength, the centralization and virtually unlimited rights of the Soviet governmental machinery. It is precisely on this topic that we shall focus our attention.

We know that Marx noted the fast growth and strengthening of governmental institutions of the bourgeois society in the 19th century and, particularly, of its executive authorities, paralleled by the creation of cumbersome bureaucratic and military organizations. All bourgeois revolutions, in Marx's views merely improved this governmental machinery which appeared with the establishment of a class-oriented society. It was precisely this governmental machinery that socialism was to bring down.

However, after assuming power in 1917, the bolsheviks had neither the possibility nor the wish to hasten the implementation of the Marxist concept of the gradual withering away of the state under socialism. Naturally, they were forced to close down many of the most important institutions of the land-holding bourgeois governmental system. However, the new state they created gradually exceeded in terms of strength and centralization the powers, complexity and variety of functions of the former autocratic Russian empire. Consequently, at the start of the 1980s, no other country in the world had such a wide and powerful, rigid and big governmental system as the Soviet Union.

This was not the only source of state power. Gradually or partially the state absorbed and integrated all sociopolitical, professional, cultural, educational and even informal autonomous establishments and associations. The appearance of direct or indirect participation in the work of the state organizations by the entire population was created. Another important fact is that, because of the special role which the Communist Party played in Soviet society, its apparatus not simply merged with that of the state but became the leading nucleus of the entire power system. Its superior agencies in fact became the legislative and executive authorities in the center and the local areas, which made the state particularly strong and independent of society.

Above all, however, its strength resided in the fact that it became the sole, the monopoly owner of all means of

production. Even the kolkhozes functioned more like governmental and not cooperative enterprises. Therefore, the state essentially became the only employer in the country. This opened new and unparalleled opportunities for exerting a totalitarian influence on all citizens without exception. Thus, having eliminated the fear of unemployment, at the same time it could deprive a person if found unsuitable of means of existence, forcing that person to engage only in activities sanctioned by the state. In other words, the creative manifestation of human will in all areas of social life was restricted.

It was thus that the state held the monopoly in training, educating, clothing, shoeing, and treating the people, supplying them with information, entertaining them and thinking for them. For that reason monopoly became a hindrance to the social, economic, political and cultural development of society and the individual. The state, however, remained "strong" and stable, omnipotent and indestructible in terms of its external and internal surroundings, ensuring the comprehensive power of the state and party apparatus which could ignore the view of the people in managing social processes.

All of this is clear. But why, then, have millions of Soviet people tolerated in recent years a supermonopolistic but inefficient system, from the viewpoint of modern progress, and have worked for it? The entire reason is found not only in the powerful power of coercion the authorities inherited from Stalinist times. Naturally, these authorities had experienced tremendous changes but nonetheless they remained strong; all citizens were forced to take into consideration their existence. It was not only the absence of any employer other than the state, who could ensure a higher living standard and a standard of satisfaction of spiritual needs. There was yet another factor with a much greater power of coercion than any external one: the ideological impact of the state, the comprehensive ideological upbringing of citizens, from kindergarten to old people's homes. The viability of our social and state organism would have been impossible without the increasing influence on all citizens of socialist ideology, with its active and ceaseless propaganda.

Today many of the principal dogmata of our former ideology are being questioned. This is one of the reasons for the intensification of a most profound economic and political crisis, which led to a crisis of mistrust in the social system and the state, and to grave generational conflicts. Not only all kinds of accidents, unexpected earthquakes, the drop in petroleum and raw materials and so on, and not even the errors and blunders of the leaders but above all the loss of faith, one would think, in the inviolable ideals and values that are the foundations of the present most difficult condition of Soviet society and state. No efforts on the part of republic or Union ministries and departments can correct the situation unless the Soviet people once again restore their profound confidence in the rightness of the socialist choice which was made by our people under Bolshevik influence in 1917.

Underestimating the ideological factor is extremely dangerous. So far, however, a number of erroneous concepts remain on the question of the place and significance of ideology in Soviet society. This particularly affects Western Sovietologists, who are clearly belittling its role and who do not take seriously the socialist convictions of the Soviet people as one of the most important values and behavioral motivations.

Thus, the noted Sovietologist L. Shapiro believes that the communist system relies not on ideology or the support of various social strata but simply on a system which today has little in common with any ideology whatsoever, including the Marxist. In his opinion, it is above all a mechanism for the seizure and retention of power, "based on the monopoly domination of a single party, maintaining itself in power through rewards and encouragements to those on whom it relies." Allegedly, the leadership long ago rejected any kind of ideology and is pursuing real tasks, which include remaining in power and fighting its rivals. He is seconded by R. Pipes who also belittles the significance of the socialist ideological factor by depicting our state as a pyramid at the top of which stand people who hide their totally unlimited power behind various ideological trinkets. He ascribes to the Soviet leadership the basest possible behavioral motivations, shaped by their personal experience and "acquired in an environment in which man is a wolf to man."

Not far behind Western sociologists is a large group of emigres from the USSR, who are trying to interpret for them the origins, the foundations of the Soviet system. For example, K. Khenkin claims that "the strategic secret of the USSR is the nature of the system in which self-reproducing and self-seeking power is everything and the people are merely a mass needed for the existence of the authorities, but are essentially a burden." According to M. Voslenskiy, author of the book "*Nomenclature*," the main thing here "is not ownership but power," the power of the nomenclature. The nomenclature is the "ruling class and, therefore, the propertied class."

Naturally, by no means do all Western Sovietologists share such primitive concepts of the Soviet leadership and people, the motivations for their behavior and their political activities. D. Sutter, a former American Moscow correspondent, wrote that the Soviet Union is a state built on an ideology which claims, like a religion, a status of universality. The Soviet regime draws its main strength from the mentality of the Soviet people, which is imbued with that same ideology. The Soviet people "consider themselves part of the historical process and react to social problems as to their own. If the living standard drops and it is explained to them that the money is needed for defense no argument breaks out as to what is more important, guns or meat. Decent food is a luxury. Everyone understands that a new airplane is more necessary." On this basis, Sutter draws the following conclusion: although the readiness of the Soviet citizens to subordinate all aspects of their lives to serving

an ideal is beyond the comprehension of the Americans, they must proceed from the fact that "despite the superficial absurdity of communist ideology, it offers its supporters a streamlined concept of history and gives a meaning to the life of even the most modest citizen, satisfying, albeit fictitiously, a vital spiritual need.... In an age of faithlessness, communism has become a powerful antifaith which shakes up our conventional concepts. It cannot be defeated with weapons, any more than it is possible to motivate its supporters to abandon it with the assistance of sops. The only way to abandon it is by countering it with a more efficient ideology."

I hope that the readers will forgive this extensive quotation. We wished to prove, based on original sources, the way our country is perceived abroad and the way the students of the Soviet system depict the interconnection between ideology and politics in the USSR. We have realized that conflicting concepts exist among Western theoreticians. They either underestimate or exaggerate the role of ideology. The one-sidedness of such views is entirely obvious.

However, more sensible views exist as well. It seems to us that closest to the truth is the viewpoint expressed by R. Tucker. In particular, he wrote that "ideology is the most important factor which has influenced all forms of Soviet policy since the October Revolution. We must not forget, however, that Soviet Russia is a country in which ideology and politics interact. It is a twin process in which theoretical concepts influence political relations, while practical assessments influence the content of ideology. The ideological system is not static. It has evolved in the course of many years and the realistic nature of Soviet policy has been the main force contributing to this evolution." We see here a realistic approach to the problem. It enables us to comprehend the complex dialectics of relations between the two basic components in the development of sociopolitical processes in the history of Soviet society.

It would be naive today to assume that the USSR or the socialist countries alone make use of ideology for purposes of strengthening their power and influence on man and society. To some extent this is the case in virtually all countries in the world and in political parties, whether in power and struggling for power. The distinction of the Soviet Union is by no means the fact that unlike the rest of the world it is an "ideological state," but something else: the nature of the ideology which is professed, implemented and propagandized. A state, for example, could rely primarily on various religious doctrines, and the ideas of isolationism, nationalism or even racism as the extreme manifestation of the latter, and on political concepts of democracy ("bourgeois democracy") which, in a number of Western countries, has even assumed a characteristic aspect of expanded ideology. The USSR proceeds above all from the ideas of socialism and internationalism as doctrines which open a new stage in the development of the entire human society.

In leading the peoples of Russia to revolution, the Bolshevik Party was thinking less of power as such, than as an instrument for building the new society. In this connection, it paid a great deal of attention to the condition of public awareness and to problems of ideologically securing its actions. The population accepted its slogans without a profound consideration of the nature of the complex ideological concepts and social plans. The party's leaders, however, at that time took bolshevik ideology and their social plans most seriously. They did everything possible to instill new ideas in the minds of the largest possible segment of people. Here as well they were by no means able to implement everything during the first years of revolution.

We know that the Soviet system was preserved in our country as a result of a most violent Civil War. This alone proves a great deal: the new system was viewed by the opponents of the bolsheviks as a miracle. Furthermore, the ranks of the winners were joined by many people who were totally alien to any kind of socialist ideals. Within the party apparatus itself, in the mid-1920s, careerists, time-servers, and so-called turncoats accounted for a substantial percentage. Consequently, one could hardly claim a comprehensive victory for the socialist ideas. In particular, this was manifested in the most severe political crisis of 1920-1921, which reflected the failure not only of economics but of ideology as well.

Meanwhile, the ideas of revolution and socialism developed, strengthened and penetrated deep within society. What is particularly important is that they were accepted by a substantial share of young people who entered the arena of active political life at the start of the 1930s. Grounds were laid for the subsequent social movement.

Nor should we ignore the fact that the Great October Revolution did not become the start of a global proletarian revolution which, as the bolsheviks assumed, would help the new social system. It was necessary to rely on our own foundations. Here as well it was necessary to bear in mind that the socialist state had been formed within the boundaries of the former tsarist Russia which, as we know, was substantially different from the traditional Western empires because of its territorial integrity, and extensive ties linking a multinational population. Not only military force but, above all, the policy of equality among all national rights, and cooperation among different nations and ethnic groups and a policy of internationalism could prevent its breakdown. This could be accomplished only by a single ruling party.

Many have been the negative and tragic aspects in the party's policy in the course of our 70-year history (I have extensively written on this topic elsewhere). However, we cannot ignore the simple fact that all social and governmental institutions in the USSR, after the October Revolution, were set up on the basis of an albeit imperfect yet uniform social plan drafted by a single party. The party constituted, and still does, if one may express it thus, the bearing structure of the entire social building. Its ideology is the foundation of the building

which was erected and is being reorganized. Therefore, despite all discussions about a multiparty system today which, naturally, in some respects is possible and even desirable, as in the past, the CPSU cannot abandon the leading role and, under USSR conditions, become an opposition party, for this would mean the breakdown of the country and the establishment of several countries with different ideologies and "bearing structures."

Recent events have revealed the following: in Poland, the Communist Party has become an opposition party; the same will take place in Hungary and the GDR; in some socialist countries, the communists have abandoned the political arena, as is the case with Romania. In this case, however, it was a question of countries whose alternate ideas (such as nationalism and Catholicism) assumed a somewhat greater place in public awareness, so that the niche for the ideas of internationalism and communist ideology was not all that spacious, and that their abandonment will not lead to the collapse of the country although, naturally, their difficulties will increase.

Our country's situation is different. In a huge, multinational and multireligious country such as the USSR, the loss of governing positions by the Communist Party would mean the end of the state itself in its present borders, economic collapse and the breakdown of the entire society. We must not ignore the 70 years of centripetal processes and the profound economic, ideological and cultural integration which was built on the ruins of the tsarist multinational empire. No religion, and even less so nationalism, could become the foundation of our unity and progress of our restructured common home. That is why the renovation of the party itself and its ideology, which are so greatly necessary today to society, should take place with concern for the fate of the Soviet Union as a whole. In response to the events of last year and the beginning of this year, the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum indicated that, although belatedly, this is beginning to be understood by the entire party.

In this connection, we must pay attention to yet another important aspect. Marxist ideology, the ideology of scientific socialism is not a myth in the USSR, as many people in the West and some people in our own country claim, insisting that it is only a tenet of faith and not of conviction of the Soviet people, and that the population is observing the ideological rituals adopted by the state through coercion or thoughtless custom whereas, in fact, its views are entirely different. Naturally, we neither can nor intend to dispute the fact that a substantial segment of citizens exist, in all social and national groups and strata within society, who have openly or in a concealed manner forsaken the ideas of Marxism and Leninism and even socialism in general. However, this could hardly apply to the overwhelming number of Soviet citizens.

To a certain extent, we also agree with the statements by the noted philosopher A. Zinov'yev, who was forced to

emigrate from our country, to the effect that "ideological claims cannot be proved and confirmed experimentally, and nor could they be refuted," and that, unlike religion, ideology "demands not faith in its postulates but their formal acknowledgment or adoption." However, this should not lead us to the conclusion that in the USSR the majority of people may not believe in officially proclaimed slogans but simply accept the country's dominant ideology. Although a significant portion of citizens have a critical view of various previously and currently existing ideological stereotypes, as a whole, social awareness is fully receptive to socialist ideals and values which propaganda presents in a simplified aspect, accessible to mass comprehension. Since childhood the Soviet person has been imbued with the ideological concepts instilled in him and has become accustomed to them. This is true. Equally true, however, is the fact that he does not reject them. They have become an inseparable element of his thinking and behavior, for socialist ideology is basically consistent with his material interests, his vision of reality and his aspirations and expectations in life. The majority of workers, peasants and employees remain supporters of the common ideals of building a just and new society, from the viewpoint of the working people.

It would be also erroneous to believe that the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state are merely proclaiming their support of socialist values, behind which they hide in their ascension to power. Naturally, they must take into consideration the feelings of society in precisely the same way that the authorities of any Western country cannot ignore the stereotypes of mass awareness (in the United States, for example, essentially any active supporter of an atheistic outlook has no chance of becoming president). Naturally, they also include a number of careerists and cynics, whose main values are not the interest of the people but privilege and power. Nonetheless, even during the worst periods of Stalinism or the "stagnation epoch," the sincere idea-mindedness and unquestionable loyalty to socialist ideals remained by far not all that rare among the ruling elite. Without this, neither the decade of the "Khrushchev thaw" nor the tremendous changes which, despite their greatly contradictory nature are taking place today in our country under the conditions of perestroika and renovation of society, would have been possible at all.

All of this does not mean in the least that in its contemporary form Soviet socialist ideology fully meets the challenge of our time. It has strongly fallen behind life, for which reason people stop believing in it and refuse to accept it. The old ideological concepts have diverged too much from reality. They do not reflect the realities of present Soviet society and the global community and the trends of development of civilization on the threshold of the third millennium. Ideology must be subjected to a serious renovation.

The initiators and leaders of the profound perestroika taking place in the USSR are beginning to understand this quite well. The realization has come that until recently perestroika did not have a suitable ideological

foundation. Such a foundation could not be provided by the eclectic CPSU program, which was adopted at the 27th Party Congress, a program which, 1 year later, was already obsolete. The call for a new thinking, which was sounded ever more loudly after the congress, was a slogan for the formulation of a new socialist ideology. Such an ideology should substantiate, in an expanded fashion and intelligibly, present public awareness of the objectives and specific tasks of CPSU foreign and domestic policy. Its purpose must be to provide the spiritual-moral, the intellectual prerequisites for the renovation of the political system, the shaping of a law-governed state and the implementation of a profound economic reform which would change not only the mechanism for managing industrial and agricultural production but also the entire set of economic and production relations. In short, it should lay the foundations for a humane and democratic socialism.

It is precisely the aspiration toward spiritual and ideological perestroika and the spreading of the new thinking to all areas of life in the country and the party that dictated the decision which was made under the pressure of the party masses of convening the 28th CPSU Congress ahead of time and adopting at it both new party statutes and a substantially renovated programmatic document. It is precisely this that imbues the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform which, following its approval by the congress, will become the provisional party program under contemporary conditions, i.e., the foundation of its ideology. The concepts contained in the draft platform, entitled "For a Humane and Democratic Socialism," are the most important step toward the ideological renovation of CPSU political capital since 1985. Their submission to nationwide discussion is a legitimate and timely shift in the efforts of the party members in party and social perestroika in yet another most important area of life—ideology.

To the Communist Party, its political capital, the trust of the people in its decisions and slogans are no less important than strengthening the economic foundation of society and increasing economic capital. At this point, merely the criticism of Stalinism, Khrushchev's voluntarism and the spinelessness of Brezhnevism will not enable us to reach our objectives. A tremendous amount of positive and painstaking work is needed in developing the ideology. At the present time such work is only beginning. However, it is being obstructed by the improperly developed relations between the social and other sciences and ideological policy, the system of power-holding authorities and the management of ideological processes, confusion in views concerning the interconnection between faith and knowledge, and between science and party-mindedness in the ideological area as well as the condition and quality of ideological cadres. Radical changes are needed in this case in both theory and practice. However, this should be the topic of a separate article.

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## THE ECONOMY

### The Economic Program of a Political Party

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[Discussion between Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin, USSR Presidential Council member, academician-secretary, USSR Academy of Sciences Department of Economics, and A. Ulyukayev]

[Text] [Ulyukayev] Stanislav Sergeyevich, you have already expressed your views on the draft CPSU Central Committee platform in your speech at the Central Committee plenum. Let us now discuss in greater detail the platform's economic content. Let us begin, however, with a more general question: How do you assess now, after a period of time, this document as a whole?

[Shatalin] Yes, naturally, the assessment of the economic part makes sense only in connection with an overall assessment of the draft platform. I believe that its present variant is at a level below which we cannot drop. It is both necessary and possible to go up, not only in terms of economic but also political and other aspects. I believe that we have not properly exposed the fundamental errors of the socioeconomic, political and spiritual development of our country and our party since 1917. What we find in the draft platform on this subject follows the channel of the concept of deformed socialism. This indicates the greatest possible temptation to avoid an answer to the most important problems to which an answer must be provided not because we wish to relish the errors but in order to be able to take responsible political steps today. I believe that the compromising spirit of the document is largely due precisely to the fact that we have not called everything by its right name.

[Ulyukayev] This leads to the following question: Is it possible, in principle, for a vanguard party and not a parliamentary-type one, a party which rallies under a single roof a great variety of political forces, ranging from extreme radicals to inflexible orthodox, to accept uniform, clear and not "left-right" programmatic documents?

[Shatalin] I agree but only partially, for such an evaluation of the nature of the document could apply as much to the type of party as to its present condition which is one of crisis. Yes, there are people on the left and the right and all other varieties in the party. However, this cannot last long. Once and for all, the forthcoming congress should determine our political aspect and course, for without this the proclaimed course toward democracy, market and humanism will not be implemented, and the country will not come out of its grave political and socioeconomic crisis. In this case we must not simultaneously play on two competing teams. The CPSU must be a party of systematic radical reforms, a party of historical initiative. Any attempts at further trying to convince ourselves and others of the possibility

and need for a so-called internal party consensus may end with a defeat for the CPSU.

I believe that the people continue to trust the party. However, we must honestly and frankly admit that the party is not united and that both its history and current situation should be assessed in clear terms, without any "on the one hand this, and on the other, that." We cannot write that it was thanks to the party and despite the deformations that thus and such was accomplished, that industrialization was carried out, defense capabilities strengthened and dislocation surmounted. We must abandon such stereotypes. The development of production forces should not be considered an ideological accomplishment. Both Japan and the FRG built factories. Was this thanks to the leading role of the Christian Democratic Union or the Liberal Progressive Party? We cannot claim that we would have stood still without the party's leadership. This is wrong both from the economic and the political sense. We declare that we are abandoning monopoly yet once again promoting it as monopoly in historical leadership.

We have finally reached an understanding of the prospect of our society as a normal democratic socialism. This makes even more necessary to put a definitive end to totalitarian-state socialism, for otherwise a great many things will be considered by society as nothing but the latest appeals and promises with which the people are thoroughly fed up.

[Ulyukayev] What specifically do you have in mind? Could you give us a couple of examples of what you consider adequate assessments of our past and the features of the existing system which are lacking in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform?

[Shatalin] First. Total state ownership proved its bankrupt nature. Its aspiration to promote everything and everywhere, guided not by economic but ideological criteria was precisely what triggered the gravest problems of our economy: low production efficiency, chronic lagging in scientific and technical progress, inability to ensure high production quality, and orienting the economy toward production instead of consumer sectors.

Second. The form given to the agrarian system is inefficient. It is an ideologized structure, fabricated by the apparatus in a peasant country, for the sake of solving its own political and ideological problems. The kolkhozes became, in reality, the state sector. Essentially there were no cooperatives. Only their name was preserved. The industrial cooperatives were closed down. All efficient forms of economic activities which hindered an incompetent ideologized diktat were destroyed.

Third. Without dramatizing the situation, but remaining on the grounds of facts, we must acknowledge that, as a whole, the socioeconomic development of the country took place in the least efficient way. It was a path of extensive development and of escalation of labor outlays

and material resources through departmental "appropriation of funds" and production for its own sake.

We say that the party and the people made a socialist choice. Historically and politically this is indeed so. However, this choice must be confirmed in the formal-legal way as well. Perhaps it makes sense once again to seek the people's advice on this matter. This could take the form of a nationwide discussion or referendum. On the other hand, currently we are in the stage of "radical change of all of our viewpoints on socialism." Therefore, once again we are making a socialist choice. What is it that we are choosing? I believe that we must clearly delineate the mandatory foundations of a democratic, a humane socialism: a multiparty system, political democracy, pluralism in forms of ownership and economic management, free enterprise, progressive taxation, social protection, ecological safety and the humanizing of society. Unless we do this, we shall once again provide vast opportunities for various types of speculations and all sorts of "dogs" which will be imposed on socialism and the party. We ourselves must calmly, soberly and honestly determine the nature of our legacy. Unless we do this, it will be done for us. This is already taking place! It is taking place restlessly, feverishly and dishonestly. We must rebuild our own image in the eyes of the people, the intelligentsia, and the world. We must prove that we are more profound, more intelligent and more intellectual than the forces which are currently attacking our movement. The CPSU must realize that it does not hold the monopoly on truth, that it is not the only savior without whom no renovation is possible. It is simply indecent for a leading party to proclaim that there is no force other than itself which can promote the policy of perestroika. Political leadership is not an axiom but a theorem. It must be proved on a daily basis. Let us finish with high self-assessments and let the people assess us.

[Ulyukayev] Then we have the problem of "historical oppression." It has been instilled in our people, with their mother's milk, that it is socialism that precisely opposes what you have listed: a multiple party system, enterprise, a free market, movement of capitals, etc. What to do?

[Shatalin] That is your and my common cause. Sober and intelligent people, starting with the president, must explain to us all of this, and the people will understand. We are an intelligent people who do not like to be deceived. I am convinced that intellect, competence and responsibility are on our side.

[Ulyukayev] You said that, in fact, it is not perestroika but the building of socialism which is taking place in the country. Generally speaking, however, could today the building of socialism be the program of a political party? Or else should it include only entirely specific problems of how to come out of the crisis?

[Shatalin] Why not? The crisis is the crisis, and socialism is socialism. Socialism is the objective of the programs of all social democratic parties. In our case, as the saying

goes, it is ordained by God himself, precisely the type of socialism in the sense in which we spoke and the sense of the CPSU Central Committee Platform. The problem lies elsewhere: in our country the name of the party does not agree with its objective. I agree that today a change of names may be untimely, probably for a number of reasons. However, in any case, we must speak of this openly and calmly and engage in an honest and well-argumented debate.

[Ulyukayev] Let us turn directly to the economic part of the draft platform. Is it necessary, to begin with? Do we have to include in the party's document the need to stimulate scientific and technical progress, forms of ownership, trade, banks, etc.? Should a political party define its attitude toward the market and toward private enterprise? Is this not the reason for the new wave of ideologizing of such concepts and the appearance of some kind of "homunculi"-types of socialist market and socialist enterprise?

[Shatalin] The problems of enterprise and the market must be mandatorily mentioned. Naturally, the terms must be meaningful. It is precisely for the party of a socialist choice that it is extremely important to indicate its attitude toward free enterprise. For this means selecting a specific model of socialism, a model in the center of which stands the creative man, the searching man, the man who makes independent decisions and, naturally, who bears full responsibility for them, for the essence of enterprise lies precisely in independence and responsibility.

Naturally, the European social democrats do not have to expatiate on the subject of the market and its mechanism. To them it would be the equivalent of saying that every child has a mother and a father. To us, however, words about the market become a political declaration. It is almost a "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen." It is simply necessary for us for the ruling party mandatorily to raise the question of an economic market mechanism. It must clearly state that this does not indicate the ambition of some intellectuals but that it is the political will of the party of a socialist choice.

[Ulyukayev] To sum it up, would it be accurate to say that unlike the majority of political parties in civilized countries we must explain to the people, to the voters a large number of things which are self-evident?

[Shatalin] Absolutely correct. To us entirely trivial ideas are discoveries and "dangerous" innovations. It is precisely that which triggers the demand for greater details and greater clarity which must be found in a programmatic document.

The party must help the president to secure for himself a firm social backing for implementing a policy of real perestroika and for creating a normal healthy economy. Generally speaking, this is mentioned in the draft platform, and although I may criticize many of its stipulations from, one could say, radical positions, I must firmly state that there is nothing to be ashamed of in it.

This is indeed our political accomplishment, a major step in the system of existing coordinates. I voted for it.

Furthermore, it is precisely our party which, for a long time, professed the principle of a comprehensive and officially sanctioned nationwide ownership, for which it is mandatory to proclaim whether we allow or we do not allow ownership pluralism. This is an essential problem. Prices, foreign trade and bank reform could, in principle, have been entirely left out of the platform. However, taking into consideration the fact that for such a long time we lived under irrational economic conditions, and investing an entirely inconceivable content into ordinary terms, perhaps it may be useful again and again to mention such simple matters, simply for the sake of making them adopted in ordinary usage and thus somehow granting them the party's "indulgence."

[Ulyukayev] From this methodological part, let us move on to more specific situations. We are familiar with the content of the economic part of the draft platform. In your view, what should be added or deleted from it? What should be changed?

[Shatalin] The first is that the proclaimed pluralism of ownership nonetheless remains declarative only. It is as though the program proceeds from the fact that state ownership includes a presumption of innocence. Meanwhile, the remaining types of ownership should as yet prove their innocence. It seems to me that the task should be precisely the opposite. It is precisely state ownership that should prove its very right to exist. Unfortunately, in the course of 7 decades all too many "compromising" features against it have accumulated, while other forms do not suffer from this. It is true that a bias is found among many of our citizens. That is precisely the reason for which there is a party of reform, so that such biases may be dealt with by properly thought-out statements and actions. That is why we must indicate where and how economic and efficient state ownership is possible; other forms are possible everywhere.

Furthermore, both the draft platform and the Law on Ownership persistently proclaim the inadmissibility of hired labor, the inadmissibility of so-called exploitation of man by man. What about the superexploitation of man by the state? This is worse. In hiring out, you can still fight for your rights with the help of a trade union; the state, however, will always be stronger. That is what we should fear. We should not erect artificial obstacles to, let us say, share holding ownership. We should not ban the buying and selling of shares in order, God help us, to prevent exploitation.

These concepts come to us from 19th century capitalism. Times have changed. Ask an American if he is willing to be exploited. His answer will be, at what price? Tell him \$100,000 and he will say that he is ready to be superexploited. As to ownership, take it away, gentlemen, and do not give me any more, for by no means is everyone aspiring to be an owner and be faced, on a daily basis,

with solving a mass of difficult problems and constantly exposing himself to the risk of being burned.

In our country, incidentally, the latest myth is that everyone must be an owner. We must find owners, for without them nothing can be obtained. Unless we find owners, how can we develop? In that same America, by no means is everyone an owner. "People's capitalists," collective owners, account for an insignificant share of the economy. All others, according to our terminology, are being exploited. Naturally, this is done within strictly legal limits. They are protected by legislation and most powerful trade unions. This makes it possible, under the conditions of an efficient economy, to ensure their social protection, which includes guaranteed higher wages under inflationary circumstances and unemployment insurance.

Generally speaking, it is time for us to realize that ownership is by no means the "dolce vita" of the movies. It means, above all, a great burden which weighs on man, absorbing all his time and efforts, without leave or free days. Ownership is impossible without responsibility, without competence. If we begin, once again, to act on the basis of the principle of "appropriate for the sake of sharing," there will be no social responsibility whatsoever. There will be social parasitism. There will be the rule of waste. There will be equality in poverty.

[Ulyukayev] Do you believe that all stipulations concerning the inadmissibility of exploitation should be deleted and that free enterprise is admissible in all areas?

[Shatalin] Unquestionably. Currently this exists in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Naturally, there could be a variety of quantitative restrictions. However, these are already mechanisms and not principles.

[Ulyukayev] The interpretation of the new economic role of the state is extensively depicted in the economic section of the draft platform. Nonetheless, we hear today frequent views to the effect that the most sensible thing which the state could do would be to withdraw altogether from the economic area. What is your opinion on this account?

[Shatalin] If we are speaking not of the 19th but the 20th century, unquestionably the state plays a great economic role, for there are matters which the market cannot handle, by definition, so to say. Its mechanisms are good for purposes of adaptation, quickly adapting to any changes in demand, and to technological changes; however, no market has ever resolved ahead of time the problem of the comparative efficiency of the production of goods, problems of education, culture, health care and the development of backward areas. Those are the natural areas of application of state resources and state intervention into the market economy. Instead of an artificial problem such as "plan or market," we should think precisely about this and about the mechanism of state control of prices, credits, subsidies, taxes, etc. In principle, it is absolutely unnecessary, for example, for

the state to own defense enterprises. In the course of the competitive struggle for orders they would work just as well and at lower cost.

It is a rather stupid situation when we wish to build a plan-market socialism, not clearly understanding where precisely state ownership is expedient and efficient. The state should monitor above all the infrastructure, the development of the basic sciences and education. It should provide social protection. Incidentally, a specialist would find strange the very term of planned-market economy. Everywhere the economy is "planned-market economy." In our country as well, and even during the times of 100 percent Stalinism, in fact there was a market. It was a deformed, a distorted, a "black" or "gray" market, but nonetheless a market. On the other hand, despite all declarations about market freedom, it is plans (precisely plans and not orders and directives) for economic development that are being formulated in all countries. Any government leader who has a specific economic policy takes, one way or another, the path of macroeconomic planning. That is why I would suggest that we speak of "the economics of a regulated market and social protection of the citizens."

[Ulyukayev] Stanislav Sergeyevich, let us assume that we have been able to resolve all such ideological problems. Immediately, therefore, there appear essential problems. For example, we proclaim real pluralism of forms of ownership. This means, however, that we must privatize. How do we imagine this?

[Shatalin] Let us openly say that we know quite well how to appropriate the possessions of the population. However, we are clearly not prepared to show sensibly and calmly how to privatize with economic efficiency and social justice. Yet the Poles and the Hungarians are engaged in such processes. We must undertake the serious study of this matter and, in general, conduct a thorough study of the problems of the transitional period.

Let me repeat: political parties should not deal with the economic mechanism. However, we are simply obligated to do everything possible to surmount the ideological allergy to rational economic concepts and phenomena. Then both scientists and the government will be able calmly to work and find optimal solutions.

[Ulyukayev] You speak of the economy of a controlled market and social protection. Let us now turn to the second half of this formula. How should a political document of the Communist Party describe social protection functioning in an efficient economy?

[Shatalin] In this case we must take some realities into consideration. To begin with, if we accept a realistic and efficient economy, there will inevitably be unemployment. It is obvious that within the state sector there have always been and there still are huge manpower surpluses. For example, unemployment has been officially acknowledged in the case of some agrarian overpopulated areas such as in Central Asia. Workers will be laid

off as a result of progressive structural and technological changes. That is why we need mechanisms and institutions which could prevent unemployment and ensure the retraining of workers. We must organize the proper funds, both central and regional. We must also provide social protection for those who lose their jobs and set aside funds for their retraining. This is mentioned in the draft platform. However, this should be stipulated more clearly and in greater detail, for in the final account it is a question of the social cost of perestroyka. It should not frighten the people. The fears of the citizens and their worry about the future should be eliminated with the right arguments.

The next problem is that of price reform. Such reform is necessary. Let me say, as a specialist, that it is impossible to provide full compensation for price increases in everything. We have major differentiations in incomes and a huge variety of products. We cannot set an individual rate of compensation for every single individual. For that reason we must have a price reform with compensation only up to a certain level of income. Naturally, this does not apply to the present mythical 75 rubles but to at least 125 rubles monthly per capita. Those whose income exceeds this level would have to make a certain temporary sacrifice. It is obvious that the category of people to be compensated must mandatorily include the retired, the disabled, families with many children and low-salaried citizens.

For a long time there prevailed in our country, and still does, the pagan myth that, naturally, although socialism may be less economically efficient than capitalism it provided huge social guarantees to the working people! Even in our by no means as yet emancipated society, which has largely retained the ideology of Stalinism, the majority of a population, which is becoming rapidly more intelligent, considers them political demagogic of the lowest order. Economic efficiency and social justice are not enemies but provide a firm foundation for each other. Could it be that social justice consists of equality in poverty rather than in honest and productive work?

Our social sphere, investments in which have increased, which is an absolutely correct policy, functions on the basis of the "every man for himself" principle. Increasingly we hear that social problems must be solved with the help of enterprise funds. No one is willing to understand, especially the politicians, that this leads to an absolutely unjustified social inequality: a poor worker in a "good" plant earns significantly more than a good worker in a "poor" factory. Generally speaking, this resembles serfdom: "The good" owner cares for the loyal "slaves." The enterprises must perform all functions: heal, feed, gather the harvest, raise their own cattle, and their own pigs.... The only thing they do not do is produce good quality products, the very purpose for which they were created. This is indeed a hymn to Soviet powerlessness and to the omnipotence of departmentalism. In the final account, this makes both the economic and social areas suffer. We should put an end to building

a departmental, a corporate, a plant pseudosocialism. If we fail to understand this today we shall never understand it.

[Ulyukayev] There is yet another quite important problem: the structure of the national economy. Should the party define its attitude toward it?

[Shatalin] In principle, it is not mandatory to include this in the economic section of the CPSU Central Committee Platform. It should be included in the program of the government, of the president, as one of the main problems. Here is what happens: in the field of economics budgetary restrictions are quite "soft;" centralized assets are distributed regardless of the efficiency of their utilization. No one knows where they go and what happens to them. This automatically triggers lengthy construction projects, unfinished building and shortages. The share of heavy industry is obviously higher than it should be. The economy is metal-intensive, resource-intensive, energy-intensive and labor-intensive. The solution here lies in a normal participation in the international division of labor. To this effect, we must prove that we are honest partners with the normal market. We should not fear the fact that under market circumstances there will be a scarcity of metal or anything else. The experience of any developed country reveals the existence of quite a number of shortages.

In the past our economy was autarchic. We had to have everything made domestically, from computers to ordinary nails. Now, however, as we enter into the global economic system, we must realize that we cannot develop all types of production and all types of scientific activities. The preservation of a burdensome national economic structure makes the solution of many problems, including that of eliminating budget deficits, questionable. Investments in this area are long-term investments. It is thus that inflation intensifies. Then, let me repeat myself, this is a matter for the government.

It is precisely this that mandatorily must be included in the action program of a political party, for it means developing problems affecting the interaction between large-scale and medium production facilities and small business. Their optimal combination is indeed the most important economic and political problem. This affects scientific and technical progress, the updating of output, problems of enhancing areas and villages, regional revival, employment, and upgrading the technical, economic and social standards of the nation.

[Ulyukayev] Is it necessary for a party program somehow to indicate its views concerning the government? Is support of the government mandatory? Or else could setting a sensible distance between it and the government be expedient?

[Shatalin] I believe that there should nothing but general support of a transition to the market, a program for financial improvements and a clear declaration to the effect that there is no alternative to the market system. The party must undertake the protection of the market

system, and calm the social fears concerning any possible worsening of the living standard. All else is a matter for the government. Although this is a government supported by the ruling party, the party should retain the freedom to criticize it. Naturally, such criticism should be loyal and constructive.

[Ulyukayev] Stanislav Sergeyevich, we shall now live under the conditions of real political pluralism, a multi-party system. What happens is that the party, which has entered in its program for action economically rational yet strict and unpopular measures, now assumes responsibility for them and risks to lose too many votes in the elections. What to do?

[Shatalin] Yes, there is such a danger. It is always easier to promise rivers of milk and banks of cream. This, however, works in the short-term. In the long-term, political distancing needs, above all, truth. As Tvardovskiy said, "we have quite a surplus of untruths." Secondly, we need intellectual strength. There is no question in my mind that the intellectual forces will rally around an honest, progressive and realistic platform. This would enable us to win any election.

Naturally, we must be prepared for the fact that a variety of demagogic forces will speculate on this, and that we shall be accused of all the mortal sins, insulted and caricaturized. We shall have to endure and suffer through this without emotionalism.

However, it is only in that case that, having made the difficult yet necessary choice, the CPSU will be a party which is indeed needed by society.

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#### 'Cobweb'

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[Letter to the editors by L. Kishkin, senior foreman, metal structures shop, Kramatorsk Machine-Tool Building Association, Donetsk Oblast]

[Text] The reason for this letter is not my intention to ask the press to solve a problem or because of the spirit of democracy and glasnost but probably simply because there is a limit to patience. This, however, is not the complaint of an insulted member of a cooperative. Yes, it will be a question of a cooperative and I beg of you to forgive me for raising this hackneyed and repeated topic. It seems to me, however, that the case I shall describe crystallizes, in miniature, the classical model of a "cobweb" about which people are writing and speaking, describing it as "invisible" and, what is saddest of all, one which cannot be fought, for which reason any such fight yields no results. I shall try to describe the case dispassionately, so that anyone who reads it can have his own evaluation and opinion.

I am senior foreman at a machine building plant; I am 43; I am a party member and member of the shop's party bureau; I have also been deputy chairman of the shop's party committee and member of the presidium of the trade union committee, as well as member of the council of plant foremen. This is not a listing of my credits and merits but merely an indication of the trust which the people have put in me in solving problems and in working with people in production, and something else as well....

The idea of the possibility of creating a production cooperative did not arise as a result of eagerness for high earnings or patriotic motivations, but purely accidentally. One of my acquaintances happened to mention that in one of the stores he frequently sees a scarcity of items which could be quite easily manufactured in our shop, from waste. I went to the store, I talked to the manager, who was pleased and who asked for our help. I also spoke to the shop chief, who also agreed. We submitted a petition to the director, requesting permission to create in our shop a production cooperative and to work during our spare time. First of all, this would benefit the plant, for it would provide additional rubles in its report on the implementation of the plan; second, rejects will become goods; third, we shall saturate the market with necessary goods; fourth, we would earn income for ourselves and not have to waste time looking for goods to the detriment of our main job; fifth (this is both a moral and personnel problem), we would become more strongly attached to our enterprise and would work more carefully and not even think of seeking a better job.

Briefly, the idea spread. The director's note on the petition was: "To be approved." This occurred in November 1988. The following month we were officially approved by the city executive committee. It was thus that the "Fobos" Cooperative at the Kramatorsk Machine-Tool Building Production Association was born. Four members of the engineering and technical personnel and five workers firmly accepted the idea. They ordered a stamp and opened an account in the bank. All that remained, before starting work, was to sign a contract with the enterprise concerning conditions and reciprocal obligations. This was considered a symbolic formality, for the signature of the director also presumed the help of the various enterprise services. We had already begun to think of how to use the waste for the manufacturing of some goods, studied publications, made prototypes and studied demand. Petitions to set up specifically production cooperatives were numerous at that time (particularly for the manufacturing of consumer goods); we believed and were believed. The local newspaper published an article which specifically mentioned that soon the necessary goods will appear in the store: an agreement had been concluded with the cooperative.

Alas, my belief that an innovation and initiative from below would be supported and developed proved to be childishly naive. The planning-economic department read the draft contract and grinned: "Who among the

plant workers would participate in your cooperative?" I thought that the department would be interested, above all, in the technical and economic aspect of the matter. However, a most ordinary discussion followed: "What is it with you, cooperative members, what is it you want?..." There was no business discussion: "Why did you quote precisely these figures and not different ones? ...Generally speaking, naturally, you are a 'nothing' compared to the plant's volume of output...." I was pleased by this: Yes, we are a "nothing," and, furthermore, the conditions we were discussing were experimental, for a 6-month period. Reality would show how to proceed, the contract could be amended and even dropped; yet, in order to do something we should at least start working. "So....," we heard significantly, "and so you want to get rich...." The remarks of the department included items such as: List the variety, list the volumes, reflect the procedure for accounting, and so on. How could I, for instance, describe the variety and the volumes without having studied demand, developed a technology or acquired specific material facilities? In general, if we were a "nothing," why were there, all of a sudden, so many requirements as though we were an affiliated foreign company? (Incidentally, let me explain that what I mean by production waste is not precious metals but waste from stamped shapes, cuttings of ordinary black sheet metal.)

During the second stage of the work, the shop chief went to the bookkeepers. Their talk consisted of remarks which were shorter and more categorical and, essentially, could be reduced to one thing: You will be stealing and we are unwilling to be responsible for this. Well, thank you for your "trust!" Some oral explanations followed. For example, is this metal scrap needed? Very well! You must begin by submitting a design for the cutting of the entire, the basic metal, so that we could clearly see where such a scrap will show up; furthermore, you must submit it to the warehouse and, from the warehouse, we shall sell it to you at a price we shall set ourselves.... Whereas I could still agree with these remarks, such an unofficial warning, expressed orally, made me think: generally speaking, was this practically feasible? We would find a bit of iron among the scrap, unclaimed by anyone. By whom and when was it junked no one could tell (we had mountains of such scrap). However, in order to make something out of it, it turns out, one must trace its entire lineage and prove it with documents. What if no one ever kept track of its origins?...

The third stage consisted of a visit to the plant's legal department. I was received efficiently, and within the allotted time—3 days later—I received a two-page answer. I realized that my project was worthless: It was too general, conflict situations were possible, something or other was not defined or stipulated, something was conflicting, official position would be used, etc.... "I suggest that the cooperative be assigned a separate premise, and separate equipment which it could lease." This was sensible, clear, good and understandable. One thing was obviously clear: the plant has neither premises

nor, even less so, any available equipment, and had some been available, at that point we would have to leave our main jobs and set up an independent company (this is not our objective nor do we wish to leave the plant).

All in all, we were given both remarks and suggestions. Act! How to act was already something else. I rewrote the contract, again by myself, although I would have liked to do this at a roundtable meeting, in the presence of interested individuals, in a form which would be acceptable to all, and find and adopt an option which would support initiative from below and would be consistent with requirements from above. Since it was the lawyers who had given the most practical opinions, I immediately submitted the draft to them. Within the proper time I received my answer: "...Our remarks were not taken into consideration... this has not been clearly stated... that has not been stipulated..., rejected by the legal bureau."

I wrote a third draft. I explained the situation to my colleagues. They were indignant and failed to understand the nature of this mistrust. The shop chief and I decided to submit the third draft straight to the director. By mid-March 1989 we were received by him. The director was indignant that his management colleagues were showing short-sightedness and were still unable to reorganize themselves. As a result, he said, turning to the shop chief: "I personally see things as follows: If you have fulfilled your plan and, furthermore, have been able to make something out of scrap you should be given medals! If you claim that the shop is short of metal, believe me, you will be strictly taken to task." This was an answer worthy both of a general director and a deputy, which he was. "How much time do you give me to solve the problem? Would two weeks be enough? You can begin work as of the second quarter!"

I came back, gathered the people around me. They cheered up. One month passed. I saw the director and reminded him of the problem. "Yes, I recall, forgive me, I have had too many other things to do, this has become now a priority matter question. It will be resolved in the next few days. I shall notify you." Another month passed. I spoke with the deputy director who told me that there has been a request to send to Moscow someone to attend a seminar of chairmen of production cooperatives and that he had asked the director whether or not to send me. No one went, but the director said that he remembered everything and that he will solve our problem in the immediate future. Spring came and then there was summer and summer leave. Once again I met with the director, in July, and asked him what should we count on. He recalled with some difficulty what the problem was, and answered that he was not refusing but simply had forgotten. He promised to locate the contract in the next few days and to make his final decision. Time passed. Naturally, gradually the mood and enthusiasm for this planned initiative diminished. We no longer worked on prototypes. We no longer collected the necessary scrap or stayed after work. I was embarrassed to look at the boys in the eye.

It is true that there also were glimmers of hope. Eventually a representative of the party gorkom came and asked about the reasons for our inaction (he was drafting a reference for a report to be submitted at the gorkom plenum). The association's party committee secretary published an article in STANKOSTROITEL, the plant newspaper, entitled "A Green Light for Goods for the People." In particular, it read: "...Party group organizer L.A. Kishkin was the initiator of the 'Fobos,' Cooperative, which will function on the basis of the TsMK. Unfortunately, the process of drafting the contract between the enterprise and the cooperative has been excessively delayed and, to this day, the cooperative has not begun work...." Before writing this article, he did not discuss it with me, and I do not know the source of his information. Let me merely point out that even after that there were neither any conclusions nor resolutions. Each separate office was silently pursuing its own affairs. August came. I no longer went to see the director personally; instead, I submitted a petition to him, reminding him of the essence of the matter. One week later I went to the secretary to ask for the answer. The record book noted that it was sent to the deputy chief engineer. At that point I realized that the problem had made a full circle and that we had to start from scratch.

It is easy to imagine the nature of my conversation that day with my comrades, for which reason I shall not describe it. In September I was invited to attend a meeting about our problem. The same people were present, although the chief bookkeeper and the chief of the planning and economic department were represented by their deputies. Everything that had already been said was repeated; general statements were made to the effect that everything is by no means as simple as it seemed to us, and everyone started to give examples of exposed violations by cooperatives in the city. What a touching concern this was, to protect us from all this. Why, I told them, do you fail to mention positive examples? Let us consider the experience of the properly working production cooperatives. Everyone agreed, but it was unclear as to who would provide such examples. Warnings were voiced to the effect that such work would create discontent in the shop's collective. Why presume this? Why not gather the labor collective together and ask it? It was interesting to note that everyone of those present, in criticizing the draft contract, mandatorily had to mention that this was a necessary and useful project but that it had to be approached somewhat differently, but if so, how? That is the point at which the meeting ended....

I asked the deputy chief engineer what was I to do now? He answered that he understood everything but that the dialogue should continue and that mutually acceptable compromises with the various plant services had to be sought. He suddenly then made the following suggestion: What if we would increase the size of the project? Include some specialists, and undertake to design and manufacture consumer goods developed by the plant. This would be supported by the director. This was the real uncharted road! Who would be against it? Please,

speak out! That is what we are striving for. He spoke with our specialists and an agreement was reached: it was decided that we could begin immediately (i.e., the customer would allocate prepared plans and materials). For the fourth time I rewrote the contract. By then the bank had lost patience and had sent us a warning that it would close down our checking account. I pleaded for mercy, explaining to the bank that we are seriously engaged in the plant in developing the immediate prospects and asked for a delay. The fourth variant reached the director and returned with his note: "Refused on the enterprise's territory!"

Had I been able to depict on paper the absurdity of the waste, the stupidity of the situation in which we found ourselves I would have done so. (For the sake of reference: of the more than 500 cooperatives which were created in the city about one-half are in operation.) I read in the paper that Fortius, an Estonian cooperative, was set up and, using the facilities of the vocational and technical school, organized the production of sports training equipment. Now the students are not doing meaningless work. An interest in labor has developed, and material facilities have improved. Experienced foremen were hired. The competition in the school today is one that even the All-Union State Cinematography Institute has never filmed. I got in touch with the vocational-technical schools in our city, I described the situation and I asked whether they would accept such an option. They answered that there was an instruction not to allow such projects and if some were already existing, they should be closed down categorically, in order not to corrupt the youth. How, one asks? Through labor in which there is an interest? Are our young people not corrupted by the vision of irresponsibility, a feeling of futility and uselessness in their training and the lack, finally, of material incentive about which so much apprehension is expressed concerning adolescents? Yet this is no longer the generation of the 1950s both in terms of demands and intellect. I have three sons and I know this to be true. I also know something else, that the words "gold-plated," even as a result of membership in a cooperative, does not frighten me, precisely for that reason. How, by what means can we make ends meet, however, is something about which I have to think all the time.

Like all other organizations and workers, naturally, cooperatives and cooperative members differ. If we go after thieves why should we suspect the honest people? Prohibitions can only strengthen the illegal economy, and meanwhile every one of us must become a practical and cunning person. I rewrote the contract for the fifth time. I pointed out that we have absolutely no claim on any plant territory and that all that is left in the clause "the enterprise commits itself" consists of three items which do not entail any obligations on anyone's part. Now, finally, they say, this is a different matter. You have finally realized that we wish you well. Why have you abbreviated this contract to the point where virtually nothing is left? Let us take a standard contract and, on its

basis, look at how to rework yours... (for your information: in a standard contract the first item of the article "the enterprise commits itself to" stipulates that it leases to the cooperative the necessary equipment... and allocates on its own territory an area for the production base of the cooperative...). Therefore, now all that is left is a note which would read: "Read the entire item and start everything from scratch...."

The circle is closed. I no longer approached the director. I do not claim to be infallible in my views, convictions and actions, and I have presented a strictly subjective perception. I know that anyone with a title and experience would be able to prove that he too is right. I, however, am already morally prepared and nothing can amaze me any longer. This is 1990. More than 1 year has passed! Was it spent in the struggle for perestroika or for personal interest? Best of all, naturally, to combine both and thus be useful to the country.

A poster with an excerpt from Lenin's letter on the work of the Soviet apparatus hangs in the administrative building of our plant management: "Once and for all, we must put an end to the scandal of red tape and bureaucratism in your establishment.... The machinery of the Soviet administration must work accurately, precisely and fast. Not only the interests of private individuals suffer from its slackness but the entire aspect of management becomes fictitious, ghostly." Perhaps this is read only by school children who come to visit the plant, for there are many want ads, such as "the plant needs...." My sons, however, are unwilling to come to replace me, to follow in my footsteps. That is perhaps why I tell them everything openly and directly and, in particular, discuss my work. Naturally, eventually I shall reach retirement age, but after us, will the deluge come?

We hear and read: "This depends on every one of us!" Does everything depend on those who are above us? We need minds, talent and personalities who are dedicated and highly decent and initiative-minded, whatever their positions, of all ranks and on all levels. One must identify them and promote them to their proper place, trusting and helping them. This depends on us! Yet we are unable to do so. Hence our past, present and future difficulties, for we do not have in our country "survival extremes." Everywhere we have a guaranteed minimum, insurance, and reliance on the state and not on ourselves. One could do without learning many things, without doing a great deal of work and, in general, without aspiring toward anything, and one would not fail. There is an internal compromise to which we have become accustomed. Such is our system. It is thus that we shall walk in circles: this is more reliable and more peaceful, although for quite some time food and clothing will have to be used sparingly until we reach the target.... Yet, we could also follow another path along which we would move faster more daringly and confidently but walking along the edge of the precipice. This is possible! However, for this we need guides, we need pilots.

Science has advanced greatly. We have computers, forecasting and analysis systems have been created, and methods and statistics have been developed.... Why is it that management practices do not use them? Is this deliberate, in order to make it simpler and easier to conceal someone's specific errors, unfinished work or ignorance? The fashion of inspirational statements and standardized answers has been with us for quite some time: "That is what those at the top believe.... Why not ask them...?" Meanwhile, from above, the boomerang falls back on us: "You, down below, see more clearly.... Settle matters locally.... You are trusted, you decide.... You are the bosses...." This is a play of words, a competition in officialdom's "erudition," quoting paragraphs, articles and standards. It is a strange collective leadership, when a resolution is unanimously passed yet no one assumes responsibility. Why is it that a semiliterate woman with a pencil in her hand can project her family's expenditures for the next year, while thousands of managers, armed with scientific knowledge, are unable to tie ends within the national economy? Because the housewife dares not be wrong, or forget or ignore something (and must even set something aside for a rainy day), for otherwise the family will not survive. The managers, however will and, furthermore will keep their jobs and will be paid for it.

These are simple truths. Unquestionably, all of us have met in the course of our work managers who are considered model and around whom the collectives have rallied! Unfortunately, everyone also knows what happens when a manager lacks principles, willpower or morality.... To begin with, discipline worsens immediately. Second, disputes break out and each subdivision withdraws within itself. Creativity disappears. It is everyone for himself, and working according to the principle of "one day at a time," "I have done my work the rest is of no interest." Worse than the fact that current plans are fulfilled at a high cost, concern for the future disappears and a handful of secondary problems emerge on the surface. Subordinates become indignant, and parasites and bawlers benefit from the discord and enjoy pouring oil into the fire, while the others work merely for the sake of being paid their wages. The terrible thing is that the collective does not break down but continues to work and the resulting consequences are even worse. At this point shouts, fussing, and uncertainty become the daily "standard." Moral and practical qualities no longer govern the behavior of subordinates, but rather their ability to "accept" the situation, to fit within it and to create the appearance of working. The newly hired, the young people who become members of such a collective accept everything on faith and are raised in that spirit. Something else is terrible as well, the fact that such managers will not support, demand or prove something they know is right, when facing superior authorities. Instead, they will adopt a policy of conciliation. It is thus that an entire chain of shortfalls and distortions of material and moral values is forged. What worries us is that today such examples have multiplied like mushrooms. Where did the seeds come from? It is our

economic management system that created this style of work. Was this an oversight or a deliberate act? The conclusion is that this was a deliberate process. It is more convenient, and it is thus that one cannot get down to the roots or to the rusty links in the chain.

What matters even more is not the past but the future! We must realize that one cannot be patient, trust and struggle endlessly.

Currently periodical recertifications of engineering and technical personnel and employees are taking place. Actually, this is a test of professional fitness. "Seniors" test and inspect "juniors." In the overwhelming majority of cases, this is done on a formal basis. However, should the managers wish it, this enables them to thus remove (replace) a subordinate. The manager has this opportunity, but his subordinate does not. I anticipate objections, for it is claimed that the practice of electing managers democratically exists. However, such elections are isolated instances and not a system, a pattern. But even this is not the most important thing. By no means will every thinking person agree to become a candidate for a given position if he can clearly see that there are others above him who do not accept such a system with their minds and hearts. Would he fill a vacancy clearly knowing that even if he has the wisdom of Solomon his good actions and intentions will get him nowhere? Unlikely. As to those who, nonetheless, will be elected, would they believe in success resulting from a change in their status? In isolated cases, yes. Most frequently, everything will remain as it was. A valuable initiative from below will never reach its full potential as long as it is oppressed by the spirit of the old.

Today the management system does not include a process of self-cleansing. Yet if no such process exist, in the future as well we shall not be protected from a devaluation of the individual's qualities. A person must not be kept in a leading position if he becomes useless and, sometimes, even harmful. A minister (or a manager of any rank) should most loudly announce what he is unable to accomplish and why. Thus, we would not describe any given year as "decisive," "determining" and "final" and, in the final account, end up by calmly accepting failure. Let us recall the labels which are already being tacked to perestroyka: "On the crest of the wave," "at the cutting edge," "at the divide." What do they tell us? Why, once again, is the government blocked by halfway measures?

If a critical situation develops in a production sector no one calls for a meeting; the brigade is gathered, the situation is explained, the possibilities are defined along with needs and resources and, together with those who do the work, moral and material incentives are formulated. Then the manager assumes full responsibility, makes decisions and secures the required labor organization. Usually, the people understand everything and accept. No one in that case exclaims: "The economy must be economical!" No one shouts and challenges his neighbor to work more efficiently, to the limit of his

capabilities, and to correct the situation (which, most frequently, is the result of the carelessness of a superior). It is thus that we should act, in my view, on a national scale. We would work for a couple of years, look around, draw conclusions, take steps and define the tasks for the next stage, earmarking what is necessary to this effect, what system to follow and what methods to use....

Let us imagine an ordinary situation. You go home from work and, having been unable to complete the balance sheet, you take it home, to finish the job. At the door your neighbor shouts at you that you failed to turn off the tap in the bathroom and flooded the floor below you. A window has broken in your apartment (in winter). Someone tells you on the phone that your son has broken his leg and that he was taken to a hospital from the school. The refrigerator is empty. You find in your mailbox the announcement that tomorrow a brigade of masons will come to repair your apartment, something for which you have waited a full year.... Would you, in that case, gather together your neighbors and your relatives for advice? Unlikely. And if you did, would all of them unanimously agree on what should be done and how to do it? Probably not. Meanwhile, you would lose time and your problems would worsen. If you are a sensible person, you would quickly turn off the tap in the tub, block the window and go see your son at the hospital and, on your way back, buy food and, at home, you would consider the situation and make your plans for the next day. At the next meeting of the tenants, you could discuss both your own and someone else's errors, find a way for keeping the house warm, draw up a plan for improving the yard, etc.... I am a supporter of democracy. However, I am also in favor of preserving wise and far-sighted centralism in management, in the interest of the common cause (as to the danger of a cult, in my view, today it is practically impossible).

A great deal could be said also about combining public work with our main job. Chairmen of trade union committees, party organizers, and deputies who combine professional with social work will never be able to contribute fully to either. Why do we delude ourselves? Let everyone imagine himself in the position of that person and he would be forced to admit that he would be unable to work properly by combining jobs. But what if we believe that this can be successfully accomplished as we rush along, as though by itself.... Could it be that this is being done deliberately? Could it be that people holding such positions have always been short of time to manage everything, to study everything thoroughly? It is like following an invisible guidance: becoming involved in such work but only to the extent of the possible, within set limits. You may be obeying the dictate of your conscience but without any particular interest, or with enthusiasm but without proper authority. Will this lead to real change and usefulness? Hardly. Will always and everywhere worthy people, who possess the qualities needed for a given job be elected? By no means always. Every one of us could cite examples of people who are experienced, conscientious, practical and with moral

qualities, who deserve to be nominated people's or social representative but do not agree to this, precisely because of the reasons I mentioned. In that case, a compromise solution is reached and someone else takes the position, thus filling the vacuum. Later, however, we become indignant, we demand, we file claims.... Yes, many good and positive examples may be quoted in this sense, but there are all too many halfway, compromise and conciliatory variants.

Today a tremendous number of questions have been raised in the country. It is we who must seek mutually acceptable ways of solving them. It is very important in this case to be able, through our own pain, to hear, and to see our neighbor as well. It is absolutely inadmissible, as we untangle the knot, to pull simultaneously all ends. We must find the loose end calmly, soberly and thoughtfully, and patiently unravel the problem.

Simple human happiness does not require too many things: going to work with joy and pleasure and, with the same feelings, hastening to go home. During free days, to relax with peace of mind, something which we need so badly. All of this could have long existed had we not simply spoken about the future but acted for its sake, perhaps doing little things, but doing them every day and all of us together.

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**Assessing Foreign Currency; Results of a Survey**  
905B0022G Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7,  
May 90 (signed to press 20 Apr 90) pp 44-45

[Information by V. Nefedov, chief, Statistics of the Agroindustrial Complex Administration, RSFSR State Committee for Statistics, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] Many among us, if not most, would like to know how to eliminate sooner the burdening import of food, grain above all, and why do we continue to seek ever new markets? Our country heads the list of the largest grain importers, which include Japan, China (wheat), Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. When shall we be able to surmount this trend which does not do us any honor? In this sense no positive changes were noted last year: grain imports totaled 36 million tons (1 million more than in 1988). Yet we were able to harvest (after processing) 196.4 million tons of grain (or 16.2 million tons more than in 1988).

Unquestionably, one of the most important aspects in resolving the grain problem is the greater interest of the farms in increasing output and sales of high-quality grain to the state. We need new and original incentive, for the old ones are not yielding expected results. In particular, last year the state obtained 59 million tons of grain or 27.3 million tons less than stipulated in the state orders.

As we know, an experiment has been under way since last August: kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises are allowed to sell hard (rated), and strong and most valuable strains of wheat, peas, lupine, and seeds of oleaginous crops for freely convertible currency. This is a truly extraordinary step. What are the initial results? They are quite modest: the country's farms sold 223,000 tons of wheat of strong, hard and valuable varieties (0.9 percent of the sum total of wheat purchases involving such strains); correspondingly, this amounted to 97,000 tons for the Russian Federation (0.8 percent). In the RSFSR grain was sold against foreign exchange by farms in 13 areas; Voronezh and Rostov Oblasts, and Krasnodar and Altay Krays accounted for four-fifths of these sales.

The study of public opinion and the analysis of statistical data indicated that practical workers had adopted quite a cautious attitude toward participation in this experiment, although its stipulations appeared quite tempting. According to a study conducted by the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics, 2,200 farms in nine Russian territories met the conditions for the sale of grain paid for in foreign currency. However, only 106 farms (5 percent) made use of this opportunity.

Why was this? The study of 357 farms which did not use this opportunity indicated that one of the main reasons was the low prices in foreign currency. That was the reason why in Krasnodar Kray 61 out of 72 and in Kursk Oblast 30 out of 42 surveyed farms failed to sell their grain. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes obtained approximately 50 foreign currency rubles per ton (per farm this averaged some 45,000 foreign exchange rubles). Let us point out, for the sake of comparison, that in 1987 the FRG paid its farmers \$316 and Belgium \$313 per ton, while the global prices of American wheat did not exceed \$114. Meanwhile, for the same type of grain we can pay our peasants much less than what a foreign farmer is paid.

Many of the surveyed kolkhozes and sovkhozes (57 percent) indicated that they did not sell grain for foreign exchange fearing a loss of the customary markups and countersales of needed resources. The farms obtained as much as 150 rubles per ton of hard and most valuable variety wheats. Having their own foreign currency is something new to them. They do not know how this "gold oasis" will exist in our modest environment, and the people think: better one bird in hand than two in the bush.

More than one-half of the surveyed farms do not trust the possibility of using the earned foreign exchange as they see fit. This was the reason cited by managers and specialists of 61 (out of 94) farms surveyed in Voronezh Oblast, of 16 (out of 23) in Altay Kray and 30 (out of 46) in Rostov Oblast. This is the natural reaction of people who have spent a lifetime working under conditions of strict bureaucratic administration.

Managers and specialists of 44 percent of the surveyed farms are concerned by the lack of independent foreign market outlets. By no means is everything clear: What to do with the thus earned convertible currency? What could one buy with it, and if so where? The people have become accustomed to a situation in which the farms can earn domestic currency only as allocated, in accordance with set funds and ceilings. Then, all of a sudden, they own foreign exchange.

Almost one out of three surveyed farms noted that the procedure for the handling of documents and selling grain against foreign exchange is excessively complex and it was this that, to a certain extent, made them avoid participating in the experiment. Also noted was the excessively late passing of the respective resolution: it was adopted after the grain in the southern grain-growing areas had been harvested and purchased or nearly. In the Eastern part of the country, because of the severe drought it was only a few kolkhozes and sovkhozes that had this opportunity.

As to the future likelihood, it varies: some 40 percent of the surveyed kolkhozes and sovkhozes intend, this year, to sell to the state grain for foreign exchange; at the same time, one out of two has no intention of doing so.

Such are some preliminary estimates. Naturally, this initial experience requires a more detailed study in analyzing the entire range of problems related to solving the food problem. Such studies, we believe, are all the more necessary as we convert agroindustrial production to one of the variety of forms of socialist ownership and types of economic management. We must truly secure for the farms equal economic conditions. This objectively requires the study of how to encourage the sale of high quality grain and other goods produced by lessees, cooperatives of leasing collectives and individual farms.

Let me point out, incidentally, that the creation of individual farms, as statistics indicate, is developing quite intensively, particularly in the Baltic area. At the beginning of this year, there were 3,900 such farms in Latvia, 1,200 in Lithuania and 800 in Estonia. They are appearing also in the Russian Federation and in other Union republics. For the country at large, by the end of last year nearly 5,000 kolkhozes and sovkhozes worked on the basis of leasing. In the RSFSR, in particular, leasing collectives employed more than 1.4 million people (15 percent of the average annual number of personnel in sovkhozes and kolkhozes). They had been assigned 48 million hectares of arable land, 12 million head of cattle (including some 4 million cows) and almost 9 million pigs. The share of the land cultivated by lessees was 36 percent for grain, and 27 percent for potatoes (we discussed the question of the development of leasing earlier, in KOMMUNIST No 10, 1989).

Huge food imports reflect the overall unhealthy condition of our agrarian sector and entire economy. Naturally, this hinders the process of implementing an active social policy. Two approaches exist to the solution of the

grain problem. The supporters of the first insist that grain production per capita should reach 1 ton (i.e., almost 300 million tons for the country at large). The others argue in favor of the need for a more efficient use of the grain, at which point we could do with our present resources. Quite convincing arguments support this idea. Thus, the EEC countries, which use for food and fodder about 500 kilograms of grain per capita, as we know, feed themselves quite well and are able to export a great deal of livestock products. In our country, including imports, we use on a per capita basis approximately as much grain as the United States (about 850 kilograms), although the yields are quite different.

In my view, it is important to combine in practical activities both approaches, paying particular attention to providing economic instruments and incentives. It is only under such circumstances that we shall once and for all stop the huge losses. I repeat something which is quite well-known: every year we lose as much as 30 million tons of grain, almost as much as we are forced to import and it is approximately the same volume of concentrate that is overspent because of imbalance. That is why, in our view, the closest possible attention should be paid to anything related to the development of forms of incentive of agricultural production and, particularly, to developing a mechanism for purchasing the grain from our farmers.

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## STATE AND SOCIETY

### Criteria of Social Progress

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[Article by V. Shelike, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] Where were we going in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s? Were we going forward or backward? What direction are we following now?

In order to answer these pressing problems it is insufficient to burn with righteous anger at the illegalities which were committed or read tea leaves as to "what will happen to us in the future?" It is insufficient to ask oneself and others whether the road leads to the temple. We must also have reliable criteria in answering the question of what was the reason for the bad features in our past and present and how to surmount them.

How to define these criteria which are also a measure of the social progress of mankind? What are the nature and specific manifestations of progress today?

Naturally, these questions are not new; answers to them are already being provided by scientists and political journalists. However, these answers lead us in such different and even opposite directions as to make us recall the fable of the swan, the crab and the sturgeon.

Whenever the custom of social scientists to address themselves exclusively to individual curtailed aspects of progress becomes widespread, it is easy to fall into one-sidedness or, worse, mistake regress for progress. The widespread concept of criteria, let us say, as being the development of production forces (conceived in strictly technical terms) frequently triggers among university students monstrous questions about the alleged progressiveness of Adolf Hitler who built superhighways, developed German industry and stimulated the chemical industry and, in general, converted to planned economic control. The senior generation could only clutch its head while the young kept asking: Did he or did he not develop production forces?

Have all that infrequently our social scientists presented precisely the development of production forces as a criterion of human progress? They thoroughly forgot about man, about all of us, as the target of historical development.

Setting this difficult problem aside, as having been resolved a long time ago by Marx and Engels, it is important to emphasize something else: the criteria of social progress require an overall substantiation on the basis of which mankind's history started. Without finding such a systemic beginning any view concerning progress or regress will be unable to contribute to the solution of this general problem. However, if no doubts exist concerning the initial "cell" of the political economy of the capitalist production method, for it was unequivocally identified by Marx in "*Das Kapital*" as a whole, philosophers and historians are not clear as to when did the materialistic theory of history as a whole originate.

During a period in which firm concepts are collapsing and values are being reconsidered, merely turning to the authorities of the past, in the secret hope of finding an understanding related to our present problems seems a hopeless undertaking. Frontal attacks against the pillars of socioscientific thinking appear more promising. In journal publications, Marx is increasingly becoming the target of harsh criticism as the prime source of our ideological mistakes and difficulties. There is probably nothing prejudicial in this, for it gives birth to a sense of civic freedom and intellectual emancipation, which we need so greatly. To many this is simply a necessary stage and a prerequisite for future successes in the independent work of the mind. However, we must not fail to notice that the weapons are fired through the sights of the simplified, the vulgarized theory of historical materialism, structured in accordance with the "*Short Course*," which led society into the mire of material and spiritual crisis. The "theory which captured the masses" was simple and boring and explained little of what was taking place in reality. However, Stalin is still "with us," when Marx is presented as both a great and a petty utopian, as the father of a wrong model because of which, 100 years later, innocent people died in Stalinist jails.

All it takes, however, is to address ourselves to Marx himself who, in the 1840s, faced the most pressing problem of determining where, actually, was mankind going. Let us consider the methodological foundation with which this question was solved by Marx and Engels within the historical reality of their time, and is their answer universal, i.e., is it suited to our present.

Let us remember that in the mid-19th century the progressive people were aware of a coming global revolution which, they believed, would resolve the crisis of civilization. Marx and Engels prepared themselves for purposeful participation in the future historical change and that was precisely the reason for which they made the effort to discover the real laws governing the development of mankind so that, while fighting for progress in ideas, the opposite would not actually happen, as had always been the case in history long before Marx. In other words, at that time Marx and Engels faced the same eternal questions of history which we face today. In order to answer them, they had to establish the **beginning**, thus securing the integral and universal validity of their conclusions.

What did Marx begin with? Out of the entire variety of **relations**, which guided the people and determined their existence, Marx singled out the **attitude of the individual** (of humanity) toward the world ("1844 Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts"). This attitude marks the **beginning** of history on the most abstract level of its manifestation. At the same time, it was so simple, understandable and appearing an infinite number of times in a variety of historical aspects that it could be understood by people with most ordinary minds. In other words, it needed no proof, which is what is necessary in **initiating** a study.

The attitude of man (mankind) toward the world is what we must begin with in determining the criteria of social progress. Let us immediately note that the interrelationship between the world and man is today the most common of all problems of this integral world, torn by contradictions. Therefore, this attitude, however abstract it may seem, immediately acquires an entirely specific content.

What is most interesting to us, however, is what Marx and Engels singled out: in all stages of its development, interacting with nature and with itself, mankind created both **human** as well as **inhuman** relations. One way or another, the people always realized this, for which reason they set themselves the task of eliminating inhumanity from their lives, understanding it, naturally, differently at different times and by the different social strata. The essence, nonetheless, remained the same: life became dehumanized when it conflicted with the natural and social **existence and development** of man (of mankind), i.e., when it was no longer in harmony with the environment and nature of man as part of this environment.

In this key, social progress initially appears as the actual reality of real people in real living conditions, aimed at

surmounting a dehumanized attitude of people toward nature and toward their likes. Such a humanistic definition of social progress is essentially quite profound philosophically and makes it possible to give it higher new and more specific definitions.

It would be useful to recall, in the same spirit, that Marx also provided the initial definition of social revolution as a protest against dehumanized life (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 1, p 447).

In the mass awareness, the meaning of it exists as the unwillingness to live in an inhuman way, as the desire for a worthy life in human society and the preservation of nature.

At the same time, as they moved from one stage of development to another, invariably the people discovered that dehumanized relations were constantly "self-reborn" in a new form, along with the development of the new, the human relations. The fact that today mankind is on the brink of self-destruction, along with nature, clearly confirms this fact. This situation is not limited by any kind of national, governmental or "socio-systemic" boundary. No one is excluded from ecological problems. A crisis of morality may be found, to one extent or another, everywhere. There are despots and informers, there are hacks and bribers. Today not only the press but also the broad masses try soberly to assess the problems of society and keep their eyes open to the dehumanized aspects of our life. Hence one of the formulations of the basic tasks of perestroika, provided as early as the February 1988 Central Committee Plenum: "Cleanse from all that is inhuman" the ideals and realities of socialism. This is a manifestation of the social progress made by our society in the period of perestroika.

However, the following question is legitimate if today as well we are unable to avoid the "self-revival" of dehumanized relations toward nature and toward ourselves: Is this not the curse of mankind, in which "any progress means also relative regress, and when the well-being and development of some takes place at the cost of the suffering and suppression of others?" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 21, pp 68-69).

In our recent past, such a formulation of the question may have seemed unexpected and unusual. Today, however, our society is seeking precisely the reason of this tragic social progress made between the 1930s and the 1950s. Without eliminating not only the political (administrative-command forms of management of society and, as a result, mass repressions), but also the socioeconomic reasons, which create and support precisely such a style of political management, we would be unable to eliminate the material foundations for converting people into cogs, into mechanically subservient executors of someone else's will, initiative-lacking pseudoworkers, who avoid labor as much as possible,

and thoughtless poisoners of the atmosphere, the fields and the forests and, actually, also people with their progeny.

Does Marx say anything on this account? He does and not casually in the least. The classics not only noted but also analyzed the sources of the constant revival and confrontation between the human and the dehumanized aspects of life. Are their solutions suitable for us, the people of the end of the 20th century?

To answer this, we must study Marx not as he is presented to us in school, reducing us to the level of seminarians, and totally simplified. The difficult legacy of Stalinism includes not only the deprivation of several generations of our compatriots of the philosophical legacy of Solovyev or Berdyayev, but also indirectly separating us from philosophy. The present generation is convinced that Marx did not care about the individual, that he dealt only in terms of classes, worshiping violence and, in general, that he is to be blamed for our difficulties. It is convinced of this without having read or studied Marx. Although slandered and debased by dogmatists and ignoramuses, nonetheless Marx remains our contemporary, more so than we may suspect.

Where did Marx and Engels see the sources of the dehumanizing of life, i.e., the reasons for that which, once again, is torturing our contemporaries as well? Was it in the obsolete forms of ownership? Yes, in them as well, but not as the prime reason, for they saw the reason for that reason as well. They went deeper into the anatomy of the civil society and to them private ownership was itself the consequence of other relations, without the transformation of which people were doomed to repeat the vicious cycle.

The elimination of private ownership and exploitation of man by man, which any first grade student considers the main task of the socialist revolution, was considered by Marx only as the start of the movement, which did not cover in the least the main objective of the revolution. As early as 1844, he perspicuously noted that the movement "through the denial of private ownership..." which begins with private ownership, does not as yet lead to the objective, for in fact even then the "alienation of human life remains and even turns out to be greater the more it is realized as being an alienation..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 42, pp 135-136). Does this not also pertain to an entire stage in the history of our country, which has resulted in today's disappointment? Even then Marx had already written, concluding from the words we quoted, that the movement toward communism (in the 1840s he did not consider socialism a separate stage) "will make its way through a rather difficult and lengthy process" (ibid., p 136).

Why, nonetheless, did he consider that a revolution cannot be reduced to the elimination of private ownership? Because private ownership itself is the consequence of the alienated nature of labor. Throughout the ages, progress advanced through an increase in the division of

labor and the assertion of the domination of the commodity-monetary exchange of the products of the divided labor. Increasingly assuming a social nature, when no one in society can claim that "I alone produced this," while retaining its burdensome and unbearable nature for the individual, in the case of a significant mass of working people it is not the source of their individual development. Meanwhile, in order to preserve an individual existence under the conditions of the prevalence of commodity-monetary relations, it is precisely money that everyone needs. Money provides a means of subsistence, respect of others, power, possibilities of acquiring the best possible education, traveling around the world, and so on. Under those circumstances, dehumanization is based on labor toward which man is either indifferent or else which he avoids as the plague (op. cit., vol 42, p 91); on the alienation of the working people from the labor conditions and products which, on the basis of private ownership, belong to the nonworking people (and, through money, ensure the latter's existence and development); on the alienated working person from society which develops at the expense of the individual; on the alienation of man in the process of communication (by virtue of replacing the interest in the individual with interest in his money, profit, usefulness, and the conversion of the individual from target into means); on the alienation of the working people from the management of society through their alienation from the state (the people are divided into managing and managed); and, finally, on the alienation of the working person from spiritual life (by virtue, for example, of the lack of leisure time or because of the noncreative nature of one type or another of socially necessary labor, and so on).

Naturally, the specific manifestation of alienated labor in the capitalist society of the mid-19th century was different from that of society at the end of the 20th. I believe, however, that that was not the reason for which our social science writers for a long time failed to notice this foundation of Marx's economic, social and political theory, until we directly faced a situation in which some people prefer to idle at their jobs while others choose a life style based on unearned income, bribery, extortion or direct plunder and murder. The point here is that to many people the pleasure and enjoyment of life are still found outside the labor sphere. Many people work for the sake of money, in order to secure their subsistence and development and to enjoy life outside and after work. To blame them for this is senseless, for the labor process itself, although it ensures subsistence through wages, does not develop man. Furthermore, it deprives him of the physical and spiritual forces needed for his development. This is, precisely, one of the features of the alienated nature of labor. We must also speak of the alienation of the worker and peasant from the products of his toil, for over a long period of time the kolkhoz member did not earn anything per labor day although he produced a socially necessary product, while the worker, to this day, as a rule cannot make direct use of his labor even through the company store and finds the necessary products ever less frequently in the state trade system.

The preservation of the alienated nature of labor in the presence of commodity-monetary forms of exchange is, precisely, one of the most essential material sources for the self-revival of private ownership relations: whether secretly, in the black market economy, or absolutely openly, in the state area, through the corrupt part of officialdom. The control over labor conditions, such as funds and the right to allocate them, and so on, is an objective prerequisite for bribery and extortion. What is this if not living at the expense of the work of someone else, i.e., most basic exploitation, founded on converting state into private property? It no longer depends on the Supreme Soviet whether to accept it or not, for it already exists, it has existed for some time in our own socialist society. That is clear if we look the truth in the eye, armed with theoretical knowledge.

Neither an administrative-command decree nor simply a democratic change in contemporary forms of ownership could eliminate the alienation of labor. It is equally impossible to eliminate the entire system of commodity-monetary exchange, as confirmed by our more than 70-year old history. As long as objectively uninteresting work exists in society there will also be people whose subjective interests find it profitable to engage in trafficking in currency or in prostitution. Efforts to re-educate people who have rejected labor by putting them in colonies and jails with most difficult and unprestigious labor can only yield the opposite results.

Eliminating the alienated nature of labor is also the main way for surmounting the dehumanizing of life and, therefore, an essential criterion of social progress in the contemporary world. Any movement along this progressive trend requires time, the creation and application of new production forces which could liberate man from a type of labor which does not develop him physically or spiritually and which requires purposeful transition to human forms of communication within labor collectives in order psychologically not to deprive the working person of the wish to invest his work in the job. We need a new organization of labor and many other things. In other words, we need an entire system of measures, not only in changing the forms of ownership but also in surmounting all aspects of the alienated nature of labor. Here as well we must be able to tap the processes which are already taking place or are becoming apparent within civil society in the search for a humane life. I am certain that one of the reasons for the wave of strikes is the spontaneous or else conscious aspiration for an equal elimination in all working people of the alienated nature of labor (unlike equal liberation from exploitation and equal attitude toward public ownership, which was the task of the previous stage of the revolution), and not simply "envying" the high earnings outside the state sector.

Through an entire chain of causalities the alienated nature of labor must be linked to the possibility and danger of the appearance of despotic forms of rule at the initial stage of the movement toward the society of the future, until that society has been truly established. In

any case, Marx could already sense this connection when he described the communist trends of his time, which we shall discuss later. I believe that one of the origins of Stalinism was the objective contradiction between the initial expectation of the working people of rapidly eliminating the alienated nature of labor and the fact that it was not eliminated in real life in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Labor enthusiasm for the sake of a shining future, which was becoming increasingly distant, could not last eternally. On the other hand, labor which faced man as an external necessity, demanded the existence within society of coercion mechanisms. Under capitalism, this function is performed by economic coercion. By resorting to noneconomic coercion, Stalin not only did not eliminate alienation but intensified and broadened it even further. The paradox is that in the case of people who are engaged in performing difficult work life seems easier when they are forced "to deal with something they do not like" than if they do this on their own good will by virtue, for example, of social need. Hence the yearning expressed by some working people for the "good Stalinist times," when there was discipline and, in general, "there was order." The dehumanized nature of life, accepted in this case as a given, triggers no protest. This, precisely, is stagnation.

The fact that alienated labor has remained to this day could be, furthermore, considered as one of the sources for the decline of the prestige of labor and a working way of life among part of the growing generation. This generation is more literate and more developed than its grandfathers; it has the possibility of existing at the expense of the labor of its parents for a much longer time than its predecessors; at school it acquires labor habits which are by no means related to the most interesting and developing production sectors which simply do not exist in the countryside or in the small towns. A certain segment of this youth "protests" against the dehumanization of its life through increased criminality, rackets and other types of criminal behavior. Incidentally, matters were no different in the mid-19th century, when crimes committed by the young against the rich increased. An increased negative attitude toward labor is another source of stagnation.

We, who experienced Stalinism, and whose thoughts are entirely opposed to any repetition of the horrors of this form of rule, naturally, do not find it any easier as a result of the fact that as early as 1844 Marx had predicted the appearance of a despotic form of rule in the political movement toward a bright future. However, this phenomenon and where it operated is worth discussing in greater detail, for it gives food for thought concerning the present ways of social progress.

In his "*1844 Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*," Marx analyzed the ideological trends within the communism of his own days and, on their basis, derived three forms of movement. The first is that of egalitarian communism, triggered by envy. In this case a "direct physical possession appears as the only purpose of life and existence; the **worker** category is not eliminated but

is extended to all people; the attitude toward private ownership remains an attitude on the part of the entire society toward the world of objects; finally, it is a movement which tries to pit private ownership against a universal private ownership..." (op. cit., vol 42, p 114). Crude communism totally rejects the individuality of man, ignoring talent and, as the ultimate envy, proceeds from concepts of a certain minimum, "from the return to an **unnatural...** simplicity of the **poor**, coarse person without needs, who not only does not rise above the level of private ownership but has not even attained it" (ibid., p 115). It is easy to detect behind this description some features of our 1930s. However, the ideas of crude, egalitarian barracks communism are widespread to this day in a great variety of social strata. For example, they live in the flow of letters demanding that everyone receive the same amount of pension ("it is our subsistence!"), and the postulate according to which "to be talented is immodest," and the heartbreaking envy of acquaintances who may own a leather jacket, a video recorder or anything else, whether material or spiritual. To this day, the senior generation of Soviet people frequently recalls with satisfaction the 1930s and 1940s, "times during which everyone was equally poor and no one particularly stood out." The lack of material wealth has been preserved in the mind as an embodiment of the principles of social justice which were applied in the case of the majority of people. I believe that this concept of socialism was widespread in the 1930s and was one of the sources for the mass enthusiasm of the young who were building a new society. Let us not forget that the idea of egalitarianism has been the age-old dream of the oppressed part of mankind and that to blame people for nurturing such illusions is futile, for in their case this is backed by the idea of ensuring living conditions on earth, a guarantee for their existence but not... for their development. The people are as yet to realize the full extent of the dead-end to which this trend leads. These concepts were made even more impressive by the "personal modesty of the leader," which was a legend skillfully fabricated for the people and which concealed crimes. The idea of an egalitarian barracks communism achieved through bloodshedding methods has been embodied in China during the "cultural revolution" period, in Cambodia, in Romania, etc.

"Therefore," Marx concludes, "the first positive elimination of private property, **crude communism**, is merely a **form of manifestation** of the baseness of private ownership...." Naturally, such a line of social progress cannot fail to trigger a dehumanized attitude toward the surrounding world.

The second form of movement toward a better future is characterized by Marx as communism "of a political nature, democratic or despotic; ...it is still under the influence of private ownership, i.e., the alienation of man" (ibid., p 116). In both democratic and a despotic variant of communism, at this stage, "it already conceives of itself... as the elimination of human self-alienation; however, since it is... unable to master the

**human** nature of need, it too is trapped by private ownership and contaminated by it," Marx notes again.

Alas, at this point Marx stops his definition of communism as a political movement. However, it is easy to see behind his brief descriptions his line of thought about the two forms of the political stage of the movement toward communism: the democratic and the despotic. Both political forms, despite all their differences, are similar in the fact that in their case the conditions for the revival of private ownership have still not been eliminated, for the alienated nature of labor, the alienation of man from man, i.e., the dehumanizing of their lives, have still not been eliminated. Furthermore, the needs of the people themselves are, to a certain extent, also dehumanized, although they encompass truly human varieties. Their conflict takes place within and outside people, individuals and society. By virtue of this fact, the people remain trapped by the idea of private ownership in conceiving of their needs and obligations toward society and individuals. This stage as well is an immature, unreal communism, many of the features of which characterize the present status of society.

Under contemporary conditions, the democratization of Soviet society, when the movement toward the "kingdom of freedom" cannot avoid a political nature (although not exclusively political!), we need a sober vision and a public discussion of all problems and trends as well as the real deadlines for the elimination of all aspects of alienated labor. Otherwise new illusions would become an inevitable source of new disappointments and, consequently, an expected rule by an authoritarian leader of which miracles would be expected while some people will avoid labor and others will show an aspiration to live on unearned income. This is not only an impasse but, worse, a regressive movement.

According to Marx, the third form of progress toward the society of the future is the truly "**positive elimination of private ownership, this self-alienation of man;**" it is the "**real appropriation of the human** nature of man and for the sake of man" (op. cit., vol 42, p 116). Mankind is as yet to reach the type of human society which will eliminate the alienated nature of labor. However, it is important to understand whether there has already been in reality—in the past and the present, although not as yet triumphant—such a line of progress as well. In any case, the classics sought its manifestations in the first associations of communist artisans, which discovered new human forms of communication, and in the organizations belonging to the First International, i.e., not only in an idea but in reality as well. Also today, in the course of perestroika, it is obviously important not to omit anything which already yesterday as well as today, albeit timidly or insufficiently clearly shaped, but nonetheless realistic and permanent exists in life as a deliberate elimination of the self-alienation of man and, despite the distorted forms of power, had existed even during our most difficult periods, nurturing the faith, hope and enthusiasm of the masses.

Since the idea that the communist production method cannot be born within a bourgeois society for, it is claimed, it obeys other laws of historical development compared to all previous history, has never been accepted by Marx and, furthermore, since it contradicts his concept of materialistic understanding of history, it is important for us not to ignore but comprehensively to nurture and support this universal human line of social progress which leads to a humane attitude of individuals toward nature and of people to people.

An unprejudiced view of today's world would reveal in a great many countries a type of human life based on humane relations. It is to this type of life that the future belongs.

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**'Thinking of Joint Work,' a British Politician's Letter**

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[Letter by Lord Wayland Kenneth, member of the Social Democratic Party of Great Britain]

[Text] To the editor: Dear sir, I hope that this letter will mark the continuation of an exceptionally interesting talk which took place last February in London in the course of the meeting between people's deputies of the Soviet Union and members of the British Parliament. More specifically, I would like to share with you some ideas which came to me later, as a result of its interpretation.

To us the Soviet Union means Russia, so that, obviously, we look at the non-Russian republics as being Russian. Russian culture is part of European culture, the culture of the European home, to use Gorbachev's famous formula. Few people in our country are directly familiar with Latvian or Uzbek culture. Unquestionably, this is partially due to the fact that Russian culture imbued half of all the lesser cultures surrounding it, as well as the fact that Russian culture, its literature, music and dance in particular, is so great and so enchanting that it seems as though we simply have no time to go beyond it (but then we are equally unaware of Hungarian or Portuguese culture). My mother was aware of the nature of literature and even the way of life triggered by Russian literature of the end of the 19th century and saw to it that I as well became exposed to it.

Ever since the war, which we waged together (it seems to me sometimes that all my friends were drowned in the convoys to Russia, but I am exaggerating) and ever since the Berlin crisis, which closed the door tightly, I have dreamed of Russian culture returning to the European home. Why is it that, when we were young, we did not share it the way we shared French, German, Italian and other European cultures as we traveled throughout the continent, seeing town and country, armed with a

grammar book, a dictionary and a passport, without permission, without the fear that people talking to us would find themselves in trouble? I began to learn Russian during those very hopeful days of the war but had never the opportunity to use it. In your case, this was Stalinism and we knew what this meant. It made us sad: Stalinism separated you from us, and yet you were part of our European heritage. However, this sadness will soon disappear. Your visit to London somewhat reminded us of someone returning home. This may be too strong an expression. Let us describe it otherwise: a family reunion. We listened to the live speech of highly placed and intelligent Russians who discussed what should be done to save the world, a variety of speeches which we welcomed in the works of your great novelists and playwrights, those same speeches which, throughout my entire life, were no more than suppressed whispers.

I am a social democrat or, if you wish, a democratic socialist. In England this means that I am a democrat. Naturally, to one extent or another, all of us are democrats. This is not all that interesting. What is interesting is something else: the type of democrats that we are. Our party consists of democrats of a social variety. We are democrats because we accept and work for the sake of a broad system of a multiparty parliamentary democracy. Within such a framework we built or else chose a specific party and a social variety of the same party. We are democrats above all for the sake of keeping the state within a specific framework and, secondly, we are social democrats, for it is within such a framework that we contribute to the social responsibility and the good of society as a whole. The purpose was not to gain advantages for any given public sector but to have the entire society benefit. Are there limits to what we could do to attain this objective? Yes, the limits are determined by the multiparty nature of elections; democracy itself sets these limits. If the majority of voters in our society decides that we are not doing enough for their common good they will not vote for us and, since we are democratic socialists and not bureaucratic, centralist, revolutionary or anarchic socialists, we shall quietly remove ourselves.

That is what social democracy or democratic socialism means for us in Britain, Germany, Sweden and the majority of other Western European countries. Our historical connection with the Russian Social Democrats until 1914, the German Social Democratic Party until 1933, and all other parties is familiar to anyone who knows the history of Europe; in Britain, however, today such people are not numerous. For that reason, it seems to me that few people have realized the depth of the statement recently made prior to your arrival, by a well-known Soviet guest, when he said that we in England should not be mistaken by thinking that you are either removing or rejecting Marxism-Leninism; conversely, you are trying to take it back to what it always was: a democratic socialism. The audience was startled. Yes, he repeated: a democratic socialism oriented toward the market.

Although our democracy is broad, it is not without faults and even its greatest supporters would not wish you to duplicate it mindlessly. In terms of elections, the German system is more refined. The main fault of our system is that it rests on the principle of a balanced vote. Our system, which favors "the first person who makes the grade," was accepted by all the European democracies, which appeared one after another in the 19th century; by 1920, however, all of them had abandoned it in favor of other systems which led to a parliamentary representation which was more or less consistent with the number of cast ballots. It was only Britain, which had invented that system, which did not change.

The difference can be determined by looking at the correlation between the number of votes required for sending to parliament representatives of a party which is most favored by the electoral law and a representative of even the least favored party. In most multiparty democracies, this ratio ranges between 1:1 and 1:1.5. This fits even the United States, which also supports the "first who makes the grade" system. The reason is that that country has two parties and, by virtue of this, the electoral law does not distort the representation system. In France the situation is somewhat worse: 1:2; in Canada it is even worse, 1:3. In Britain, however, the correlation is 1:9. Therefore, if you look at a member of parliament belonging to the least favored party, which, precisely, happens to be the Social Democratic Party, you will see a person behind whom stand nine times more voters than a member of the Conservative or Labour Party. Our electoral law is the greatest fault in our political system which, not without a reason, is described as the "electoral dictatorship;" the present prime minister has been elected by an increasingly reduced electoral minority.

In your country, however, with your new revolution, there are invaluable advantages benefiting all revolutionaries: you are not chained to anything. You could pass any electoral law you may deem suitable. Unless you want a two-party system, you may choose a system of proportional representation. Should you choose the system of giving preference to the first-come, the person who has "made the grade," or something similar, and find that you have more than two parties, your democracy will suffer and you will start complaining. Let it me add, furthermore, that it seems unlikely that you will limit yourselves to two parties only!

The way of separating the power of a party from the structure of a state and its torments, naturally, is at the very sources of democracy. Regretfully, we cannot directly help you in the search of an ideal presidential form of government, for obvious reasons. However, from where we stand, we can clearly see several models; it looks as though a strong presidency of the U.S. or French variety is of great interest to you, compared to the presidential system adopted by Germany and Italy. The United States has the oldest acting constitution in the world, for which reason it is not surprising that for quite some time it has been creaking. The United States

greatly suffers from the fact that its secretaries of state, defense, treasury and others are not members of congress; they do not have to go to the congress on a daily basis and have to answer on the spot the profound questions of their colleagues who are or should be their equals. The United States is also hurt by the ancillary effects of a totally unrestrained confrontation between democrats and republicans during the period of presidential elections. To begin with, the election of a president is limited to a circle of multimillionaires. Naturally, in your country as well, they will eventually appear. They may not be eliminated in a multiparty democracy. However, it is very important for the presidency to be open to the remaining population as well. Second, the American president, as he assumes his duties, uses his status and can bring with him an entire staff of all kinds of inexperienced and stupid individuals, and even people with a tarnished reputation, chosen both among highly placed circles as well as among "simple people." Other countries in the rest of the world have already had to tolerate such people as ambassadors appointed to their countries. The United States itself suffers from this, for such envoys are not only unable to submit to Washington highly skilled reports, but by their very existence block the way to capable young people, who are prepared to serve society. A new multiparty democracy, which would like to establish good relations with the rest of the world should pay particular attention to this fact. For all of these reasons the French model seems to be entirely worthy of attention.

As to economic policy, a major reason exists for learning from our negative experience. Outside the Soviet Union, no one has had cause to be so horrified by shortcomings in the command system as has our own prime minister. In formulating a policy, she looked in the right direction: our system was severely short of any market discipline. However, if during your visit you would have taken a walk at night, you would have seen people sleeping on sidewalks and in doorways in numbers which were quite new to London. An increasing number among them are adolescents. Some of these people are drug addicts, and many have been released from mental hospitals "in the care of society," i.e., with actually no supervision. Others have simply been unlucky in their profession, and are looking for jobs. They are at the very brink of the precipice of a market economy in which state intervention is considered radically faulty. The history of the use and trafficking in drugs and the problem of violence in the United States, after 10 years of republican administration, may seem different but the morality is the same.

Even the "simple people," particularly in our cities, suffer from the consequences of the elimination of the town self-governments and, subsequently, banning control over construction and transportation. The opening of new jobs for office employees in our urban centers was previously controlled in order to avoid a faster increase in the number of such positions compared with mass transport possibilities. All of this belongs to the past. The number of passengers taking the London subway has

doubled compared to a decade ago. Meanwhile, the government is increasing its pressure with a view to reducing state subsidies to financing and servicing the rolling stock. Most such lines were built in the 1900-1925 period and taking the subway becomes a daily horrible and even terrorizing tribulation for millions of Londoners. They are forced to take the subway, for even if they have their own cars—and the majority of them do—they are unable to park downtown. Buses (which charge more in our country) have already been prepared for "privatization" (sale to private companies). This means shortening the lines by one-half in terms of distance, so that the passengers would have to change and thus pay for a second ticket. The breakdown of our system of state hospitals, I believe, is known throughout Europe. Yet how proud we were of our national health system when it was introduced in 1949. These are only examples of the trend of withdrawal from social responsibility in favor of a near-sighted pursuit of private well-being, while our petroleum is being exhausted and inflation is coming back.

We know now what life is like with an increasingly pure market economy. Actually, it is quite good for professional capital investors and a variety of market dealers. It is impeccable for high-level managers, lawyers and bank personnel and not bad for skilled personnel. However, it is quite bad for the unskilled, and increasingly disgusting in the case of teachers, professors and scientists on all levels (for which reason they emigrate); it is particularly horrible for the old, the sick and the single mothers. A market economy is also a dirty economy, for the "market" does not know how to adapt its economic values to the environment, and those who have paid for various "extra expenditures" are still able to pass them along to all of us, or else to future generations.

But let us stop moaning. What will you do? If you convert from the environmental pollution of a stammering command economy directly to the competitive pursuit of the ruble, you would make yet a new contribution to the future difficulties of mankind. Do not jump into our cesspools. If you were to shift from the extremes of a public ownership and a command economy to its opposites, you would become the antithesis of communism and would lose the opportunity to become a synthesis of communism and a free enterprise market. With such a Hegelian-Marxist role of synthesis, you would be able to amaze the world yet once again, a world which has by now become entirely different. Let us believe that it is precisely you who will put the final touches on the painting of the history of the 20th century and, having accomplished this, the Russian people will finally be able to pursue its true destiny.

However, you could build the type of society which you wanted and, whatever its nature, we would have a reason to be stunned. With gaping mouths we would be looking at the way you are juggling with hand grenades. What will the new Union look like? Our empire was not like the Russian Empire. At first the difference was small: simply, you walked while we sailed. You established

your rule over the Pacific Coast, over that which is now known as the RSFSR, while we were asserting our own on what is today the Atlantic Seaboard of the United States. You reached the Black Sea while we were establishing our rule in India. It is there that the similarity ended. We were restrained in the American part of our empire by one aspect of our own civilization, democracy, as well as the growing sizes of our settlements. We left India before we could be expelled, for it did not include British settlers but only administrators, teachers and technical personnel. In your country, for centuries, there have been Russian settlers everywhere. If any Western country had experience in decolonizing which could be equated to your own hand grenade, it was France; 17 percent of the Algerian population consisted of French settlers.

As members of NATO, we have become so steeped in the idea of the "Soviet threat," that we have long been seeking a substitute. The idea that we may not find it and that we could do without the nuclear umbrella is slow to come to us. In my view, the main threat to NATO, which is a purely military pact, would be the disappearance, whether fast or slow, of the Warsaw Pact: in other words, this is by no means a threat but a new situation which some of us find difficult to realize. We keep listening to all the encouraging suggestions which arise in a new atmosphere, which is like childhood: What to do with Unified Germany, the Western half of which is in NATO and the Eastern in the Warsaw Pact? What will happen to NATO and its joint committees covering all military contingencies, when, under its shadow, both Western and Eastern Europe start coming together? Oh yes... during dark cold evenings I cheer myself up with the idea of the joint intelligence committee. "So, gentlemen, our agenda is nearing its end. Should we start getting ready for something else?" The majority of us would decisively object to instilling in the minds an anti-Chinese "crusade" as, I believe, would you. China will cope with its own situation. We have enough concerns in settling our own continent and the globe without starting new quarrels which would require a mass of money and inventiveness.

Whatever may happen in the Soviet Union, Western Europe intends to remain Western Europe and not abandon the degree of economic harmony which has been reached within the European community. East Germany has long maintained special economic relations with the community. We could slow down its future economic development waiting to see what will happen with Eastern Europe, and we should avoid anything which could hinder your coming home. This would strain our natural patience and pride in our "successful" economies and is a burden on those who made this success possible.

Would you like to join us? To whom are we addressing this question? Will you be a federal state? (We listen to Mr. Gorbachev when he says that as yet you have not had a federation.) Or will this be a loose confederation of republics under Moscow's residual guardianship, with

the old population of the republics under the residual guardianship of Russians living in them? What could one say about a huge Switzerland, a variety of federation, in which no one knows the name of the president and everyone manages to remain neutral among all the alliances? (Without having the silent Swiss banks.) Or else will internal relations be more like those which existed between the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s? Will this be a multilateral association of equal citizens pursuing its foreign policy along a coordinated line? What kind of line will that be? Will this be yet another addition to the numerous members of the United Nations, who look in different directions as they develop lines of interaction among forces rallying around local national antagonisms? Perhaps this too would not be bad: at least they would have the freedom to do what they want, without any traps or cold war blackmail as it exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Or, perhaps, this could be bad; mankind has not grown up sufficiently to be protected from any other cold war variety, this time waged among economic rather than military superpowers.

We know that you are no better informed than we are. The majority among us, however, believe that you acted correctly by holding on to the Helsinki process for the sake of stability and order, both short and long-term. We simply wish for the building of the European home to become more tangible, stronger in its foundations. We also believe that you are right in your efforts to combine an impeccable balance with the speed which you obviously need in the area of disarmament. Most of us also welcome Mikhail Gorbachev's words to the effect that the reunification of Germany is not being questioned. The Germans need self-determination as much as any other nation. Furthermore, it has now become obvious that if German reunification fails, such a country, plunged into chaos, could become more dangerous to Europe than the additional economic strength it would gain from reunification. If we block this, actually, as Henry Kissinger said, we would create a German problem in order to have to solve it.

How will you be able not to drop any one of those hand grenades? It is impossible to avoid the difficulty of resolving the developing situation. The withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam and your withdrawal from Afghanistan have already taken place. Our withdrawal from the empire is a thing of the past. He who decisively, without claims or justifications, does what is inevitable, neutralizes most of the political poison. To preach is easy, and this is a fact. Had we been a Christian country we would have prayed for you. At the present time, however, we are probably less Christian than you.

All of this was discussed in the course of our meeting, and we must now think of working together. As a guide in such efforts I would happily take the words in the report submitted at your 27th Party Congress: "The course of the history of social progress demand with increasing urgency the organization of a constructive and

creative interaction among the countries and nations on a global scale.... Such interaction is needed in order to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and for civilization to survive.... Combined with competition, the confrontation between the two systems and the growing trend toward interdependence among countries within the global community are the real dialectics of contemporary development. It is precisely thus, through the struggle of opposites, with difficulty and, to a certain extent, by feeling our way, that a conflicting but largely interdependent integral world is taking shape."

It would be better for parliamentarians of both countries jointly to start doing what we did separately: talk (although we describe this as "talks" while you call it "consultations." In the sessions of precommunist parliaments in Russia, the various dumas, this was known as "thinking." Personally, I like all three variants). Last February we met in London under the aegis of the Interparliamentary Union. At all times the members of this blessed universal organization have stood above the cold war and even during the worst times it was one of the main nongovernmental channels for contacts among opponents throughout the world. This is a place to start. There also are various academic groups, roundtables and the likes, as well as friendship societies. These, however, are different starting points.

Do you not think of the need for an Anglo-Soviet "Koenigswinter?" When this word is mentioned in England (it is a village on the Rhine River), the members of parliament take their seats and start making notes. Although we have organized interparliamentary connections with the majority of countries in the world, the "Koenigswinter" British-German bilateral group has remained somewhat different. It was created as a result of the urgent need for reciprocal understanding, in 1945, and has never looked back. This is not an exclusively parliamentary group. It includes scientists, journalists, a few bankers and industrialists. What is even more important is that throughout its existence, in the time between meetings, there has always been on either side someone who was perfectly familiar with both countries and was ready to promote ever new meetings without changing his own affiliations. This has been a major secret.

Should we have something similar? Money remains a problem. We are familiar with your situation and you, probably, know that although our country is not poor, the cost of a parliament does not have priority among the concerns of our governments and, naturally, is not the least of its concerns.

Everything in Europe is being harshly criticized and is changing. "Scientific" socialism is not the only type of socialism being criticized today. Democratic socialism is criticized a great deal. The "people's" democracies are not the only attacked democracies; "bourgeois" democracies are also being targeted. The melting pot is melting us no less than it is melting you. If we could jointly see,

in the general seething, the outlines of a common destiny, this should be the first objective which we should aspire to attain.

Sincerely yours, Lord Wayland Kenneth

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## MEASURE OF ALL THINGS

### The Great Son of Mankind; The 150th Anniversary of P.I. Chaykovskiy's Birth

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[Text] What place does Chaykovskiy hold in the culture of our time and how closely is his canonized image, which exists in the ordinary mass awareness, related to the real image of this brilliant artist, and who is he: a basic classic or a vital and somehow important and yet unrecognized phenomenon of our present spirituality? This question and other facets and questions related to Chaykovskiy's creative legacy were the topic of a discussion held in the editorial premises of KOMMUNIST, defined by one of its participants as "Chaykovskiy's paradoxes." Participating in the talk were orchestra conductor Gennadiy Rozhdestvenskiy, USSR People's Artist, Lenin Prize laureate, professor; Manashir Yakubov, State Prize laureate, honored worker in the arts of the Dagestan ASSR, honored member of the Dmitriy Shostakovich International Society, candidate of art studies and music expert; the discussion was moderated by Nikita Sibiryakov, the journal's culture section editor.

[N.S.] As you obviously know, by decision of UNESCO, 1990 was proclaimed the Year of Chaykovskiy. It is thus that the world will celebrate the sesquicentennial of the birth of this great Russian composer. In the minds of millions of art lovers his First Piano Concerto and Symphony, the operas "Eugene Onegin" and "Queen of Spades," and his ballets "Swan Lake," "Cinderella," and "The Nutcracker" are the embodiments of music.... Each epoch has its own concept of Chaykovskiy. Dozens of books and thousands of articles have been written about him. Petr Ilich's world fame began during his lifetime. However, his path was by no means covered with roses: Tsezar Kyui commented on his creative beginning in unflattering and even sharp terms; subsequently as well there have been frequent unflattering critics and detractors of Chaykovskiy. However, for more than a century now his music is being played and is conquering audiences. Many generations are rediscovering it. What do our contemporaries know about Chaykovskiy and what do they find in his works?

[G.R.] Yes, he was born 150 years ago.... The centennial of his death (1993) is approaching, yet he remains, actually, a figure largely concealed behind a curtain of secrecy, including both the person and his legacy for, unfortunately, this legacy is limited to an exceptionally

small range of performed works. There is even an anecdotal formula: one asks a person how many symphonies Chaykovskiy wrote. The person would answer: three: the fourth, the fifth and the sixth. This is a common cliche. Precisely the same happens when the question is asked about his operas: the people mention only "Queen of Spades" and "Eugene Onegin," while the others are shunted aside. Apparently, ballets have been the luckiest. All three of them are equally well-known, universally performed and equally liked. The works for piano have been virtually forgotten today by performers, other than "The Seasons." Not even the Great Sonata is being performed. There also is the First Concerto. No more than a dozen songs are being played (out of hundreds!)

[M.Ya.] It seems to me, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, that you opened this discussion with the most important topic: the cliches. I believe that the anniversary would be the most suitable time for cliches and, with a certain apprehension, I am waiting for the articles which will appear in the press at the beginning of May. They will be dedicated to Chaykovskiy. They will state that he has superb operas which are an invaluable contribution to the treasury of Russian (and world) opera classics, and that his symphonies are a stage in the development of world symphonic music. All of this is the truth, the absolute truth. However, all of this has been stated repeatedly. Meanwhile, it would be quite interesting to try to define a new attitude toward Chaykovskiy, related to what we describe as the new thinking, the rejection of stereotypes. In this area as well trends are already taking shape in the public mind and public journalism. I would describe them as specific cliches and dangers. In particular, there is one very primitive and amazingly surviving trend. Today, as we know, we are reassessing many values. Since we have already said that Chaykovskiy is a classic, now perhaps we should say that Chaykovskiy is not a classic.

[N.S.] On the other hand, one could take another approach: What is understood by the word "classic."

[M.Ya.] This is the main thing.

[G.R.] If Chaykovskiy is a classic, he therefore is a prophet and, consequently, could be described as a member of the avant-garde. His works and the impetus he provided have something which inspires us to this day. In our circles, however, the concept of "classic" is associated with a folder for music scores carried by children as they go to music school, and a statue or a portrait on a wall, and all of this immediately becomes uninteresting and boring. The portraits themselves assume an impersonal feature.

[M.Ya.] That is precisely the point: if a classic is a drunk, a gambler, a scandal maker, a loafer or a playboy, whether he dies in a paupers' hospital, his portrait will nonetheless show a proper, righteous, touched-up and inanimate face.

[G.R.] You probably saw the last photographs of Petr Ilich, which have absolutely nothing in common with the

way we imagined him. Incidentally, this applies also from the viewpoint of age: staring at us is an old, decrepit man, beaten by life, infinitely alone, and profoundly unhappy. Clearly, it is precisely this that explains the composer's last opus: the infinitely tragic Sixth Symphony.

[M.Ya.] There is more. If we go back to our idea of a classic, I believe that the classic is always new, unexpected, unpredictable. That is why he is always in conflict with his time, with "common" sense, and with the stagnant, conservative and reactionary side of the prevalent ideology; in terms of this ideology he always remains a dissident and always a nonconformist....

[G.R.] At this point you are speaking of an artist who becomes a classic **later**, whereas in the course of his creative work he is simply one more face.

[M.Ya.] No. I am convinced that also "later," after having been promoted to the rank of a classic, he remains the same. However, it is the dominant viewpoint that touches him up, glosses his image, making him belong.

[G.R.] Yes, depending on what is needed. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, Chaykovskiy's image changed several times, quite drastically. Leafing today through the journal PROLETARSKIY MUZYKANT one can read quite curious things said about Chaykovskiy, such as being a bourgeois whiner and an enemy of the people.... This was followed by a sugar-coated image. Like a label, the concept of "vanguard" was only yesterday treated as an abuse. Today it has acquired a positive meaning. If composers, poets or painters are, in the broad meaning of the term, members of the vanguard, they consequently are in the lead. Does Johann Sebastian Bach not deserve today this title? He continues to lead. In other words, he is the type of locomotive engine which pulls the composition, a member of the avant-garde. Like Chaykovskiy.

[M.Ya.] Let me try to defend the viewpoint typical of official ideology. Naturally, we are being told, Bach is in the vanguard but, at the same time, he is quite controversial. He is a member of the vanguard **despite** religious ideology and **regardless** of his profound errors. Let us go back to Chaykovskiy. In the 1920s it was bluntly stated by the Proletkult and, subsequently, RAPP critics that Chaykovskiy was alien to the proletariat. For example, in 1923 Sergey Chemodanov wrote that Chaykovskiy "unquestionably is in no case in step with reality with its revolutionary ideology." The newspapers noted that "Chaykovskiy is crowding our programs and is offered without any control, in huge doses...." Therefore, it was necessary to **limit** the hearing of his music. Here is another quotation: it was considered necessary "to put some limits to this attraction without any critical interpretation of the class significance and trend of Chaykovskiy's work." However, Chaykovskiy was stronger than this and not to perform him was impossible. Somehow, he had to be made to fit ideology. Let me

recall what you and I were taught at the conservatory. Chaykovskiy had to be turned into an optimist. Therefore, this is what the textbook for the conservatory (1947) which, incidentally, is still used, wrote about his Sixth Symphony: "The music of this symphony is imbued with such tremendous and inexhaustible reserves of spiritual energy that it gives it a clearly life-asserting nature." What kind of nature? This was no longer a pessimist, someone alien!

[G.R.] This is like trying to prove that snow is black! Above all, one must not doubt, one must believe!

[M.Ya.] Yes, and the most terrible thing was that more than one generation was raised with such formulas.

[G.R.] One may think that there is no great danger in such evaluations, for this is unbelievable. Nonetheless, the people believed. In examinations that was precisely what one was supposed to answer. However, the examination had to be passed in order to get a "pass for life."

[M.Ya.] It was thus that the public awareness was gradually deformed, step-by-step instilling in it that all art must be optimistic, smooth, pleasant and melodious. Remember that part in Shostakovich's "Antiformalistic Gallery," in which Dvoykin, meaning Zhdanov, says: "We need a pleasant, melodious and harmonious music. We are in favor of beautiful music." Subsequently, as he discusses dissonances, he directly argues with Chaykovskiy, who wrote: "A dissonance is the greatest power in music; if it did not exist music would have been doomed merely to depicting eternal bliss, whereas what we cherish most in music is its ability to express our passions and our pain. Consonant combinations are helpless when it is necessary to touch, to shake up, to excite, for which reason a dissonance is of major significance." In 1948 he should have been classified as an antipeople's formalist....

[G.R.] It seems to me that requirements concerning melodious and "beautiful" music are backed by a simplistic approach to art as entertainment only, something like going to the Sandunovskiye Baths: it is comfortable, warm and there is nothing to trouble you.

Consequently, the question is that some strata who influenced the development of music and who held the power themselves needed no different higher level contacts. That is why they sought in Chaykovskiy's music precisely entertainment and pleasure which, if one so wished, naturally could be found. However, unfortunately, these people did not like but where rather repelled by something else, something great, created by a giant such a Chaykovskiy.

[N.S.] Nonetheless, Chaykovskiy reached his audiences. It would be quite interesting, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, to know your opinion as a performer, a practical musician: What is the reason for this unanimity with which each new generation accepts Chaykovskiy, regardless of the attitude of the authorities? In my view there has been no time when his music has not been revered.

[G.R.] The nature and style of Chaykovskiy's music, what it radiates, its emotional structure itself, trigger a maximum of responsive emotions which are found in every person, although here as well some things are unattainable. For example, we cannot understand why Chaykovskiy is so popular in Japan, among people who have an apparently entirely different culture, mentality and religion. When his name is mentioned, the Japanese virtually freeze, as though hypnotized. I have been a frequent visitor of that country and I am always asked: Please, bring us Chaykovskiy. Naturally, this is an emotional current.

[M.Ya.] What a current! In my view, Chaykovskiy stands out among all other 19th century Russian composers by the fact that, being profoundly Russian and linked to Russian history, its folklore, and so on, he nonetheless remains the only Russian composer of the 19th century who expressed the philosophy of European individualism (in our country in the past this word was usually given a negative meaning and pitted against collectivism). Individualism as an attraction of the individual toward self-expression and self-realization, remains to this day the most important internal dominant feature in human life. Today, in the period of perestroyka, we say that what is universally human and truly human in man should become the starting point in political, economic, and all other structures. Chaykovskiy was, to the highest extent, the spokesman for this trend which, in general, in world art in recent centuries became determinant and has not lost its relevance to this day. Recall his Fourth Symphony: the fatal tragedy of individuality and the search for a positive solution to the problem by blending with the mass ("go into the people. Look at the way the people know how to enjoy themselves..."). In that sense he is not only all alone but, to a large extent, one of a kind. That is the secret for Chaykovskiy's continuing great emotional impact on the people throughout the world.

[N.S.] Does it not seem to you that, nonetheless, great art always teaches what is good and beautiful? If we consider Chaykovskiy's basic moral credo, it always indicates the victory of good over evil.

[M.Ya.] No, not always. It is always a protest against evil. It is pain in exposure to evil and suffering, but not always victory.

[G.R.] Naturally, in his ethics Chaykovskiy placed goodness higher than anything else. He dreamed of the triumph of brightness. However, in his life he had seen a great deal of evil and had passionately opposed it. This is one of the concepts of his Fifth Symphony. As to its finale, there are two viewpoints. It is said that the transformation of the basic motif of the symphony in the finale is the triumph of goodness, for this topic is being asserted, powerfully, in a major tone. It seems to me, however, that this would have been an excessively primitive solution of the problem for an artist of Chaykovskiy's scale. That is why when you imagine the opposite concept that nonetheless evil triumphs, having

assumed the appearance of goodness, it is equally convincing. Even the finale of the Fourth Symphony, usually perceived in our country as exceptionally optimistic is, actually, tragic.... The very program you mentioned, written by Chaykovskiy, confirms that this is one of the tragedies of the interrelationship between the individual and society. In our country, as a government-sponsored concert, the following was mandatory: What shall we end with? The finale of the Fourth Symphony. Why? What do you mean why? "A birch tree stood in the field." In general, this was loud music and each beat was marked with a strike of the cymbals.

[N.S.] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, how do you explain that although the beautiful, bright topic of love in the "Romeo and Juliet" overture-fantasy, ends on a tragic note, one nonetheless comes out of it cheered?

[G.R.] You may come out cheered, even after the finale of Prokofyev's ballet "Romeo and Juliet!"

[M.Ya.] This is the law of catharsis: real tragedy, in its classical, its ancient understanding (as is also the case with Shakespeare) gives birth to a feeling of lofty shakeup and cleansing. However, I cannot say that I come out in a bright mood having heard Chaykovskiy's Sixth Symphony.

[G.R.] I cannot perform it. In the past I performed it a great deal but now, for the past several years, I have abstained from doing so. It is a most profound tragedy without catharsis. It offers no hope. I am wrecked by this work: after performing it I personally feel dead. It was only recently that I began to feel within me a small hope that, perhaps, after a while, I could return to that symphony. This would be from an entirely different viewpoint. Should this take place, I would perform it by itself and nothing else. The program for the public should read: please, no applause. I would play and leave. Everyone else should quietly disperse, as one disperses after a funeral....

[N.S.] A great deal was spoken about Chaykovskiy here as a creative personality. How has his civic appearance been transformed? Perhaps there are some new documents, archive publications which were previously inaccessible such as, for example, some dealing with his social views (it was claimed that he was almost a monarchist, a political philistine, etc.).

[M.Ya.] In this case it is less a matter of discovering previously unknown documents, although they do exist, than of concealing and ignoring those which are already known. Let us start with Chaykovskiy's social views. Here is what he wrote in one of his letters on the subject of the tsar, the subject of his monarchism: "Alas! We are being governed by a good, a sympathetic person, not gifted with a mind by nature, poorly educated or, in short, unable to gather in his weak hands the loosened mechanism of the state. Strictly speaking, today we have no government whatsoever." In the 1920s, when all political sayings were noted, Chaykovskiy was accused of monarchism for having written the Coronation March.

He was also accused of having written songs based on the poems by K.R. There was nothing monarchic in them. However, K.R. was the Grand Duke Konstantin Romanov, and anything related to the House of Romanovs was rated, after 1917, on the basis of the same yardstick....

You mentioned at the start of our conversation the way Kyui criticized Chaykovskiy's first performance. Let me give you examples, however, related to such universally accepted masterpieces as the First Piano Concerto with Orchestra and the Violin Concerto.

The First Piano Concerto became, in our country, in a sense, a musical emblem, the symbol of Russian national classics. This is a great work which expresses the power of the state, the strength of the national spirit and the triumph of life. No one would claim today that this is not an absolute masterpiece.... When Petr Ilich performed it for the first time, on 24 December 1874, Nikolay Rubinshteyn had such critical things to say about this work that Chaykovskiy, as he admitted it himself (in a letter to a close friend) felt so hurt that he was unable to say anything. Rubinshteyn refused to play this work. As a result, look at the parallel: for the first time the concert was performed not in Russia but in the United States; when, finally, the premiere took place in Russia, in the words of Chaykovskiy himself "the concert was desperately maimed, particularly thanks to the orchestra conductor, E.F. Napravnik, who did everything possible for the accompaniment to be such that there was a horrible cacophony instead of music." It was only 3 years later that Rubinshteyn nonetheless performed him in Paris, at the Trocadero (1878). Here is what a critic wrote: "Mister Chaykovskiy's concert is not among the best works of this composer, so that, perhaps it may have been more suitable, from the musical viewpoint, if Mister Nikolay Rubinshteyn would have played the first part only, which is quite lengthy, and which has a booming and brilliant conclusion.... However, apparently Mister Nikolay Rubinshteyn wanted to end it even more brilliantly. He kept for quite some time the audience on the boring and insignificant Andante and subsequently the just as insignificant finale, for the sole purpose of reaching the mounting end with the loud and banal breakdown of the entire orchestra against the background of which the brass is raving a trite topic, the purpose of which, in all likelihood is to indicate some kind of apotheosis. There is little music here but the public is shouting and applauding fiercely and the work is in the bag." Who wrote this? Vladimir Stasov.

[G.R.] "Letter from Alien Lands." It is like an icon!

[M.Ya.] Then Chaykovskiy's Violin Concerto appeared. The authoritative violinist L. Auer said that this work could not be performed for technical reasons and refused to play it. Once again the premiere was not in our country but in Vienna. It was performed by Adolf Brodskiy, and conducted by Hans Richter. What did the critics think? This was a work of "very doubtful merit."

Another newspaper wrote: "It was a barbarically disgusting concerto." Agreeing, another newspaper wrote: "This concerto was written only for a soloist who would like to display maximum technical skill."

That is how Chaykovskiy was "flattered." This happened until the very last days of his life, when "Queen of Spades" was removed because, you see, the tsar had expressed his negative attitude toward "Sleeping Beauty." As a result, Chaykovskiy sent a sharp letter to I. Vsevolozhskiy, the director of the Imperial Theaters, with a request to pass on his words to the minister of the court or, if possible, directly to the tsar. This was the greatest possible impertinence. In connection with the commissioned "Nutcracker" and "Yolanta," he wrote: "You are trying to return to my music the favor of the tsar and, to this effect, you are suggesting to me for the next season to write a new work. It is on the subject of this work that I decided to send you this letter. In undertaking the work "King Rene's Daughter" ("Yolanta"—author) and "The Nutcracker," I have the same feeling as a person who has been invited to enter a house the host of which has already clearly indicated his unwillingness to have him as his guest. Unless the tsar encourages my work for the benefit of the theater, how could I work lovingly, with the necessary tranquillity and desire for an establishment where he is the host?" This letter was made public for the first time only recently.

There is a conformist and a loyal subject for you. This was a man with a tremendous sense of his own dignity, who showed an absolutely forbidden behavior toward the tsar.

The view that Chaykovskiy was always successful, always flattered, and that his works were accepted immediately and enthusiastically is another myth which should be disposed of. To this day it is written in popular publications that the Sixth Symphony was the final triumph of the composer. Yet it almost failed during its first performance. It was only after Chaykovskiy's death that it was appreciated, or else perhaps the very fact of his death cast a special reflection, a particular shade on this work, emphasizing its special meaning. What was the case with "Eugene Onegin?" After its premiere, this opera was abused most cruelly: "Once again realism has rendered poor service to art in general and to the composer in particular.... Actually, what kind of music could be written with words such as "hello, how are you?" "Quite well, I thank you humbly." Or else, in the ballet scene: "What are you grumbling about?" "I am not grumbling...," etc.? Such poetic dialogues abound in the opera.... What kind of suitable music could be written with such lyrics?... How long, oh musicians, will you convert music into some kind of mathematics and force this most fantastic and most antirealistic of all arts to serve your real, your antiartistic theories?" (Newspaper SOVREMENNYE IZVESTIYA, 20 March 1879). It would be suitable for these lines to be read by those who determine the destinies of young talents, for today, possibly, there is a new Chaykovskiy in our neighborhood. If we do not push him into the dirt, to say the least

we ignore him, we push him away from us. Perhaps we could learn not to do this....

[G.R.] I am not so sure about this!...

[M.Ya.] Well, I would really like to lighten up this "law," nur zu mildern, as the Germans say.

[N.S.] We mentioned the limited nature of prevailing concepts about Chaykovskiy, about some kind of diktat of the ruling ideology and official views. How can we surmount this today, in practical terms? What, in your view, should we do first?

[G.R.] Chekhov who, incidentally, was greatly loved by Petr Ilich, wrote that in Russia there is a terrible poverty when it comes to facts and a terrible wealth of all kinds of views. Chaykovskiy's works are the main and necessary fact. Yet in our days as well they are not entirely accessible. We do not have any academically collected works by this great composer and that which we have could hardly be described as such. "Objective circumstances" may be quoted to this effect as well. The publication of Chaykovskiy's collected works began in 1940. The war prevented this project. After the war the project was taken up quite energetically. However, to this day it remains unfinished. Yet, the printed prospectus, which was issued in 1940, totally bypassed Chaykovskiy's spiritual music. To this day we cannot find it anywhere. It is a bibliographic rarity. There are no scores. Therefore, in my view, a resolution must be passed which would make it mandatory to publish additional volumes which would include all of Chaykovskiy's spiritual works. Here is an anecdote: when an album of records with vocal music came out, including Chaykovskiy's romances, it skipped the cycle for children. It was totally excluded because of the song "Christ the Child Had a Garden." Yet the cover proclaims "Complete Collection." In the same precise way that in the literary section of the "complete collection" the diaries of the composer are not included. Yet they had been published in our country in 1923 although quite curtailed.

[M.Ya.] The most valuable part of the collection of Chaykovskiy's literary works are fifteen volumes of his letters, more than 5,000 of them, many of which are published for the first time. Chaykovskiy's letters are a priceless source for the study of his unique personality. I would make them mandatory reading for young composers. They include a tremendous feeling of personal dignity and an unshakable faith in his talent as well as striking modesty. Unfortunately, the size of this edition (some volumes do not exceed 1,000 copies!) is totally inconsistent with its cultural significance. It is also regretful that some of the letters which had been previously published in our country in their entirety have now been distorted through hypocritical deletions.

[G.R.] These cuts were stipulated by the editors.

[M.Ya.] Such stipulations are unsuitable for an academic publication which, furthermore, comes out in a miserably small size, aimed at the narrowest possible circle of specialists. However, it is not a question exclusively of the letters and, perhaps, it may not be a question of the letters at all. The question is significantly broader. It is a question of the attitude toward the classics and the efforts of each separate age to make them fit it. You, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, spoke of the publication or, rather, the nonpublished religious works by Chaykovskiy, such as the "Liturgy of Saint John the Baptist," "Night Vigil," and others. Is this not an example of the fact that this classic did not like the ruling ideology and its dogmas? We claim that we must come closer to the real Chaykovskiy, to understand him, and that, above all, something which we were always told, we must determine for ourselves his outlook. Yet the determining feature of Chaykovskiy's outlook was the fact that he was a Christian, a profound believer. He was not a fanatic but, I would say, he was a thinking Christian, as were many members of the Russian intelligentsia in his time, people such as Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy. However, to conceal their religious views totally would be difficult and in published works an outlook is clearly embodied in the texts. The matter with Chaykovskiy was simpler: even the titles of religious compositions were deleted from the list of his works, as they were from concerts, records, publications, etc. The Christian foundations of the outlook of this brilliant composer are a vast and complex topic and the nonrecognition of this reality is impossible, for this outlook influenced his entire work, his symphony scores, his concepts of operas and his romances.

A ridiculous point is reached: take any Soviet edition of the "Children's Album" series: some titles of the works have been deleted. For example, the first part of "Morning Prayer" has been renamed "Morning;" the last, "In the Church," has been renamed "Chorus." This is a barbaric falsification of the classics, subordinated to ideology.

[G.R.] This is not considered in the least an outrage committed against the classics....

[M.Ya.] Absolutely not. This is considered "necessary." That is why I insist on my idea that even after his death a classic may remain bothersome. A classic is a "dissident," a "formalist." He mandatorily is in step with eternity and not with his time and not only with his time but with our present and, in all likelihood, somehow with the world of tomorrow and the day after. The moment this stops he will no longer be a classic. That is where I see my paradox.

[G.R.] Let me add to what has been said about letters and academically collected works, that the scores of the most familiar of Chaykovskiy's works cannot be purchased, not to mention the scores of his operas. Yet without them the performers cannot work. There are no records of his music. Try to buy a set of his symphonies

or, for example, quartets, romances or his operas "Voyevoda," "Oprichnik," "The Maiden of Orleans," "Mazepa," or "Cherevichki." They remain unavailable, regardless of how much you may be willing to pay; even "Eugene Onegin" cannot be found. I have recorded in full all his three ballets but they are unavailable in the stores. Yet his symphonies and concerts and all of his other works, as interpreted by different people, should be available, so that one could select and compare. Also quite needed are video cassettes with Chaykovskiy's music, his theatrical-music works above all. There is tremendous demand for them. It is furthermore extremely important to reissue the priceless work by the composer's brother Modest Ilich, the three-volume work "*The Life of Petr Ilich Chaykovskiy*." In my view, this is the best among all works written about him, the most thorough and accurate. Incidentally, the work discusses his Christian ethics extensively. This three-volume work should be reprinted. A cooperative has published Valishevskiy. A book about Chaykovskiy would be welcomed with interest.

[N.S.] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, you say that different recordings are needed, with different performers. At this point another important question arises. In the course of your career you have extensively conducted the performance of Chaykovskiy's works. To the best of my recollection, even your first work abroad included Chaykovskiy. Recently, with your participation, there were 14 performances of "The Nutcracker" in London. Twenty years ago your recording of this ballet was awarded first prize for culture in the FRG. Naturally, you know this.

[G.R.] No, I was not informed of it, so that I may not become conceited.

[N.S.] This was in December 1970. In your view, what are the prospects for presenting various interpretations of Chaykovskiy, to what extent would this be admissible? Remember the unseemly story of the article which Zhyuraytis published in PRAVDA on an alleged "monstrous action" on your part, as you were preparing for a new performance of "Queen of Spades" in Paris?

[G.R.] A great deal has already been written about it, particularly in OGONEK, where this entire story has been presented quite clearly.

There were four of us working on the performance which was to be staged at the Opera: David Borovskiy, Yuriy Lyubimov, Alfred Shnitke and myself. The purpose was absolutely clear and had nothing to do with any kind of distortions of "Queen of Spades:" it was to perform in Paris Chaykovskiy's opera, which would be sung in Russian, preventing any distortion of the vocal line or the rhythm, and avoid depriving the opera of the fragrance which, if the Russian language were to be abandoned, would be unfailingly lost. It is no accident that the overwhelming majority of operas throughout the

world stage today operas in the original language. However, we intended to introduce some explanatory comments, in the course of which an actor or an actress would read some parts of Pushkin's text as translated by Prosper Merimee. The purpose was to help the public understand, for the public does not understand at all what precisely is being sung in a foreign language. Today in a number of theaters, including in New York and London, there are superscripts which are projected above the stage. The people can read in their own language what is taking place on the stage. This system has its proponents and opponents. Some say that this distracts the attention whereas others, conversely, think that it is good. We deemed such captions unnecessary. A commentator would appear on the stage from time to time and read Pushkin in French. For such short breaks, the text written by Alfred Shnitke on materials based on "Queen of Spades" was accompanied by music on a clavichord, as was performed in the original, by Pushkin, i.e., in the 18th century. This was the nature of this entire "abuse." One more thing was done by Shnitke on my request. On numerous occasions, in conducting "Queen of Spades," in the Bolshoy Theater and on the stages of other countries, I had never been satisfied with the orchestration of the last page: after the chorus at Germann's funeral has finished, the final bars of the orchestra, the finale, which Chaykovskiy instrumented with woodwinds and high flutes was always too loud. Whatever one may try, it is impossible to achieve a truly quiet sound. For that reason, I asked that the last bars be performed with string instruments. That was, actually, all. This was the pretext for accusing us of molesting an icon, vandalism and abuse of Russian culture. You are asking me if I remember this? I remember it quite well, for I almost lost my job. My records were withdrawn from the stores, performances on the radio were banned, and so on, and so forth, i.e., the blow which someone wanted to strike through the hands of Zhyuraytis was almost successful. Clearly, reality made its own changes in what occurred. Going back to the different interpretations, I think the following: Chaykovskiy's works, his music, particularly his stage works, are so varied in terms of the thoughts, ideas and emotions they contain that in this case the field of activities for a director or a conductor is infinite.

[M.Ya.] You spoke of desecrating an icon. This is quite aptly put. Veneration of icons, servility, cloying and pretended veneration of the classics are other characteristic features of the official attitude toward culture, which has sunk roots in our country. Could we imagine that on the occasion of Chaykovskiy's anniversary, let us say, among other publications there will also be an album of caricatures of Chaykovskiy, even some contemporary ones? Yet, Petr Ilich himself was by no means alien to humor and even to self-irony. We are familiar with the case when, together with the French composer Camille Saint-Saens, he danced on the stage of the Bolshoy Theater in the Moscow Conservatory the ballet "Galathea and Pygmalion," parodying all sorts of ballet steps. Before the war, on that same stage, an act more

"monstrous" than the one you mentioned involving "Queen of Spades" took place.

[G.R.] Absolutely accurate! "Eugene Onegin" was staged so to say in reverse. The show was entitled "Upside-Down." Women's parts were sung by men, the best known singers, and all male parts were sung by women.

[M.Ya.] And, incidentally, at that time Natalya Petrovna Rozhdestvenskaya sang Onegin. Neither the hall nor our culture collapsed, for this too is a kind of expression of love, but the love of a free man. It is an expression of love refracted in deification through laughter and play. It is a happy love, it is a love-admiration.

[G.R.] This is the most important thing.

[M.Ya.] Naturally, in this case there is no abuse. However, we are so unfree that it is demanded of us that everything should be "proper," "seemly." This is the basic stereotype governing the shaping of our official culture, which greatly hinders the live feeling of the way we perceive Chaykovskiy and the classics in general.

[N.S.] Let us go back to the question of various performance interpretations: In practical terms, how could such a program of creative competition among the masters of the musical theater be achieved? Is this realistic?

[G.R.] For quite some time I have been considering the need to create in our country a Chaykovskiy Theater. Not a theater "imeni P.I. Chaykovskiy," but a theater entirely dedicated to his operas and ballets, a theater which would exist precisely for this exclusive purpose, for there is a Wagner Theater in Bayreuth, there is the Leos Janacek Theater in Brno, in Czechoslovakia.... A Chaykovskiy Theater must absolutely be established and, I am confident, there will be one in the Soviet Union. It could operate like a festival theater, without having its permanent theater company but by inviting for each season stars from different countries, perhaps not on a year-round basis, but for several months annually. The point is that it would always stage all of Chaykovskiy's operas and ballets. Year after year there would be repeated but different interpretations: today, let us say, one company would stage "Eugene Onegin" (director, conductor, painter, etc.) and the show would last on the basis of its box office success, one, two or three seasons; this would be followed by another company.

In my view, such a theater should be based on the latest developments of technology and technical facilities and located in Klin, alongside the museum, thus making it an entire complex: a museum center, an archives center and a theater. Here we could invite performers, both domestic and foreign. This would make it an international festival which, I am convinced, would immediately become equal to the biggest world festivals, such as those in Vienna, Berlin, Edinburgh, etc. I have no doubt that there will be a huge public, including tourists. This is also a matter of prestige. It would be good and proper

for the decision to set up a Chaykovskiy Theater be made precisely during his anniversary year.

As to performers, masters of all ranks would deem it an honor to perform on its stage. Personally, I would go to work there with infinite joy, I dream of this!

[M.Ya.] Well, if we are allowed to dream today, let me add that our country should have a Chaykovskiy Society, a member of which could be any lover of the music of the great composer. Generally speaking, it is abnormal (although it is natural, as a result of blanket prohibitions), that in our country there is no Glinka Society and, naturally, Musorgskiy, Rakhmaninov, or Skryabin societies. Incidentally, there was a Skryabin Society in pre-revolutionary Russia. It had branches in various cities, issued its own bulletin, sponsored evenings....

[G.R.] There is an Dmitriy Shostakovich International Society in London. Once every 2 months it publishes a journal with information concerning all events in the world related to Shostakovich's works: concerts, staging of operas, festivals, books and articles about him, and new recordings of his music.

[M.Ya.] This could also be the case of a Chaykovskiy Society. Above all, however, there must be a center which would contribute to the dissemination of the music of this great composer and cultivate love for him. Every year, in May, the society could sponsor throughout the country celebrations of Chaykovskiy's music. Children's competitions could be organized in music schools, dedicated to Chaykovskiy, with performing pieces from his "Children's Album" and "The Seasons," with meetings on his life and works. To the children and their mothers or grandmothers, in Arkhangelsk or Nalchik, let us say, winning such a competition could become a lifelong memory. Meanwhile, the International Chaykovskiy Competition could also broaden its range. Within it a competition among conductors, quartets and chamber ensembles is quite necessary.

Naturally, accomplishing this is not easy. As it is, the competition is quite overburdened. Its international prestige is noticeably declining and it is beset by many problems. However, why not hold it twice a year, alternating between pianists, cellists and conductors, in one group, and violinists, vocalists and chamber orchestras, on the other. A solution must be found although it would be simpler to abandon it....

[N.S.] Probably it would also be important to remember that in our tense and difficult times it is precisely culture that must be the great force which bears on its shoulders social morality. In such times Chaykovskiy's music could also become for the young people an insight, an open way to great art.

[M.Ya.] Yes, Chaykovskiy's music is a real shelter. It is a spiritual "support and prop," to use his own words, a support which is so greatly needed today. We find in Chaykovskiy the highest power of true culture, real

classics which are always new and at all times engage in a complex interaction as a result of which they improve the times in which we live.

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### 'Democratization Will Become Historically Possible'

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[Excerpt from a book by F.I. Dan; prepared for publication by V. Bushuyev]

[Text] For quite a long time the Menshevik Party was depicted in our historiography exclusively as being a counterrevolutionary, an antipeople's force, an active participant in mutinies and subversive activities against the Soviet system, an accomplice of the right-wing S.R. and White Guards and foreign interventionists.

It has now become obvious that this image is quite different from reality and how heterogeneous, in fact, was the ideological-political orientation of the various strata and groups within the Menshevik Party. Along with the right-wing (A.N. Potresov, P.B. Akselrod and others), who, from the start, opposed the Leninist trend in the Russian social democratic movement, there had always been among the mensheviks influential left and center wings (Yu.O. Martov, F.I. Dan and others). The so-called Martov trend of mensheviks-internationalists, which took shape after the February Revolution, accepted the Soviet form of state government in the country. Without sharing the party concepts of the bolsheviks, after the October Revolution it held a loyalist position within the soviets.

The left-wing mensheviks supported the bolshevik concept of a global revolution. They approved the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly. They rejected the appeals of the "left-wing" S.R. to join the 6 July 1918 mutiny. At the plenum of their party's Central Committee, in October of that same year, they officially proclaimed their refusal to engage in political cooperation with the bourgeoisie. Their representatives invited the bolsheviks to participate in the work of the soviets. They legally published in the country a number of newspapers and bulletins. Subsequently, finding themselves in forced exile, the leaders of the left-wing mensheviks, without concealing their ideological differences with the communists, opposed the interventionist plans of European reaction aimed against Soviet Russia. They helped to disseminate in the West relatively objective information about life in the USSR, and participated in the movement of solidarity with the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.

On the basis of new and previously inaccessible documents, historians are as yet to determine in detail what it is that prevented, during the Civil War, to implement to its end the Leninist tactic which had been codified at the

Eighth RKP(b) Congress, aimed at the consolidation of all patriotic forces of the young republic and the creation of a broader democratic front. It is also necessary to answer the question about why, under the conditions of the NEP, when ways of economically strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry had been found, it was not possible to secure civil peace and cooperation in the political superstructure. What was the role played here by the organic fault, discovered by Lenin, of the strata and parties which, by virtue of their nature, for quite some time would continue, as he said, to fluctuate, to "shift from one camp to another" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 38, p 169); what was the role of the mutual mistrust and reciprocal intolerance, the heavy burden of previous differences and the fierce ideological struggle during the prerevolutionary period and during the revolution itself, and the unwillingness or inability to reach reciprocal understanding and to compromise?

Another question to be answered by the scientists: To what extent did exile abroad, and persecution of the members of the loyal opposition, which did not participate in counterrevolutionary activities, and which included many mensheviks, set a precedent for the subsequent internal party struggle and accounts settling in the struggle for the establishment of a regime of personal power, clear the way for repressions against any type of dissidence within the Communist Party itself and facilitate imposing on the country the scarecrow of "enemies of the people"?

In order to assess the role of the left-wing mensheviks and their views on the past revolutionary movement in Russia and prospects for building socialism in the USSR, F.I. Dan's work "*Origins of Bolshevism. On the History of the Democratic and Social Ideas in Russia After the Liberation of the Peasants*," which was published in 1946, in Russian, by the New Democracy Publishers, in New York, 1 year prior to its author's death. Written under the direct influence of the victory of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, and under the conditions of a powerful upsurge of the democratic movement throughout the world, this book enables us today to take a substantially new look at the way the left-wing mensheviks assessed the history of Soviet society and to study their projections concerning the further development of the USSR and Europe after the defeat of German fascism and Japanese internationalism.

In some spots we feel in the book the mark of a certain idealizing of the Stalinist regime and an underestimating of its destructive and repressive function. Probably, after the victory over fascism, which seemed to have "written off" many of the crimes committed by the turn of the 1930s, to a certain extent this may have been inevitable, even more so to this author who had long been separated from the homeland and lacked exhaustive information concerning Stalin's domestic policies and the actual state of affairs in the country. Of interest to us, however, are not the weaknesses of this book, which can be seen with

the naked eye, but its strong side, an inflexible belief in the democratic future of socialism.

Dan's book points at the opportunities which existed for European and global development, had in the first postwar years the division within the international labor movement been eliminated and cooperation organized between communists and social democrats, for the sake of maintaining peace and building the new society. Regardless of whether we accept Dan's arguments and conclusions, one thing is clear: the defeat of fascism created certain prerequisites for the type of development of events in the Soviet Union and in Europe as a whole on which, as the book shows, some democratic and socialist circles in the West relied. The historians are as yet thoroughly to understand the reasons for which these opportunities were lost.

Naturally, we cannot agree with many of Dan's assessments. Many of his projections and expectations were not confirmed and may even seem naive today. However, his sincere concern for the destinies of socialism and democracy in the postwar world and his belief in the socialist future of the further development of mankind cannot be questioned.

Dan's efforts to analyze this future, as he saw it in March 1946, indicate a significant change in his own views and concepts. The book shows that the comprehensive and conflicting experience of domestic and world history had taught a great deal to the menshevik left-wing, as representatives of the International Social Democrats. It had eliminated a number of dogmas and prejudices on the basis of which they had built their ideological and political structures on the eve of and after the victory of the October Revolution. The author admits the failure of the prophecy made by the Russian mensheviks and the European social democrats concerning the impossibility of building socialism in our country. Addressing himself to the problems of democracy, he just as clearly acknowledges that in the Soviet Union there is a society in which there are no hostile classes and which offers entirely different opportunities for political life, compared to a society divided into classes. Socialism, Dan concludes, could and should develop democracy on its own basis, without taking at all as a model of democracy any other social system, regardless of its attributes and features.

F.I. Dan was one of the personalities of the nonbolshevik socialist movement who, while differing with the communists on basic ideological views, never concealed their high rating of the historical significance of the October Revolution. On the evening of 25 October (7 November) 1917, he noted in his book, "this writer opened, as chairman, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which gave the power to the bolsheviks. This marked the start of a new chapter in the history not only of Russia, which became a Soviet republic, but also in the history of the social and political development of the entire world."

Nor did Dan doubt the historical legitimacy of bolshevism as a phenomenon of global socialist theory and

practice, the accuracy and irreversibility of the choice which our people made in October 1917, and the gigantic strengthening of the role of the Soviet Union in the development of the world as a result of its prime contribution to the defeat of Hitlerism. In the introduction to his book he wrote: "My task is to enable the reader to understand 'bolshevism' not as a random phenomenon triggered by an entirely exceptional development of circumstances and defeating the decades of struggle for liberation waged by the Russian intelligentsia, the Russian working class and the Russian people in general but, conversely, as the legitimate product of this struggle and as a historically inevitable stage of this struggle on its way to a victorious completion."

There could be no doubt, "Dan further wrote, "that if, as we should surmise, the establishment of political democracy would become one of the consequences of the military victory of the antifascist front, in any case in Russia, such a democracy can be built only on a socialist and not a capitalist foundation and, naturally, in new forms consistent with this new foundation.

"The reasons for the unviable nature of bourgeois democracy in Russia, in the final account, are found in Russia's historically late entry into the path of capitalist development, compared to the other major European countries. This lateness left its characteristic imprint on the country's entire economic, social, cultural and political development....

"The study of this development is not only of theoretical but also of practical-political interest. It can help to understand the situation which began by developing in Russia in the course of the war and the results of which will be felt in the years and decades to come. It is of essential significance in assessing prospects concerning the postwar development of the European continent, in the destinies of which, henceforth, Russia will play a primary role, consistent with the primary role it played in the military and political defeat of Hitlerite fascism."

Following, with some abbreviations exclusively related to the limited space in this journal, is the postface of F.I. Dan's book, entitled by him "Results of the Development and Prospects of Bolshevism."

The "democracy-socialism" antinomy, the struggle for the resolution of which runs through the entire history of the Russian revolutionary movement and Russian revolutionary thinking, remained unresolved by the 1917 Revolution as well....

More than half a century after the liberation of the peasantry, in its majority, the peasantry did not abandon its indifference to purely political problems against which crashed, as we saw, the hopes of generation after generation of Russian revolutionaries. The war ended with the liberation of the peasant masses as well from the mystique of tsarism. The peasantry made willing and extensive use of the benefits provided by the republican political freedom which was proclaimed by the victorious revolution. However, neither war nor revolution

made this freedom, in the eyes of the peasantry, a vital value for which one could and should fight, or else turned the Russian peasantry into any whatsoever reliable support of free and democratic statehood. As was the case with the first, the February period of the revolution, and the second, the October Revolution, not political but economic and social reasons remained of decisive importance to the peasantry. However, in precisely the same way, and throughout the Civil War, as well as during the years of initial instability and the subsequent gradual consolidation of the Soviet system, interrupted with "crises," the political aspect of the regimes and forces engaged in fighting each other played a minimal role in terms of the attitude of the peasantry toward them: the peasantry or its individual strata ("kulaks," "middle peasants," "the poor") defined their attitude exclusively from the viewpoint of their own struggle, initially for land and then for the freedom to dispose of the products of the land. The "Constituent Assembly Front," which had been organized by the S.R., not only doomed itself to a crushing defeat but also greatly contributed to discrediting in the eyes of the broad peasant masses the very idea of political democracy in its "European" aspects, precisely because it took up this idea as its banner and, for the sake of its defense in the Civil War, took the side of the antibolshevik barricade behind which stood and, furthermore, were in command the forces of the so-called "White" movement, i.e., the forces which the peasants justifiably considered as the defenders of the old landowners and the fighters of a revision of the recently accomplished "black division."

Under Russia's historical circumstances, the situation developed in such a way that it was only the "kolkhoz" system, which broke definitively the narrow framework of the individual peasant farm, that was able to crush the limitations remaining within this framework of the ideological and political outlook of the Russian peasantry, and which was the first to establish for the peasantry a tangible and obvious indivisible link between its own economic destinies and the destinies of the state. The peasantry began to learn about the "governmental" approach to the problems and the problems of its own economic and social life only from the local, rayon, republic and all-Union soviets in which, even after the 1936 "Stalin" Constitution, which equalized all citizens in terms of electoral rights, the vestiges of the old privileged strata remained virtually unrepresented, liquidated as they were by the Soviet Revolution, while the monopolists were the "working people," i.e., workers and peasants, together with the Soviet bureaucracy and the professional intelligentsia, serving no longer private but state interests. That is why despite the "single candidacy" at Soviet elections and the "single party" control of Soviet politics, Soviet parliamentarianism did not prove to be a "fiction" in the least but a very real factor of the "democratization" of the Soviet system: in particular, and especially precisely under the conditions of such "parliamentarianism," and subsequently under its extremely powerful "ideological" influence, for the

first time there was a broad "politicizing" of the Russian peasantry and its shaping into a social force which could become one of the firm and reliable foundations of the "working people's democracy."

This process of "politicizing" of the Russian peasantry greatly advanced in the course of the trials and experiences of the antifascist war and is nearing its completion under our very eyes, under the conditions of the "occupation" contact with the European West and the increasingly arising problem of the postwar economic, social and cultural reconstruction of the country and the ever more difficult and complex problems, increasingly demanding the maximal enhancement of the activeness of the mass energy of the people. However at that time, in the October-November days of 1917, that process was merely a distant prospect. At that time all the thoughts and hopes and passions of millions of peasants at the front were entirely absorbed by the idea of their immediate return home, while tens of millions of peasants in the rear also wanted an immediate "black redivision." This "redivision" had begun, it is true, even before October-November. However, it was thoroughly obstructed by the socialist members of the Provisional Government and actively opposed by them in the illusory hope of solving the "agrarian problem" not through the chaotic order of unsanctioned local seizures but on a planned basis, with legislation passed by the future constituent assembly. What truly tied strongly the peasants to the new "Soviet" system was the firm awareness that this was "their own" system which would erect no obstacles on their way, either related to the immediate withdrawal from the war or the immediate "black redivision." This made them all the more willing to grant entirely to the victorious Bolshevik Party the handling of the very process of the "constitutional" establishment of the new system. Under those circumstances, given the total disorganization and substantial dislocation of the transportation system, caused by the disorderly fleeing of millions of soldiers from the front and, in turn, the threatening hunger and stoppage of industry in the cities, the "Soviet system" and, furthermore, the "dictatorial" ideology of bolshevism, could not fail to become, at the very origin of their power, dictatorial. The immediately following sabotage on the part of the bureaucracy and the professional intelligentsia, the raising of "White" armies and the first outbreaks of the arising Civil War, and a desperate and almost hopeless struggle against food, economic and administrative difficulties could not fail to turn this dictatorship into a terrorist dictatorship.

The dictatorial-terrorist and one-party forms of government, which took shape from the beginning the "Soviet system," confirmed that even after winning a "decisive victory" over the tsarist regime, the Russian Revolution left unresolved its age-old basic problem of combining democracy with socialism. It was precisely the unresolved nature of this problem that the "Martov" trend within the Russian social democracy, linked with bolshevism not only through the unity of the "final objective" but also essentially in the common understanding of the

"sociology" of both the Russian Revolution as well as the global developments, under the conditions created by World War I, that was unable, for more than one-quarter of a century, to either blend with bolshevism or be dissolved within it. Very soon the democratic-reformist degenerative "right-wing" socialism in general stopped being a factor of Russia's revolutionary and socialist development and turned into a kind of "left" wing of the liberal-conservative camp. However, the "Martov" trend played a major practical and political role in the sense of mobilizing the nonbolshevik circles of the proletariat and the radical intelligentsia in the defense of the Soviet system in the Civil War, and an even greater one in the sense of mobilizing the international socialist movement in the struggle against the policy of military intervention, economic blockade and political "nonrecognition" of the Soviet government....

However, whereas the existence of the "Martov" movement was, so to say, merely a "symbolic" confirmation of the unresolved "democracy-socialism" problem within the Soviet revolution, the fact that throughout more than 25 years of existence of the Soviet system it was precisely the question of "democracy" that invariably drew the attention of the Soviet government and the Bolshevik Party at each new stage in the development of the Soviet Revolution and with each new turn of Soviet policy, in the course of the latest governmental or party "crisis" and provided an entirely realistic proof of this lack of solution. This was the case not only in the very process of the establishment of the Soviet system. It also existed in the course of the "discussion on trade unions," which preceded the transition from "war communism" to the "new economic policy" (the NEP); such was the case throughout the entire struggle among factions and trends within the Bolshevik Party, which marked the prologue to the period of comprehensive "collectivization" of agriculture and the country's feverish "industrialization," and which was eliminated through "purges" and "trials;" such was the case when in the aspiration to block the military threat which had been created for the Soviet Union with the assumption of power by Hitlerite fascism, the Soviet government proclaimed a policy of "collective security," a "united" proletarian and "people's" fronts outside the country, and the "Stalinist" 1936 Constitution, as the embodiment of "the most advanced democracy in the world," within it; finally, such was also the case when, along with the "defense of the fatherland," the Soviet government made the "defense of democracy" one of the main slogans of the anti-Hitlerite war. Even now, after the victorious completion of this war, the problem of "democracy" and of the country's domestic and foreign policies and approach to the international-proletarian question of the interrelationship between a reviving social democracy and a reviving communism becomes increasingly "topical" as the central problem of the Soviet society and the Soviet government.

However, the "democratization" of the Soviet system or, more accurately, the political shaping and strengthening

of its democracy is not visible as yet, and we shall have further occasion to speak of the reasons for this. First of all, however, we must also be aware of the factors which made it possible for a party which, during the time of the coup d'etat, based on even the most optimistic estimates, had no more than 250,000 members... most of them quite recent, not only to assume power over one-sixth of the globe, with an almost 200-million strong population, but also to retain this power for more than one-quarter of a century and, furthermore, within such a historically very short period of time, make it the instrument of a more radical economic, social and cultural reorganization of a backward country than any previous revolution experienced by mankind had been able to accomplish.

Naturally, the entire preceding history of a peculiar ideological development and, above all, the invariable orientation toward "armed uprising," which strengthened the hierarchical structure of the Bolshevik Party and which developed in all of its units the habit of "total obedience" to authoritarian directives coming "from above," was a preparation for dictatorial methods of bolshevik rule. However, in order to resolve the problems of self-defense and administration, which immediately faced the Soviet dictatorship under the conditions of the chaos we described and, furthermore, in order to cope with the tasks of initially rebuilding and then radically reorganizing to its foundations the dislocated economy of the country, it needed, immediately at that, a new apparatus which, to a certain extent, could replace the old one, for a large percentage of which had welcomed the new system with sabotage or with openly switching to the "White" counterrevolutionary camp in the Civil War. It was precisely this new apparatus that the entire previous work done by the social democrats, the efforts not of the one but of both of its factions, provided.

The clandestine cells, the combat groups, the military and technical organizations, the parties and units, etc., gave the bolsheviks cadres of organizers of the "Red Guard," and "food detachments," the Cheka and other agencies for the struggle against sabotage and the threatened counterrevolution. However, how many dozens if not hundreds of thousands of workers, who were trained by the mensheviks through the trade unions, the cooperatives, and insurance, cultural and all other organizations of workers' struggle, in self-management and self-activities gave the bolsheviks cadres of worker-organizers and administrators of the nationalized economy. It was only the relatively few politically already entirely self-defining and, frequently, most outstanding circles of this "labor intelligentsia" who held to the end their menshevik positions and, like the other mensheviks, left the practical-political stage and became victims of repressions. The overwhelming mass of the "worker intelligentsia," raised by the mensheviks, grew up under Soviet rule and became the strongest support of its economic system. This may sound paradoxical, but it was only the many long years of menshevik work and,

particularly and especially the "liquidators," that created this worker vanguard, without which the nationalization of industry and trade and the collectivization of agriculture would have been impossible, and without which the Soviet Revolution would have been doomed to failure. The course of events irrefutably confirmed in this manner that within the very struggle between its two factions of Russian Social Democrats, there existed the historically necessary factors for the victory of the Russian Revolution: each one of them, in the very "extremes" of its system served, as Plekhanov said in his time, "one of the sides," of the twin task which history had set to the Russian Revolution but which, for repeatedly described reasons, could not have a straight and harmonious resolution.

As has been frequently emphasized, the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and democratic intelligentsia in themselves had always been politically helpless. Having eliminated the division between themselves and the "White" front in the Civil War, they definitively deprived themselves of any opportunity for exerting any ideological and political influence if not on the workers at least on the peasant masses. Under those circumstances, considering the already noted political indifference on the part of the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie at that time, cadres consisting of elements shaped by the prerevolutionary work of the social democrats proved to be sufficient for giving the bolshevik system the opportunity to strengthen and to begin to build, naturally, in its most simplified and rough way, the new revolutionary apparatus and to resolve, again through the most simplistic and crude methods, perhaps the most urgent economic problems, i.e., above all to provide services to the Red fronts in the Civil War and to supply the urban population with food and the transportation system and industry with fuel and raw materials. At that time, having expropriated not only the capital of the bourgeoisie but also its consumer property, with its "egalitarian" and free distribution of the available goods among the "working people" and the "food detachments," removing from the peasants "surpluses" and using "labor armies," fed mandatorily by the entire able-bodied population of both sexes, "communism" was able to organize in some areas of the country collective work, above all in the extraction of fuel. It was no accident that this "communism" was described as "war:" as primitive and, essentially, inefficient. Under the conditions of the great revolutionary upheaval in the agricultural system of the country and the breakdown of industry and transportation, inherited by the revolution from the "imperialist" war and monstrously intensified by the Civil War, it was this "communism" that left the bolshevik system no way other than its approach to the solution of said urgent economic problems. Therefore, we do not have to explain why, along this way, under the circumstances marked by the Civil War, the dictatorial forms of the new power could not fail to become increasingly comprehensive and "strict." The same trend was followed also by the developing international situation.

As we know, fully consistent with the spirit of his farewell letter to the Swiss workers, Lenin himself believed that bolshevik dictatorship would turn out to be no more than a relatively short event, unless helped by the socialist revolution in the progressive European West, and that the historical significance of the Soviet "Commune" in that case would be reduced to the fact that it would be infinitely bigger than the Paris Commune and become a legend, an ideological flag, a model for emulation by future socialist revolutions which will learn from its experience, its victories and defeats. However, the low resistance of the German proletariat, morally and politically disoriented by the "war" policy of the majority of social democrats and trade unions, and weakened by the resulting political discord and civil war, made it possible for the capitalist victorious countries to nip in the bud the socialist revolution in Europe, in general, and to free their hands for military intervention and economic blockade directed against the Soviet socialist revolution in Russia.

Nonetheless, the bolshevik dictatorship did not perish. However, as the chance of resolving economic and social contradictions within the Soviet revolution by directing its further development into the channel of a joint revolutionary socialist development of Europe (on which the "Martov" trend as well relied) vanished, these contradictions became ever worse and the struggle against them increasingly difficult; the methods of this struggle became increasingly harsh and strict and the governmental forms of the Soviet system assumed growing "dictatorial" aspects: in the final account, the "surgical" transformation of the economic and social structure itself of a backward country reached its peak and completion with the policy of "elimination of the kulaks" and "comprehensive collectivization," and proved to be the high cost which alone could have prevented the collapse of the Soviet Revolution and its surrender to the forces of domestic and international capitalist reaction.

The greatest incentive for the development of the Soviet system in that same "dictatorial" direction was the military danger which kept threatening the Soviet Union even after the period of blockade and intervention was replaced by commercial relations and diplomatic recognitions. The most profound and inexhaustible source of this danger was the instability of the continental-European capitalist society, particularly Germany, its vital center. This was the inevitable consequence of having "rescued" it by force from the socialist revolution in Europe, thus excluding the possibility of its own peaceful noncatastrophic development, depriving it, at the same time, of the moral and political strength to resist the pressure of anticapitalist and socialist trends and ideas, the extreme manifestation and symbol of which, by the force of history, was the Soviet Revolution: the suppression of this revolution became a question of survival for the weakened continental-European capitalism, which had all the necessary reasons to rely in this case on the sympathy and assistance of capitalist reaktion and conservatism throughout the world.

This became entirely clear when the ruling classes in Europe began everywhere to counter the socialist danger which was developing against them by supporting "fascist" movements, despite the "anticapitalist" banner which enabled these movements to draw into their own orbit the disoriented broad masses of the petite bourgeoisie and the peasantry, which, for ages, had been the mass support of capitalism. This was so natural that, after a provincial rehearsal in Italy, it was precisely in Germany that "fascism" reached its peak of development and that German "national socialism" immediately became the point of application of that "anti-Soviet" policy, the clearest and final prewar manifestation of which was "Munich." However, in Germany Hitlerite fascism meant war, and regardless of the nature of the preparatory and initial phases of this war, one could not fail to see, as was noted at that time in the so-called "war theses" of Otto Bauer and the author of these lines, that despite the forced creation of a military coalition between the capitalist democracy and the Soviet Union, there would nonetheless be war, above all against socialism, not only Soviet but also European and global, and that in that war the Soviet Union was destined to become the most powerful socialist citadel.

Hitlerite fascism and the war dealt a lethal blow to European capitalism and made the socioeconomic and political revival of Europe possible only as a socialist revival. This means that in Europe after World War II there can be no revival of the economic and social conditions which, after World War I, divided and weakened its labor movement and strengthened and expanded the ideology of democratic reformism, on one hand, and centralist authoritarianism, on the other. In both its wings this movement now undertook in earnest the task of seizing the power as a necessary instrument for the socialist reorganization of the social system.

However, under the conditions of postwar Europe, this grandiose task which violently cut into the interests of so many powerful social forces raised in the old ideas, cannot be resolved exclusively through parliamentary vote or "armed uprising," as was the case in October-November 1917, when the Bolsheviks cut the Gordian Knot of Russian revolutionary conflicts. Nor can it be resolved by a divided working class. It requires not only the mobilization of all of its own forces but also the ability to rally around itself intellectual workers and all the nonproletarian toiling masses of town and country and become for them, as Marx said, the "liberating class." Neither such mobilization nor such unity are possible without taking into account the extremely limited nature of the methods applied by purely parliamentary democracy in such an age of upheaval. However, nor are they also possible without taking into consideration the habits of engaging in free democratic activities, which have not only become part of the flesh and blood of European intellectual circles but have been developed through the age-old history of Europe among the broadest toiling masses of town and country, as distinct

from those popular masses on which the 1917 Soviet Revolution relied and which made that revolution. Surmounting the division, therefore, becomes not only necessary but also possible: we cannot fail to see how in the very course of the struggle for power waged by the European labor movement in front of our very eyes, in both of its wings gradually the elements of a unifying political-ideological "synthesis" are growing, trying organically to combine communist revolutionary dynamism with the socialist free organization of self-governing masses.

Naturally, the way to surmount the division which is already 30 years old can be neither direct nor easy. Ossified ideological, psychological and emotional traditions within both wings of the divided labor movement have frequently manifested themselves, and still do, slowing down and ruining the process of restoration of worker unity. However, always, in the final account, the iron historical necessity crushes and defeats the ideological and psychological inertia of parties, groups and leaders. It is this iron historical need that makes it necessary for postwar Europe to become socialist. It is this iron historical necessity that will bring about worker unity, without which a socialist Europe is impossible.

However, a socialist Europe does not exclusively mean the creation of entirely new conditions for the development of Europe itself and of the rest of the world. It means creating entirely new conditions for the further development of the Soviet Revolution as well, a possibility for resolving on an international scale the contradictions of Russian socialism and Russian democracy, which cannot be resolved within a national framework and which, as we see, have always appeared to the theoreticians of both wings of the Russian social democracy as the only solution to such contradictions.

Whatever the aspect of contemporary bolshevism may be, it is the direct offspring of the revolutionary struggle waged by the Russian social democrats from which bolshevism developed and, even more than that, the struggle which began more than 100 years ago, between changing generations under the conditions of the actual development of Russia with its inherent contradiction: the delay, which made having democracy without socialism impossible, and a backwardness which made impossible the achievement of socialism in its free democratic forms. What is even much more important, however, is that whatever the image of contemporary bolshevism may be, history made it the bearer of the "key" idea of our age: the idea of socialism. Placing it at the head of a huge state, it also made it a factor of tremendous power in the complex and catastrophic process of the practical implementation of these ideas.

It is impossible to assess the prospects of the future development and of socialism, both European and global, and of bolshevism itself, without taking these two factors into consideration as being historical givens and irreplaceable. The question may be only whether the process of the historical achievement of socialism and

the process of evolution of the Soviet system (and, with it, bolshevism itself), not in the sense of a historically inconceivable return to the regime of parliamentary democracy, naturally, but in the sense that its "humanizing" and "democratization" would take the path of a kind of ideological "synthesis" which is maturing within the European socialist and communist movements.

We said that the question of the democratization of the Soviet system was raised by the bolsheviks themselves at each new stage in the development of the Soviet state. It can be said that the inner, the "organic" democratization of the Soviet system has not been interrupted from its very start, increasingly becoming its inalienable and characteristic feature. The "politicizing" of the Russian peasantry was a process of such democratization of the Soviet system....

An unquestionably major step in this internal organic democratization was what became a firm accomplishment of the "Stalinist" Constitution of 1936: the elimination of the category of rightless people and the proclamation of the basic equality of rights of all citizens without exception, regardless of their "social origin." It is conceivable that in this sense even more important in a country with a party dictatorship will be the democratic idea of the primacy of the "nation" over that of the "party," and "civic valor" over "party card," which was persistently emphasized in the national-patriotic propaganda during the war and which led to the fact that millions of soldiers, employees, workers and peasants, intimately acquainted with the Soviet system but not with the specific ideology of bolshevism, joined the party during the war.

Nonetheless, at no stage was this continuing democratization of the Soviet regime given a political shape, in the sense of codifying for the benefit of the citizens the freedom of speech, discussion, criticism, formation of groups and engaging in organized actions not only in the area of "business," cooperative and farming and problems of "applied" policy, but also in the area of "higher" politics, in the realm of the essential problems of the governmental system, the structure of the system and the basic lines followed in its domestic and foreign policy. Invariably, the reason for this was the fear that such freedom would benefit social forces which could become bearers of the process of capitalist restoration and, furthermore, constitute a support for foreign agents working for a hostile "capitalist encirclement," which was a permanent source of possible military threat to the Soviet country. In an effort to "use" such nonproletarian social forces, the Soviet system meanwhile refused them official legal conditions outside of which they could not successfully operate and, in the final account, as we saw, it inevitably untangled the knot of the consequent contradictions of "elimination as a class" of one such social force after another: tsarist bureaucracy and the generals, big land owners, the financial, commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the nepmen, and the kulaks.

The cruel "liquidation" operations preserved and strengthened, as we saw, the harsh dictatorial nature of the Soviet system. However, they did not prevent the possibility of its "Bonapartizing" which had been predicted for a number of years by its socialist critics and on which its capitalist enemies relied: the new bourgeois strata which developed on the basis of the revolutionary routing of feudalism, from which, historically, "Bonapartism" draws its political and material strength, did not appear. With the liquidation of the "kulaks," however, all possibility disappeared of the revival of this wide stratum of strong peasantry, which had become rich in the revolution, and which lends its mass support to any kind of "Bonapartism." In the process of "liquidations," the Soviet society became socially equalized. The division between its ruling "upper strata" and the guided "lower strata" was no longer clear. A continuous "exchange of social substances" took place between these upper and lower strata and ever new people's strata rose upward along the social ladder.

The elimination of the kulaks and "comprehensive collectivization" of the countryside have made Soviet society "classless," in the sense that the material inequality which remains within it is one which is not socially firm but ordinary and transient, an inequality which does not offer anyone the opportunity for making it a basis for appropriation of the country's economy or a tool for the exploitation of other population strata and, least of all, a basis for forming a new "ruling class." Furthermore, this "classlessness" of the country excludes the possibility of a fascist degeneracy of the Soviet system, something which is currently being tirelessly predicted and even "noticed" by its capitalist and democratic critics. However, that same "classlessness" also excludes the possibility of the revival of the internal dangers which were previously related, in the eyes of the Soviet system, to the political shape to be given to its basic democratization.

The disappearance of this internal threat is what enabled the Soviet government not only to proclaim "democracy" "the most advanced" democracy at that, as the basic principle of the Soviet system, but also to take demonstrative steps toward its political shaping. Unquestionably, this included, in domestic policy, the 1936 "Stalin" Constitution, which proclaimed, for the first time, the equality among all citizens and replaced the traditional Soviet open voting with secret balloting; in the international-proletarian policy, it proclaimed the "united worker" and "people's" fronts; in foreign policy, a course of rapprochement with the democratic countries for the sake of throwing fascism back. As we saw, this line followed by Soviet policy was wrecked by "Munich," and the war ended its further development.

However, that same war created, as we pointed out, all the necessary prerequisites for the socialist restructuring of Europe and for the restoration of labor unity as a necessary instrument for such reorganization. Socialist Europe means the elimination of the external threats which, as we saw, were, from the very first days of the

Soviet Revolution, one of the main factors in the development of the regime it created, in establishing a dictatorial trend, and one of the main obstacles to the political democratization of this regime, as well as one of the main reasons for the "self-isolation" of the Soviet Union, and its aspiration to distance itself from the influence of the external world by erecting the thickest possible impassable wall.

With the disappearance of the internal and external threats, entirely new conditions will be created for the further development of the Soviet regime and its political democratization. This democratization will become historically possible. The profound interest shown by the Soviet Union in the fastest possible building of a socialist Europe and, therefore, in the successes of socialist-communist unity, will make for it such a democratization historically increasingly urgent. The tremendous work which is facing the Soviet Union to restore the population's living standard, dislocated by and worsened even further in the course of the war, and the satisfaction of the increased self-awareness of the popular masses and the increased mental and moral demands of the population lead to believe that this democratization will become increasingly historically necessary.

Naturally, the process of political democratization of the Soviet system could hardly take place smoothly, without hitches and failures: the inertia of group, mutual and private interests and, even more so, the inertia of decades of developed ideological, political and psychological habits and postponements will erect thousands of obstacles on this way. Naturally, the result of this democratization could hardly be the simple transformation of the Soviet regime, which has become so commonplace, into a regime of parliamentary democracy.

This regime is based on a system of political parties, representing the economic and social interests of antagonistic classes or individual segments of these classes, fighting against each other and for the votes of the electorate. It is symbolized and headed by a parliament of one type or another, as the arena on which the verbal competition among the parties takes place and which is the seat of the supreme authority, the voting in which resolves disputes. However, in a society in which there are no antagonistic classes there would hardly be any place for political parties of a type similar to those which developed in the course of the functioning and development of capitalism. This does not apply to Soviet society alone: Marx predicted that in a socialist society "management of the people," i.e., "politics," will increasingly be replaced by the "management of objects," i.e., by "economics." It appears that his prediction has all the chances of being confirmed by the actual course of social development. Therefore, one may think that the freedom of speech, criticism and organization, the electoral struggle, and so on, which political democratization will provide to the Soviet citizens, will be used less by political groups than by groups which will be primarily professional, corporate, local, national, ideological and so on.

What shape will this freedom assume? Today, one can only guess. What matters is that it will guarantee the truly free ideological self-determination of Soviet society, of all its strata, and truly free self-management in all areas and all levels of activities, from top to bottom, economic, social as well as governmental. Finally, this will provide a solution to the painful problem of combining freedom with socialism, a problem which, for more than a century, remained insoluble and on which the Russian revolutionary movement has struggled so dedicatedly and heroically, in all alternating areas and in the struggle of friend against friend, a frequently passionate and fierce struggle.

More than 100 years later, we are beginning to come close to the implementation of Hertzen's prophetic prediction about Russia: "We shall lead socialism to freedom." What Hertzen did not predict, however, is that it is "we" who will take "socialism to freedom," not as distinct from Europe and not in opposition to Europe and not without Europe, not alone....

"Socialism to freedom," the old banner of Russian "originality," has all the chances of becoming a universal banner in the development of all countries and nations on earth. The prophetic "Russian idea," its "universal humaneness," which was proclaimed by Dostoyevskiy, this extreme Russian nationalist but also great Russian seer, is turning into historical reality. The "Russian idea" is becoming a "universal human" idea for in the course of a century, in all of its statements and ups and downs, it was an idea of dedicated struggle for the solution of this problem which is becoming the real problem of our age: the problem of achieving freedom within socialism and socialism within freedom.

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## CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### The Principle of Freedom of Choice: International Aspect

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[Article by I. Malashenko, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] This principle, codified in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress, is one of the most important ideas of the new political thinking. It was formulated by the country's leadership 2 years ago. However, its conceptual substantiation is still largely absent. Naturally, similar concepts are found in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and many other international legal documents. Unfortunately, in recent decades they have been usually received in our country

as the unavoidable due paid to democratic rhetoric, not directly related to real international politics. Many were those who tended to forget that the right of the people to a free choice had been not only proclaimed but also practically implemented with the October Revolution.

The actual subsequent rejection of the principle of freedom of choice was also reflected in the works of our social scientists who, in frequent cases, merely noted the actual policy dictated essentially by great-power interests.

Today by no means is each new word in politics consistent with the existing concept, and many attempts at the conceptual interpretation of the new steps in policy are unnecessarily of a preliminary nature, something like a "trial balloon" in solving complex theoretical problems. Nor is the principle of freedom of choice an exception, a principle which has now become a political concept which has brought about such far-reaching practical consequences as to require the comprehensive interpretation of political experts.

I believe that we could mention a minimum of two dimensions of the principle of freedom of choice: socio-political, i.e., the right of the peoples to choose their social system, and the international, the right of the state to choose the course it will pursue in the world arena and the ways and means of securing its national interests, partners and allies. The present article deals essentially with the international aspect, although we must also remember the close link between the internal development of society and its external circumstances.

The basis of the principle of freedom of choice is the fact that historical development has a number of options. Although today this concept may seem almost trite, for many years we actually proceeded from the opposite premise. History—contemporary history in any case—seemed like a linear process, the determining feature of which was the universal conversion to the "only accurate" socioeconomic and political system, of which we were the model. In a society of command-administrative socialism, the problem of choice had been eliminated once and for all, and the search for any variant of development was proclaimed ideological heresy.

Today, as we look at the distance covered by our society, we can see that there were opportunities which remained unused, and alternatives which were nipped in the bud. Possibly, we may even be investing excessive energy in seeking a different path and in attempts mentally to extend interrupted trends, based on the principle of, what would have happened if.... The past cannot be redone. However, we can draw lessons for the future: we must not yield to the hypnosis of the "final truth," and try to convince ourselves and others that there are no alternatives to any given solution. Conversely, the lack of options should immediately act as a caution: Are we ignoring any other existing opportunity?

The views which a society has about itself is inevitably reflected in its concepts of the outside world, for which

reason the reinterpretation of the historical path covered by our country and the rejection of the "monolithic unity" of views on social development also entail a reassessment of international realities. For many years we saw in the very existence of a different sociopolitical system a source of threat to our security, and any manifestation of pluralism in the socialist world and the world communist movement, not only as a rejection of our ideological rightness but also in an increased external threat. If any given country, as a rule with active Soviet help, made a choice which was consistent with our concepts of socialism or "socialist orientation," this choice was considered definitive and irreversible, and a retreat from it was simply conceived as "intrigues of imperialist forces."

This watchful and inimical attitude toward the multitude of hues and varieties in the outside world was rooted, however, not only in our ideological concepts but in international realities as well. The activities of dozens of countries in the world arena always, naturally, create the impression of great variety and, sometimes, a picture of the "struggle of all against all." Totally uncontrolled rivalry among governments has historically been the cause of wars and conflicts and, not without a reason, was considered a threat to international and national security. On the other hand, pluralism in world politics was to a large extent merely the appearance behind which was concealed the domination of several great powers, while the others had been assigned a very passive role. Although not one of these powers had succeeded in reaching world hegemony, international relations were distinguished by their profoundly anti-democratic nature.

Meanwhile, currently a trend toward democratization is gathering strength, not only in sociopolitical life in different countries but also in the international system as a whole. New social forces and movements, nations and countries have emerged in the historical proscenium, unwilling to tolerate any longer their role as extras and trying to become real features in global politics. To this effect, however, they must have true freedom of choice, be it in domestic affairs or foreign policy. The democratization of international relations, based on the principle of freedom of choice, is dictated not only by moral considerations but also by the lessons of postwar history and the political realities of today.

#### Cold War: Choice Without Choice

After World War II a bipolar structure appeared in international relations, in which the role of the main antagonists was assumed by the USSR and the United States. Frequently the sources of this were considered to be the incompatible ideologies of the two "superpowers." However, the conflict was also based on profound geopolitical reasons, the clash of the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, above all on the European Continent. Naturally, the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States acted as the leaders of the

different sociopolitical systems was of major significance. However, the concept of international relations as an arena for the clash between socialism and capitalism ignored the fact that the subjects of global politics were not the socialist and capitalist "camps," but countries motivated above all by their national interests.

During the cold war period the rules of the game in the international arena became simplified to their extreme. Superideologization of intergovernmental relations created a black-and-white vision of the world, which was distinctly divided into "ours" and "theirs," or "friends" and "enemies." Each "gain" by the United States was automatically considered a "loss" for the USSR, and vice versa. From the viewpoint of the main participants in the confrontation, the quintessence of foreign policy wisdom was expressed by the old saying that "he who is not with us is against us." According to this logic, each country had clearly to define its place on one side in this global confrontation or another.

Despite the fact that the cold war was based on geopolitical and ideological factors, it did not in the least break out automatically but as a result of decisions which were made quite deliberately in the different capitals. To a large extent, it was the choice made by the American elite, which was seeking ways of mobilizing its society in support of the globalist power course charted by Washington after World War II.

The "threat from the East" or, at least, belief in that threat, simplified the problem of substantiating the various actions taken by Washington in the international arena. It was a powerful factor for the strengthening of NATO and helped to "keep in line" the members of that bloc, despite political differences which arose among them. The task of preserving bloc unity was also facilitated by the fact that NATO was considered by its members above all as a geopolitical alliance which did not formulate "excessive" ideological and political demands to its members.

The cold war choice also enabled Stalin to maintain in our society a feeling of "besieged fortress," which he needed in order to strengthen his regime of personal power, and supplied one more reason for suppressing any manifestations of "free thinking," which were immediately classified as imperialist "ideological sabotage." The logic of confrontation also eliminated the need to seek compromises and to take into consideration partners in the international arena, their views or the aspects of their chosen development.

As a result of World War II, what developed along the Western borders of the Soviet Union, replacing the anti-Soviet "cordon sanitaire," was a kind of "safety belt" consisting of a number of countries which had been liberated by the Soviet Army from nazi occupation and had taken the path of democratic development. Some of them had kept a developed political standard and parliamentary traditions and quite strong social democratic

movements, while right-wing parties had become discredited because of their ties to the nazis during the war. Cooperation with such countries could have guaranteed, in the long range, not only the needs related to their development but also the interests of Soviet security. However, the Stalinist regime could feel secure only by instilling in Eastern Europe, through diktat, its own "model of socialism," intensifying the atmosphere of coercion and repression.

The strict requirement of maintaining "unity in the ranks" of the allies was manifested throughout the virtually entire postwar period in the Warsaw Pact, where any deviation from ideological and political orthodoxy was considered not only dangerous "heresy" but also a potential threat to the safety of the alliance.

Officially, state sovereignty and the right of a nation to make a sociopolitical choice were not rejected, but only providing that any alternate decision would fit the Procrustean bed of "real socialism." The efforts to dismantle command-administrative socialism in any Eastern European country could be considered sufficient grounds for intervention in its internal affairs by the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union above all, naturally, for the purpose of "defending the gains of socialism." This approach was actually the foundation of the extensively advertised Western "doctrine of limited sovereignty," or the "Brezhnev doctrine" which, although very vaguely formulated in Soviet official documents, was manifested with extreme clarity in the suppression of the "Prague Spring" of 1968. This action, which had become an open violation of the right of a nation to a choice, was publicly condemned by the heads of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland 21 years later.

The cold war sharply restricted the freedom of choice not only of its "rank-and-file" members but of the "superpowers" themselves which, it seemed, should have enjoyed a virtually free hand by virtue of their status. The logic of confrontation dictated that arising problems must be solved by force. It demanded a harsh reaction to any action taken by the opponent, if considered a violation of the international status quo.

In this bipolar and superideologized world, events occurring not only in the "central" (European) but also the "peripheral" areas assumed to the opposing sides exaggerated significance. Any local conflict became a test of strength and resolve on the part of the "superpowers." This meant that just about any developing country, in making its sociopolitical choice, was to acquire, one way or another, the support of the Soviet Union or the United States. Since, as a rule, such a choice was paralleled by a confrontation among different forces within that country, inevitably the USSR and the United States became involved in strictly internal clashes and conflicts, supporting, in some cases, regimes which had come to power, or the opposition, in other.

Washington, however, based on its experience of the war in Vietnam, realized the futility of efforts to keep in power regimes which lacked domestic support, and began, whenever possible, to avoid any direct involvement in major regional conflicts (which, naturally, did not exclude the active use of subversive operations, weapons supplies and "police" actions which, on the American scale, were considered "minor"). In our country the results of the war in Indochina were interpreted, above all, as confirmation of the changed ratio of forces between socialism and imperialism in the world arena, which also had far-reaching consequences for Soviet third world policy.

We were firmly convinced that by supporting the countries with a "socialist orientation" we were helping them to exercise their right to a free choice, to protect themselves from imperial encroachments. Frequently, particularly at the initial period of the process of decolonization, such was indeed the case. However, in the course of time our help began to be demanded with increasing frequency by groups which turned out unable to assert their power without outside military "support." It became clear, however, that even a strictly "progressive" system cannot remain in power in the long run unless it relies on the firm foundation of internal support, on the democratic choice of the entire nation. Therefore, a criterion in terms of realpolitik (in addition to strictly geopolitical motivations) in the matter, let us say, of giving someone aid or refusing it, obviously, had to include not ideological dogmas but specific political considerations concerning the legitimacy of the regime, the extent to which it was approved within a given country, etc.

The importance of the accurate concept concerning the real choice made by a given society was confirmed for us by the tragic experience in Afghanistan which, by the end of the 1970s, was viewed by the then Soviet leadership (and not only by it alone) as a country which had taken the path of socialist orientation and which had to be supported by the Soviet Union. As was pointed out, however, at the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the assessment of the situation in Afghanistan was based on ideological concepts which substantiated the profoundly erroneous decision to send troops into that country. The practical aspect of the use of military power was that of interfering in the sovereign rights of a nation, whose choice, as we are well aware today, was distinguished by major historical and cultural characteristics.

#### **The New Realities and Freedom of Choice**

At the very first stage of perestroika in our country, it became necessary to make our concepts fit the international realities and to develop new principles of behavior in the international arena.

Looking around us, we realized that the contemporary world could in no way still be considered bipolar and that the majority of countries were openly fed up with

the role of extras, which had been imposed upon them according to the cold war scenario. In recent years, the United States and the USSR looked less like the leaders of united cohorts than like gladiators who were wearing one another down in front of a large audience. We realized that, from the viewpoint of the real processes of international development, Soviet-American confrontation simply made no sense, and that denying to other countries the freedom of choice had become a dangerous anachronism. As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, we reached the conclusion of the mandatory nature of this principle not simply because of good motivations. We were led to it by the impartial analysis of the objective processes of our time. Striking changes had taken place not only in Europe, which had long recovered its strength after World War II and had begun ever more actively to define its own destiny, but also in the zone of the developing countries, where the great variety of choices in social development and the fact that the chosen path could not be reduced to a simple duplication of "Western" or "Eastern" models had become particularly clear.

The formulation of extremely accurate views on the contemporary international realities demanded the deideologizing of approaches to international problems, and a rejection of shifting ideological preferences or differences to the area of intergovernmental relations. This does not mean the rejection of values and ideals which a given society may choose. However, should it project its ideological systems on the international surroundings, an extremely distorted image of the world arises in the public consciousness and a sober realization based on the principle of "that is what it is" is frequently replaced by ideologized assessments such as "that is what it should (or should not) be." Inevitably, an ideologized foreign policy, which does not take sufficiently into consideration the interests of the partners and does not acknowledge their right to a free choice, clashes with reality.

In accordance with our own ideological concepts, we largely linked our security in the European area to preserving in the Eastern European countries the command-administrative model of socialism, and for a long time were unwilling to take into consideration the fact that many of them, by virtue of a sufficiently high level of economic development and political standards, had realized far earlier than our society the inefficiency of the "antimarket" economy and the faultiness of the anti-democratic political system. For quite some time any serious deviations from the "general line" had been suppressed either by the ruling regimes, whose representatives were not necessarily guided exclusively by the aspiration to remain in power, but also could sincerely believe in the accuracy of the way chosen by the first socialist country in the world, or else, if there was a shortage of "domestic means," the Soviet Union would act as a guarantor for the preservation of the status quo. Meanwhile, a sociopolitical tension was building up in the European socialist countries, along with a rejection of a situation in which entire societies were in fact being deprived of the right to choose.

However, before respect for this right had been declared one of the most important principles of the new political thinking, our society had made its own choice, the choice of perestroyka. The vast changes which were made in our country could not, naturally, fail to be reflected in the other socialist states, the political and economic structures of which had been largely established according to our own image and semblance. The Soviet Union, which had abandoned its paternalistic attitude toward its allies and imposing on them of its own sociopolitical prescriptions, including perestroyka, objectively played the role of a gigantic catalyst for change in the socialist countries.

Soviet perestroyka was perceived in a variety of ways by the Eastern European regimes. Those among them which tried to listen to the demands of the public for economic and political change and to implement them, made use of their regained right to a freedom of choice in engaging in profound changes, as was the case with Poland and Hungary, for instance. However, even in such countries the reforms turned out to be largely "postponed," which was manifested in the sharp decline of the political impact and influence of the worker parties which, in the eyes of society, bore the main responsibility for the protracted preservation of a discredited system of command-administrative socialism.

An even more difficult situation developed in countries whose leadership considered, quite legitimately, perestroyka a threat to the social order which secured its power monopoly, and chose the preservation of the status quo by all means. Such a course inevitably led to an explosion of mass discontent and to the fast collapse of regimes which tried to oppose the renovation process. The rapidity of such changes confirmed how timely and "overripe" were their prerequisites, and their peaceful and nonviolent nature in the majority of countries indicated the high political standard they had reached. Naturally, Romania was the exception. Here the overthrow of the regime was the result of a bloody struggle against the dictatorship, which not only rejected the right to a choice by its own nation but also resorted to most barbaric repressive measures.

Our society reacted to the changes in the Eastern European countries with obvious sympathy although, naturally, mixed with apprehension concerning the possibility that our own security may suffer as a consequence and, in some cases, frankly speaking, with doubts about whether we had acted properly by proclaiming the principle of freedom of choice which, consequently, was applied by our allies. Fears concerning any possible negative influence of the "political earthquake" in Eastern Europe on international stability, however paradoxical, was manifested in the West as well, where, occasionally, we hear in political debates something like nostalgia for the predictability of events, the habit of which had been established during the cold war.

Clearly, we must, above all, ask ourselves the following question: Could we have acted differently? Before our own allies had made their choice, we had made it

ourselves, opting in favor of perestroyka within Soviet society and for deideologizing foreign policy.

Naturally, in theory, we had another option as well: to use all available instruments of influence, to preserve the status quo and to prevent any "disorder" among the allies. However, such a course would have been unacceptable, and not only from the moral viewpoint, and would have meant that our proclaimed support of universal human values and democratic ideals was on paper only. It would have led to a growing separation from Soviet policy by our allies and the increased dislike and even hostility toward a country which opposed the aspirations of entire nations. To this day we see in the Eastern European countries outbreaks of anti-Soviet feelings. Let us admit that, to a large extent, they are a reaction to the situation which had prevailed for decades, during which the Soviet Union acted as the creator and protector of the command-administrative system.

If a society has a sufficiently high political standard, in the long run we could rely on the fact that the political and ideological "extremes" would be kept where they belong—at the margin of social life. To this day, however, in the majority of Eastern European countries the attitude toward the Soviet Union is defined not only by negative emotions, which accumulated in the course of decades, but also by sympathy for Soviet perestroyka, which offered new prospects for social development for both our country and for our allies.

The Eastern European countries made an important and simple choice: the command-administrative model of socialism was doomed to collapse. This was the result not of speculative ideological concepts but of life itself, given the conditions of a system which had demonstrated its inability to satisfy the needs of modern society.

However, let us not think that the problem of choice is limited to this. The peoples of those countries must answer the crucial question of what specific type of society they intend to build. The main socioeconomic structures cannot be replaced instantaneously by simply eliminating from the name of a country the word "people's" or "socialist." The reformers must take into consideration the real condition of the economy, the situation in the social area, the traditions of political standards as well as the political institutions which had developed in the course of four decades. This means that the desire to turn the economy to a market system and to establish real democracy in the political area will not mean building from scratch, but will be a lengthy process of transformation of the structures which had been established in those countries by the end of the 1980s.

Inevitably, as the socialist countries take the path of change, differences among them will arise ever more clearly. Such differences have always existed but had remained concealed behind the facade of the "single path" of development. Should we fear such pluralism?

Possibly, the experience of our partners may, in some areas, substantially enrich our own concepts of alternate ways of changing socialism and thus broaden the possibilities of our own choice. Since many socialist countries have moved far ahead of us along this path, it is not excluded that, in turn, they would become catalysts of some reforms about which, for the time being, we remain indecisive. This means that the sociopolitical and ideological dimensions of our relations will not disappear but will acquire a qualitatively different content, determined above all by reciprocal interest in seeking a solution to the crisis.

Freedom of choice means not only multiple options in the sociopolitical development of a given country but also acknowledging its freedom to maneuver in the area of foreign policy, taking into consideration its specific national and governmental interests. What are the guarantees that our friends and allies will not start looking for new partners for themselves?

As historical experience indicates, the foundations of truly strong alliances rest less on the ideological similarity of their participants than the commonality of their interests and geopolitical factors. Within the context of the profound sociopolitical changes occurring in the Eastern European countries, the obvious tasks include a systematic deideologizing of the Warsaw Pact, a rejection of ideological and political demands as prerequisites for membership in the pact and its "demilitarization," i.e., a consistent lowering of the military component, while comprehensively developing political interaction.

Today some political parties and groups in several Warsaw Pact members are calling for withdrawing from the pact. Occasionally, this meets with a response on the part of public opinion. Despite the emotional coloring of the processes occurring in Eastern Europe, it is unlikely that any one of these countries will begin to act against its own interests and make a break with the Warsaw Pact, surrendering to an instant compulsion. If any one of them would no longer consider this alliance a guarantor of its own security, having thought about the problem at length, it would make no sense to try to keep it, for neither the firmness of the Warsaw Pact nor its effectiveness would improve by maintaining an appearance of unity. Furthermore, let us not forget that the principle of freedom of choice applies to our country as well, for which reason we have the right to develop relations above all with those among our partners with whom we are joined by common interests and political guidelines.

The partners of the Soviet Union are just as interested in preserving stability on the European Continent which, however, can no longer be maintained by perpetuating the division of Europe and retaining a high level of military and political tension among its different areas. Consequently, the aspiration of a number of our allies to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territory (which can be easily understood in the context of the history of our reciprocal relations) does not, in itself,

create any threat to the security of the USSR, although equally understandable is our interest in a reciprocal reduction in the levels of troops and armaments by NATO. The fast changes in the status quo dictate the need for the increasingly active use of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in stabilizing the political situation on the European Continent. We must acknowledge that today the process of NATO's politicizing is developing more consistently than that of the Warsaw Pact, where it has largely assumed a spontaneous nature, which reflects the rapidity and scale of the changes which have taken place in the Eastern European countries. We believe, however, that the new regimes which appear in those countries would be unlikely to wish any "rocking of the European boat."

The Warsaw Pact's loss of its customary "monolithic nature" does not mean in the least the automatic strengthening of NATO, according to the rules of the "zero option" game. Since opposing the "menace from the East" constitutes the counteracting and cementing power of NATO, the processes occurring within the Warsaw Pact are bound to be reflected on the North Atlantic Bloc as well. Naturally, we cannot fail to take into consideration that some people in the West, in the United States above all, hope that under the conditions of the growth of centrifugal trends within the Warsaw Pact, the NATO "politicized" bloc will become a powerful attraction for the Eastern European countries and that a united Germany will become a member of NATO.

From the viewpoint of economic interests of the socialist countries, the EEC—the Western European integrated group—is a powerful "magnet." The community not only has significant resources but, judging from all available information, is prepared to use them by setting sensible conditions for assisting Eastern Europe's the economic development. The future of the Soviet economic reform will determine the extent to which the Soviet Union will be able to create a sufficiently strong field of attraction for its partners, not limited to their traditional dependence on Soviet raw material and fuel and energy resources, or the reciprocal interest of the socialist countries to market goods which are noncompetitive on the world market.

The "German question," the prospect of the unification of the two German states, which forces us to take a new look at the deployment of forces in Europe, will be a major test for a policy based on the principle of freedom of choice. On the one hand, no one can say "no" to the national aspirations of the Germans. However, both the Soviet Union and the international community at large have the right to expect that neither German state will begin to pit the right of the Germans to a choice against the legitimate aspiration of other nations to peace and security.

Naturally, the question of choice under the conditions of a polarized world in which traditional ideological guidelines are losing their significance, while military power can no longer be considered the only guarantee of

security and stability, will be much more difficult to answer than it was during the period of the cold war, when we saw no alternative to the military-political and ideological confrontation between East and West. Unfortunately, in recent decades we became all too accustomed to assessing the situation on the basis of the "either-or" principle or the "black and white" option, and largely forgot how to find the delicate balance which, actually, is the foundation of international politics. Of late a public discussion on problems of our foreign policy has been initiated within Soviet society. The open and democratic discussion is an important guarantee of the fact that no serious option concerning our activities will be ignored by society.

A comparison among all viewpoints, and weighing the "fors" and "againsts" is particularly necessary in the implementation of the right to a choice by the population of a multinational state. The exercise of the right to self-determination by one ethnic group inevitably leads into the same situation other ethnic groups within the country, groups whose interests have become interwoven in the course of decades. The implementation of this right cannot be reduced to one hasty decision but is a search for reciprocally acceptable solutions to numerous economic, military-political and legal problems. The political forces abroad, which tend to accept any secession as a fait accompli, should not forget the complex international-legal nuances of this process, for the final proof of the independence of a new state is its recognition by the state from which it has seceded.

The burden of traditions and biases is felt in any society; meanwhile, national self-confidence leads not only to the belief that one's choice is the only right one but also to impose it upon others. For example, American democratic institutions did not prevent the long series of U.S. interventions under messianic slogans, and the custom of considering its own view of democracy as mandatorily applicable to the rest of the world not only allows Washington to "substantiate" acts such as the invasion of Grenada or Panama, but also to ensure their mass support within the country. As it welcomes the proclamation and practical implementation of the principle of freedom of choice by the Soviet Union, Washington is, it appears, not ready as yet to be guided by the same approach when it comes to its own partners. Does this mean that we acted in haste by charting a course of democratization of international relations and granting the nations the right to make a choice, whether in domestic matters or foreign policy?

We believe that, in the long run, denying the freedom of choice is futile, for the variety of the contemporary world and the multiple options offered for its development are, so to say, an insurmountable fact which can be ignored only to our own detriment. The acceptance of the universality of the principle of freedom of choice is motivated not only by moral considerations and the priority of universal human values, but also the need to make one's ideas consistent with the realities of the contemporary world, which does not fit in the least within the

framework of the cold war approach. Denial of the freedom of choice can only trigger an increasing social aspiration to the acquisition of this right and, should it remain unsatisfied, to an aggravation of international contradictions and conflicts, which may have severe and unpredictable consequences. Naturally, any society has the right to believe in the accuracy of its own choice. However, to convince others to follow it is possible, in the final account, only through the strength of its own example.

It is to be hoped that the various political problems which will be discussed at the 28th CPSU Congress, related, to one extent or another, to the principle of freedom of choice, will contribute to our interpretation of the realities of the contemporary world and the enrichment of Soviet foreign policy.

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#### Non-Police Story

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[Materials prepared by N. Yermoshkin and V. Rubtsov]

[Text] Today, when the main obstacles to broad economic cooperation among countries with different social systems have been eliminated in the course of our perestroyka, making Soviet economy part of the global economy is becoming a mandatory aspect of our domestic development. We are seeking new reliable ties; we are broadening and intensifying contacts; thousands of new people have become involved in this process, taking their initial steps in a very complex foreign economic area. Therefore, the objective difficulties are worsened by subjective ones. We must learn a great deal more in order to be better oriented toward the global market. If we were to ignore Western experience, the dynamic development of our economy, involving the use of various forms of ownership and market mechanisms, will turn out quite problematical. This is confirmed by the practical experience of the first years of perestroyka, in the course of which many efforts to organize joint work with Western enterprises failed. Such cases have been repeatedly reported in the Soviet press.

The materials at the disposal of this journal confirm this and shed additional light on the reasons for and circumstances of the failures, although they may seem to be isolated cases. The editors found it expedient to acquaint the readers with the Western and Soviet viewpoints on the matter.

#### 'I Fear That...'

We first heard from one of our diplomats about a millionaire who sincerely wishes to help perestroyka and who, on each occasion, suffers major losses. Apparently, this was not a rather common occurrence in Western business practices. Therefore, let us begin by letting the

victim speak. A recording taped in France, contained an emotional report recorded in English:

"In mid-1987, I was involved in several projects in the Soviet Union. One of them was approved after consultation with the head of Goskino. The new deputy chairman of that organization asked me to consider plans for importing video equipment from the West, with a view to organizing subsequently the production of video cassettes in the Soviet Union. I considered the idea worthy of attention. The first thing I did was to make a trip, at my expense, to various countries to study the market for video equipment and related production facilities. I visited Sonio in Germany, Sony in Tokyo, Phillips in Holland, and Thompson in Paris. I also held meetings with different U.S. companies. Based on the results of the trip, I drafted two reports concerning the market for video equipment and the strategy used by the different companies. Since I had long-established relations with Phillips, I found it easy to deal with this task. However, I could not even imagine that, returning to the Soviet Union with a report and a ready plan for action, everything would collapse. The talk I was conducting at that point with representatives of the radio industry indicated that the chairman of Goskino had nothing to do with this project and, although he was generally speaking a good man, he could not even understand that in order to implement this assignment I would have to spend time as well as \$20,000-\$30,000. The entire project ended with the fact that I was not even extended the courtesy of an answer.

"Subsequently, I became involved in another project, with those same officials and their subordinates: the founding of a share-holding company, in which I would invest 40 percent of the capital, the object of which would be to open video theaters throughout the Soviet Union. I was asked to be in charge of importing video films. I discussed this project in London, Paris and West Germany, trying to provide the best possible conditions for the deal. After a number of business meetings in the Soviet Union and abroad, it was decided that the scale of the project would be broadened by purchasing ordinary motion pictures. I had to conduct talks with the biggest U.S. company for the sale of motion pictures. Three to 4 months in a row I commuted between the two countries in preparing a contract. Several suggestions were submitted in the Soviet Union and meetings were held in Moscow with representatives of the American motion picture industry. Once again, however, everything collapsed when it became clear that the participants on the Soviet side had neither the time nor the power to discuss deals on such a scale. As a result, I lost my credibility among the American motion picture industrialists. They simply realized that after having lost so much time they nonetheless were left with nothing.

"With this I stopped dealing in such projects and, in general, thinking about them. For one full year no one even mentioned this on the Soviet side. No one met with me. The people here had already become accustomed to the fact that numerous initiatives, which end with

nothing, are being suggested to Western businessmen. The strangest feature of all is that Soviet ministers and their deputies may sign agreements but seem to ascribe to their signatures no validity whatsoever.

"It is difficult for Western business people to realize that the Russians with whom they meet could be also totally uninterested and believe that their participation in deals does not impose on their side any obligations whatsoever. A great deal of experience in working with the Soviet side is required before one can understand this absurdity. In the Soviet Union managers and deputy ministers do not deal hands-on with the various matters. You are looked upon as petitioners. In the West, when a deal is being concluded, it means that both sides are truly interested and that each one of them will use its experience and knowledge.

"My contacts with Inturist were equally disappointing. In this case I dealt with Messrs. Venichenko and Fedorov. We discussed several plans, one of which called for opening three restaurants on the third floor of the Kosmos Hotel. Designers were invited from Singapore, and designers and builders from the Netherlands, to look over the place and discuss specific projects with the restoration personnel. On two separate occasions we submitted proposals and twice suggested the founding of a joint enterprise. We signed preliminary agreements before our partners had made what I could describe a stupid suggestion: They asked for a 70 percent interest although this profitable project was to be entirely financed and organized by the Western partners. This made me so indignant that I walked out of the premises. However, no one reacted to the fact that a businessman, who had lost a lot of time and money only to hear such stupidities had been unable to take this.

"A similar situation prevailed in another deal with Inturist, concerning the installation of video premises in Moscow hotels. We brought specialists from London. We were prepared to set up a joint enterprise on a 50-50 basis. We were to ship to the Soviet Union and to install all the necessary equipment and to supply the films. To prepare the deal, we traveled to the United States, England and the FRG, where we signed preliminary agreements. This was followed by a long silence on the part of Inturist, and the project collapsed.

"It was also Inturist who suggested the opening of a restaurant at the Metropol Hotel. Once again designers and technicians came to assess the possibilities. Once again plans were submitted and, once again, but this time it was the Metropol director, said 'we do not need this.' Once again everything turned into dust.

"This was followed by the planning of yet another deal involving the supplying of equipment to the Kosmos and other hotels. I got in touch with friends and specialists in this area in other countries and submitted their proposal to Inturist and... received from it neither an answer nor a letter.

"The final and biggest deal which I discussed started in 1987. My idea, which I have not abandoned, is to organize investment banking in the Soviet Union. That year I held discussions with Mister Obozintsev who, at that time, was deputy chairman of the USSR Gosbank and who reacted enthusiastically to the project. Subsequently, I met with other Gosbank officials. I was seen by Kamentsev, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to whom I presented, in a one-hour meeting, my suggestion, describing the importance of such an initiative. It was subsequently decided by the Gosbank that this should not be limited to their participation alone, for which reason I made the rounds of all banks in Moscow and all of them made their own additions to the project. In the final account, after 18 months, nothing came out of this.

"Annoyed, I wrote to Gorbachev, Ryzhkov and Kamentsev, stating that I no longer wish to have any business deals with the Soviet Union. All of this was turning into a joke, for the people with whom I had to deal could not realize the importance of the suggestions, although noted banking experts, such as Kendall and McNamara were ready to participate in the 'West-East Investment Bank' project, believing that it made great sense.

"After I had abandoned my final project and thought that I was finished with it, a noted Soviet diplomat asked me to go to Belorussia, to Mogilev, and to discuss with the local authorities the implementation of my idea. At that point I invited the first secretary of the Mogilev Party Obkom to consider the scale of any possible deal. The Mogilev delegation studied the activities of Western banks and enterprises in various industrial sectors, thus gaining an idea of the functions of banks and of bank finance engineering and consultation services, so to say, as important intermediaries which can coordinate an entire range of deals. We then once again met in Mogilev. Subsequently, yet another Soviet delegation went abroad to study the details of the proposal.

"Let me point out that, on the level of relations among countries, the significance of joint West-East banks has not been underestimated and that no more than 2 and a half months passed from the suggestion submitted by French President Mitterrand on establishing a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for Eastern Europe to its opening, on 15 January 1990 in Paris, with the participation of 34 countries, including the USSR.

"But let us go back to our Belorussian affairs. A final agreement was eventually concluded and the first meeting of the board was held recently. Despite previous failures, I have not lost hope that the substantial efforts I have invested will be fruitful. This is not simply a question of making money but of having Soviet managers eventually begin to understand the way the Western economy functions and the way Western managers think. This is because until they can surmount their total lack of understanding in such matters no good business relations between us are possible.

"Western managers who come to the Soviet Union quite quickly encounter such lack of understanding. Time is money. Wasting an hour and even 15 minutes costs money. Trips cost money, any step taken for the sake of concluding a deal such as ours costs money. However, the concept of the connection between time and money is absent in the minds of the Soviet people. Yet it is time for them to realize this. Generally speaking, I cannot even imagine how this problem can be resolved. When will Soviet managers begin to think in economic terms, taking into consideration the time spent on making deals? When will they begin to behave toward Western business people as they deserve to be treated, and become their partners?

"We come to your country not to take money away. We come to engage in joint projects. In the West, joint projects are like creating a family. Marriages are concluded if they are in the interest of the citizens and if both sides are equally rewarded as a result of a joint life. The growth of true reciprocal understanding between partners, as relations develop, is the main component of joint enterprises as well. After surmounting numerous obstacles and, finally, the conclusion of a serious business agreement with the Soviet partners on the establishment of a West-East investment bank, I still hope that our project will succeed.

"Deep inside me, however, I am afraid. I fear that the events of the past 3 years could be repeated. I fear that throughout the huge territory of your country there may not be a place where such a deal could be successful. The failure of such deals will be to the detriment of the Soviet Union and, naturally, to the Western managers who have become involved in such relations. It would mean that neither the time wasted nor the suggested ideas will yield results and that cooperation between West and East is inefficient. It so happens that all the Westerners who became my partners in such projects believed that this was one of the ways for achieving greater reciprocal understanding between East and West.

"Let me also say a few words about Soviet managers and their superiors. This can no longer go on. It cannot go on when, after we shake hands on starting a joint enterprises we become disappointed by the lack of telephone communications and unanswered letters. At that point some kind of petty political infighting and jealousy appear among those who claim to hold a high position in the common project, and dislike of such people within the political system where not all of this is liked. I fear, but still hope that this time my apprehension will be wrong."

#### The Restless Millionaire

Let us now name the author of this recording. He is Frantz Lurwink, someone well known in the West. Let us supply our readers with more details so that the problem which he so emotionally depicted appear in its actual dimension: he is a self-made 57-year old businessman from the Netherlands, whose name carries a certain weight in international business circles. He is a graduate

of the Business Management School and, after a 3-year training in several developed countries, Lurwink opened commercial agencies in Britain and the FRG for a big Dutch timber processing company, after which, 32-years ago, he was hired by the Phillips Multinational Corporation. In 2 years of work in its headquarters in the Netherlands he learned all the aspects of its world-wide business before himself becoming vice-president of the corporation's branch in Pakistan.

Seven years later, he became president of a Dutch company for the production of engines and motorcycles, which was having financial difficulties. Lurwink was able quickly to put it back on its feet and reorganized it into a very large and prosperous company. He was equally successful in a similar operation as president of the biggest textile combine of the Netherlands. He started his own business in 1973 by purchasing, over the next 11 years, 20 enterprises in various economic sectors: oil wells, real estate, management, tractor manufacturing, textiles, advertising and health care.

In 1984, the life of this prosperous businessman took a sharp turn which tells a great deal about him as a person whose view that money is by no means everything that matters in life could be believed. He sold all of his enterprises and focused his efforts on the Allerdink Foundation, which he personally established. The Foundation took its name from a castle which Frantz Lurwink bought in the Netherlands. Its purpose is to organize meetings between workers in the mass information media of West and East concerned with international tension and the threat of a rampant arms race.

Lurwink himself spends a great deal of energy and time to encourage as many people as possible to acquire not only an awareness of the threat to peace but also optimism about actions which mandatorily occur when people begin better to understand the sources of their previous negative reactions, become self-critical and, therefore, more receptive to the arguments brought forth by their traditional opponents.

As to his efforts to help us in the area of organizing mutually profitable and efficient economic cooperation, we see as an explanation for his almost philanthropic persistence his sincere desire to help in our perestroika and, with his character, molded by the harsh capitalist reality, to attain his set objectives. This is in his blood. We found a confirmation of this in the correspondence between Lurwink and our high official authorities, a correspondence which he obligingly put at our disposal.

However amazing this may seem, his business successes, in the course of which he empirically acquired a global overview of economic processes, have given him greater opportunities compared to many among us to understand Marx's way of thinking, as the latter predicted the inevitability of the establishment of a single world market, as well as the complex national and social approaches to it.

Following are some excerpts from a letter he wrote to his Soviet partners: "It is precisely the market that plays a decisive role in the shaping of a healthy and efficient economy. It cannot stop, for it inevitably must expand. In this case it subordinates everything to itself, making maximal use of individual talents. When development becomes uncontrolled and weaker, it turns into its inhuman and unfair side. Your revolution, having served as a counterbalance, influenced the conversion of the capitalist system in the social-market economy with a more equitable distribution of wealth and greater social justice, which led to extensive economic growth. The efficiency of all the elements of our economic life has been the result of the desire to show a profit, which is the motive force of the system."

"...In order for a social-market economy to function optimally, the political life in the country must be democratic, for democracy is lacking in our economy and, in order to avoid abuses of power in the economic area, we need a counterbalance in the guise of democratic forms of political life.

"Economic growth and economic trends in our country are in general determined not by economists but by the leadership of the economic institutions and are, to a certain extent, regulated by governmental policy."

These are the features which Frantz Lurwink can detect in our administrative-command economic system: "The main principle is that the people want to work for the sake of having a better life. Throughout the vast Soviet territory, the command economy has planned economic institutions in such a way that they have no commercial departments. They are not engaged in their own research or in strategic planning. Everything is centralized. Full employment and a closed market are the structural parts of this system. Political and economic leaderships have become interwoven and the economy is managed through political directives."

A sense of delicacy prevents Lurwink from getting into the details. However, the atmosphere of our glasnost and self-critical attitude allows him to note the positive changes which have taken place in Soviet public opinion and, actually, see the problems encountered by perestroika. Together with us, he thirsts for stability and fears any backsliding. If we try to determine the main reason for the present confusion felt by this Western specialist, it would turn out to be the scandalous lack of competence and professionalism in our circles, in anything pertaining to finances and management of a contemporary production process. This is not the fault but the difficulty of our specialists, and people such as Lurwink have long been trying to find a way of making our ideologized awareness realize this important fact.

In a letter to our high authorities, Frantz Lurwink shows a practical scorn for worldly politeness: "In the case of Russia, the conversion to a new system of economic management is a problem of tremendous scale. In my view, this cannot be accomplished through the sole

efforts of the Soviet government. It requires the huge involvement of talent from the entire world in order to initiate these changes."

Bearing in mind the fact that he gives priority to the task of developing an entirely new financial system of accountability and control, based on enterprise profitability, which should be in command, he has been unable to find in our midst any reciprocal understanding about this matter. Nonetheless, he believes that Western investments, albeit important, are not the primary requirement of the Soviet economy. In his view, the prime requirement is for the Soviet people to start showing initiative. According to Lurwink, the efficiency of Soviet economic subdivisions amounts to no more than 30 percent of that of the West. The economy can be activated only with a ruble which could buy something. To this effect, the system must reward people for persistent labor and, furthermore, pay for talent. It should stimulate productivity in all economic subdivisions. This means a better utilization of equipment, reduced inventory and quick sales of produced goods. It is only thus, he says, that production could be increased by 10-20 percent.

In his view, the ideal would be to create a "Western economic corporation," which would be able to assign in various areas of the Soviet Union Western specialists, who would work there for at least 1 year. To this effect one could hire recently retired managers, whose salaries would be substantially lower.

Lurwink himself believes that in order to obtain the best possible results from East-West cooperation it is precisely the creation of such "marriage of convenience" brokerages that would be useful. "A Mogilev Development Corporation and a Mogilev Innovation Fund," he wrote, to Moscow last September, "would be the only experiment left out of hundreds of other ideas which have appeared over the past 3 years. It is already being obstructed by bureaucrats and, at this stage, I feel like jacking everything. The Soviet government must support this project, allowing the corporation in Mogilev Oblast to have the right directly to sell goods to the West, undertake the merger of enterprises and engage in all sorts of activities which may become necessary. If the project becomes corrupted by the bureaucracy it will be hopeless."

Lurwink regrets that "a group of financial institutions, which is considered substantial even by Western standards, related to the planned enterprise, including Lazard Freres, Matushka, Deutsche Bank and others, is operating in such a limited area as Mogilev. The Belorussian operation should be on a scale more consistent with the strength of this group."

In January, this was followed by "I fear that..." (see the opening of this report).

### The View From Mogilev

That which Lurwink describes as a corporation is known in Mogilev as the "Joint East-West Enterprise for the Development of Mogilev Oblast." Here the president is called chairman and the vice-president, V. Leonov, is the vice-chairman, although more frequently referred to as the vice-president. Any joint enterprise begins with the formulation of a common language, equally understood by both sides. The president and the vice-president, according to the rule, would trade positions once every 5 years should fortune favor this newly created corporation. Vasilii Leonov, Mogilev Obkom first secretary and deputy chairman of the corporation's board, described to KOMMUNIST the problems and opportunities of this mixed business, as he saw them.

Although this may sound trite, he began his interview, one of the reasons which have brought our economy to its present difficult condition was its self-isolation from the international market and the international division of labor. I am one of those who believe that, given the present difficulties of the national economy and the contemporary standards of science and technology, the solution to the difficulties should not be sought immediately in all areas. We must choose the most promising one. The oblast party committee and I, personally, were encouraged in reaching the conclusion that we had to participate in the international division of labor by the policy which was announced at the 19th Party Conference. You may recall that the Belorussians were the first to start mentioning regional cost accounting. The idea of cost accounting led to thoughts about foreign economic activities on the regional level. We already had a sufficient amount of data about the inefficiency of the existing forms of foreign economic cooperation. When it became known that all enterprises were granted the right to sell on the foreign market, and considering that there were several hundred such enterprises in our oblast, it became clear to us that if each one of these enterprises was to hire even a single specialist familiar with the features of international trade and able to talk as an equal with Western business partners (in our country no one has trained such specialists and, to this day, no one has undertaken to do so), where could we find them?

Our conclusion was that we must develop regional subdivisions, associations which would coordinate and direct this work and help us to reach the global market, for going through ministries and departments in our huge country was the equivalent of trying to squeeze the entire country through a narrow doorway. This is impossible, however capable the people may be. Yet today the competition for enrolling in the foreign trade academy is for 1,000 students. Therefore, training specialists will be expensive and lengthy. Furthermore, not each farm or enterprise would find it advantageous to have its own foreign economic service. That is how we reasoned in our oblast.

My second impetus was the result of my official duties as obkom secretary. I kept hearing almost all the time, look,

the goods produced by these people and their situation are good, whereas ours are poor, substandard. I started answering: Let us do what they do, let us study their experience and, perhaps, work together.

At that point I was helped by some of my Moscow connections. A person from our area, a Soviet diplomat and old acquaintance of mine, looked for a solid, a conscientious and authoritative businessman who would agree to cooperate with us. It is thus that we got in touch with Mister Frantz Lurwink. We began to study possibilities for cooperation. We studied the areas in which we could establish contacts and interact, trying efficiently to combine our two so greatly different economies. He came to us, he sent his experts and specialists. On two occasions I went abroad. In the course of these trips Frantz Lurwink widely opened the doors of Western enterprises, banks, commercial companies, market research bureaus, frankly describing their activities and acquainting us with the main features of a market economy. Actually, what we were doing was studying one another, what they could do and what we could do. Then, gradually, during the year, a common idea began to take shape: it was necessary to set up a joint enterprise and not a regional company engaging in foreign economic activities, consisting exclusively of our own specialists. Both they and our people had to become involved, so that they would come to us, study our mechanism and our economy, while we would choose among their plans for cooperation those which would be suitable under our circumstances, without eliminating the possibility of cooperation on the intergovernmental and interdepartmental levels. We simply chose that which would help us to start joint work efficiently and quickly.

Let me cite an example. We have a leather plant in Bobruysk. By investing some \$1.5-2 million, and with Western technology and chemicals, we could meet a modern standard so that our leather goods would be consistent with world standards and leather would become entirely competitive on the world market. This solution was suggested to us by the Western specialists who visited the enterprise. Such could be the result of reciprocal contacts, when they assume a business and not a tourist nature.

Unexpectedly to ourselves, we also realized that in a number of cases our goods met 80-90 percent of global requirements, but also that some additional finishing was needed and, in some cases, changes in design and packaging, some advertising and some quality improvements, and then we could sell on the Western market. However, as practical experience indicates, it is precisely because of such "petty matters" that we cannot compete with Western specialists.

The second problem we encountered was the lack of foreign currency. In our trips abroad we studied the banks in France and West Germany and go-between companies in the Netherlands and Belgium from the viewpoint of possibly investing their capitals in the

development of our oblast. If the Western bankers feel that a project is not a myth but reality, obtaining a capital loan in convertible currency is no longer a problem. However, unlike the situation in our country, they have banks and not bank offices, and they themselves must become convinced of the reality of the projects in which they invest their money.

I look optimistically at the Joint East-West Enterprise for the Development of Mogilev Oblast, for the projects were based on the real possibilities of both sides. I have already assumed specific obligations. Our partner Frantz Lurwink is worried that if the project fails his reputation in Western circles would suffer. This has become our mutual responsibility.

I am convinced that our hands and minds are no worse than anyone else's. However, we frequently lack interest and experience. In matters of legislation and account settling, today we have a free hand; today we can pay according to labor. However, this must be done in such a way as not to skip certain stages and create unnecessary stress.

It all depends on us. As far as salaries are concerned, we adopted the following system: as long as our enterprise shows no profit, those who head or manage something will not receive a single kopek, a single cent. However, once we start showing a profit, we shall pay, and pay well. Naturally, we shall pay immediately the workers who are laid off and have no other job. However, I believe that in the future as well Soviet managers, who combine such work with party and government duties, should make philanthropic contributions. I, for one, will contribute my salary to the Chernobyl fund. In this case, it will be a in both foreign exchange and rubles. Therefore, we do not intend to get rich, for we are convinced that this money belongs to the Soviet people.

What are the difficulties we are encountering? I would say that the difficulties here are more of a psychological nature. Ways can be found to adapt to each other our seemingly incompatible economies. However, the greater difficulties are those based on mental stereotypes (it is true that I was warned about this but did not pay any attention to it). For example, we show a reciprocal apprehension: our partner is concerned with our reliability. Another difficulty is our economic situation and the related frequent abandoning of already reached decisions: we either give the right to an enterprise to sell on the foreign market or else deprive it of this right. Such an inconsistency has an extremely adverse effect on our Western partners. Nor should we fail to point out the nonconvertibility of our currency.

I am convinced, however, that solutions exist to all difficult situations. The unusual nature of a joint enterprise is that we are using Western specialists to solve our problems. In order to lower expenditures, we recruit exclusively recently retired specialists, who will cost us a lot less. These people who, in terms of our concepts, are young, 50 to 55-years old, have extensive experience and

the desire to prove themselves in a new field. We have already become convinced of this.

The superior organizations began to worry about whether someone would take advantage of us, for many bitter cases of this kind have already taken place. However, we fail to accept one important feature: our Western partners value the given word, in any case no less than our written-down obligations. If our partner proves to be unreliable, the moral harm he would suffer is as detrimental to him as a monetary loss.

In mid-January, after a 3-month study of the suggestions we made jointly with Lurwink, it seemed to me that we were given the nod by the USSR Council of Ministers on establishing a foreign economic enterprise. S.A. Sitaryan, Council of Ministers deputy chairman, issued an order that this resolution be drafted within a week. Here are some of the details: initially, the corporation personnel would number 20 people. This will be a Western style company providing financial services. It will consult the oblast's leadership, the ministries and the industrial sectors in matters of investment, purchase policy and financial engineering. It will assist in the creation of joint enterprises and direct trade with the West and, with the participation of Western managers, provide consultation and financial aid in the development of economic structures aimed at the markets at home and in the West.

The investment fund would be managed jointly by our East-West Corporation for the Development of Mogilev Oblast, and by a large investment and financial group, headquartered in the FRG, which would include Lazard Freres, Matushka and other banks. They will select the latest technologies, inventions and products, both Western and Eastern, which would be competitive on the global market but which, as yet, had not drawn attention to themselves. The very compact corporate offices will be located in Mogilev, Moscow and Dusseldorf.

One detail which amazed me: their interest rates turned out not to be higher than ours. We have already reached an agreement with the Western banks on the financing of a number of our projects. However, I neither can nor wish to provide, for the time being, all pertinent details.

Everything appeared to be in order. Alas, 2 and a half months later, we still had no official paper. In the closed circle of foreign economic departments no one is explaining to us the reasons for delays with obeying Sitaryan's order. There is no solution to this problem.

As you can see, Lurwink has reasons to be concerned with our rigidity and irresponsibility. I admit that sometimes I too feel if not terrified at least ashamed of our inability and, in this case, lack of understanding and unwillingness to solve pressing problems. At this point I do not know how to answer to the entirely specific suggestions formulated by our Western partners. In this case it is a question not only of the reputation of individual Soviet businessmen but of something much bigger. For the past 6 months everything has been ready to start operations. We should begin.

Such are, briefly, the external conditions and the situation which we have developed jointly with the Western enterprise.

Finally, toward the end of March Lurwink once again flew to Moscow and visited Mogilev. Although his project has become mired in our swamp, strange though it might be, he was full of energy and plans. After meeting with him, we believe that we may have found a partial explanation for this fact. He married a charming young Russian woman, Natasha. He showed us with love and pride pictures of his 2-year old son Alexander.

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### **Janos Kadar Remembers the 'Prague Spring'**

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[Text] Preface by V. Musatov:

In this issue the reader will be acquainted with excerpts from the book "Janos Kadar—A Testament," which came out in 1989 in Budapest. It includes talks between Hungarian journalist A. Kanyo [Hungarian names transliterated from the Russian] and J. Kadar (1912-1989), who headed the country and its ruling party, the MSZMP, for more than 30 years. The final interviews with Kadar, which were held 3 months prior to his death, and some documents from the MSZMP archives shed light on the complex problems of Hungary's postwar history and that of the Eastern European area.

These excerpts, published for the first time in the Soviet press, describe Kadar's reaction to the effort to renovate socialism in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and his objection to the idea of the collective intervention of the five Warsaw Pact members in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia in the spirit of the notorious "Brezhnev doctrine."

As we know, Hungary participated in the "collective action," which was condemned by the leaders of the Soviet Union and four Central and Eastern European countries in December 1989, and judged an unlawful interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign Czechoslovakia. In 1968, however, taking into consideration the position held by the then Soviet leadership, given his efforts to save the initiated Hungarian economic reform, Kadar did not dare openly to pit his country against the other Warsaw Pact allies. This line pursued by the Hungarian leader eloquently proves a great deal: the forced compromises, and the adverse external and internal conditions under which the Kadar program was being implemented in the 1960s and 1970s.

"Kadarism," as a series of reforms of the preperestroyka age, so to say, had its objective historical limits. The experiments were based on the post-Stalinist model, under the conditions of the monopoly status held by the MSZMP. Against the background of stagnation in the USSR and the events related to the consequences of the

cultural revolution in China, the Hungarian changes were not benefiting from external support. Furthermore, they frequently met with opposition. Inside the country, Kadar had to struggle against dogmatic forces which rejected innovations.

J. Kadar welcomed Soviet perestroyka at an already advanced age, no longer at the peak of his influence. However, as an experienced politician, he saw in it an opportunity for the renovation of socialism and the development of its potential. The subsequent Hungarian policy of reforms, in his understanding, was based on combining continuity with renovation and gradual progress, with the guiding role of the MSZMP which should rally all other reform forces and trends.

This concept of "revolution from above" was not carried out but contributed to the fact that the radical democratic changes which took place in Hungary in 1988-1990 occurred in an atmosphere of stability and evolution.

In the spring of 1988 Kadar decided to withdraw from active political life. However, the "multicolored" structure of the party's leadership was unable to ensure unity in the implementation of the party's decisions, aimed at a smooth revival of society. In an atmosphere of sharp debates, the party, which had initiated the changes, lost its leading role. Criticism of communist activities during the entire postwar period arose in the country, and attention was focused on communist responsibility for the precrisis condition. Naturally, this could not fail to affect all of Kadar's activities, which began to be subjected to both just and biased criticism. The broad Hungarian population strata acknowledged the merits of their leader at his funeral in 1989.

The talk with Kadar is a historical document, for which reason we are offering excerpts from it, unedited by stylists and editors, i.e., as it was published in Hungary.

#### Meeting with Dubcek

[Kanyo] After you resigned as party general secretary, references to your person and activities began to be less flattering. Interestingly enough, your former opponents abroad are being more objective than some people with whom you worked and who profited from this.

[Kadar] I have always believed power to be a dangerous matter; I know from personal experience how one can abuse it. This could have been the case with me as well. However, I have never respected people who change opinions like their underwear. Some assessments sadden me. However, an objective assessment of our affairs can be provided only by the next generation and history. Excessively hasty evaluations frequently contain unnecessary emotions and tactical elements. They are not always of a lasting nature.

[Kanyo] In the course of our previous talks you have always abstained from evaluating individuals, particularly those who are still among the living. You made no

distinction between politicians and ordinary people. How do you explain this approach?

[Kadar] I do not wish deliberately to harm anyone.

[Kanyo] Now, however, I must nonetheless ask you questions about matters the consideration of which will not permit you to keep silent about their participants, although some of them are still with us.

[Kadar] What about?

[Kanyo] They pertain to the Czechoslovak events of 1968 and the role which our country and you personally played in them. A great deal of conflicting views have been expressed on this subject, and not only you but our entire country has been blamed.

[Kadar] In August 1968 all of us found ourselves in a state of profound crisis, both personal and political. I can see that some people are still unable to come out of it. Yet this hurts our entire movement.

[Kanyo] Our readers and, probably, the international public would be grateful if you could describe the background of the sad events of August 1968. First of all, I would like to ask you to describe your relationship with Alexander Dubcek.<sup>1</sup>

[Kadar] One of the results of the discussions which were taking place within the fraternal Czechoslovak Party was the replacement of Antonin Novotny<sup>2</sup>, with Alexander Dubcek. He turned to me with a request for a meeting without any preconditions. The meeting was held at the start of 1968, somewhere in Slovakia, concealed as a hunting trip. I was accompanied by Karoly Erdei<sup>3</sup> and, if I am not mistaken, our consul in Bratislava. The conversation was quite meaningful; we got to know each other. At the end Dubcek suggested that our families got together. I did not object to this but, as we know, such contacts did not take place, not only in Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations but also in general. This was not due in the least to anyone's willingness or unwillingness.

Comrade Dubcek felt somewhat diffident. He had lost weight, and the events had affected his nervous system. He said that he was not pleased by becoming the leader of the party; ever since the party had been founded, a Slovak had never headed it. Naturally, I congratulated him, after which I expressed my sympathy, considering that the leader faces a great deal of trouble, and assumes major responsibilities and has very few pleasures. He appreciated the joke, relaxed, and the atmosphere of our talk warmed up. He told me that he had immediately received an invitation from the Soviet Union but wanted first to achieve some results at home and only then go to Moscow. The conversation also turned to the fact that in the Czechoslovak state one leg is longer than the other; for example, there was a Slovak Central Committee but not a Czech Central Committee; the Czechs had a strong union of writers, 75 percent of whose members were also party members, but not one of them was willing to head that union. Such were the topics we discussed. Dubcek

was repeatedly and deeply moved, saying that few were the people with whom he could converse so freely.

[Kanyo] When did you meet next?

[Kadar] Soon afterwards, again on Czechoslovak territory, in Komarno.<sup>4</sup> At that time he informed us about his trip to Moscow, which he described as very useful; in the talks with the CPSU, the entire leadership, headed by Brezhnev, participated. He pointed out that the next will be a visit to Warsaw. Meanwhile, strange things were already taking place in the country and new demands were being heard.

[Kanyo] Did these "strange" phenomena play any role in organizing the meeting in Dresden?

[Kadar] Yes, along with a restlessness which could be sensed on the part of the CPSU and the other parties, and the fear that matters would go too far in Czechoslovakia and that the socialist system and, possibly, the alliance could be threatened. Initially, it was a question of the meeting being attended by countries bordering Czechoslovakia, for which reason some were unwilling to accept the participation of Romania. Later, unexpectedly, Bulgaria nonetheless found itself among the participants, but not Romania.

[Kanyo] Therefore, this was not your wish.

[Kadar] To the best of my knowledge, this was not discussed.

[Kanyo] What took place in Dresden?

#### **Consultative Meeting by the Six Parties in Dresden (23 March 1968)**

[Kadar] To the best of my recollection, at some point and stage of organization, the members of the Politburo were informed as to who should participate in the meeting. We said that the meeting should include the heads of countries neighboring Czechoslovakia, so that it will not appear to be a rejection of the Romanians. According to the latest reports, Bulgaria as well would not be present, bearing in mind that on the following day Comrade Zhivkov<sup>5</sup> was scheduled to go to Turkey. Aware of this fact, we went to Dresden and met with the Bulgarian representative. In other words, in the final account, the situation was such that the Bulgarians were nonetheless represented.

We did not agree 100 percent on the agenda. The meeting was opened by Comrade Ulbricht,<sup>6</sup> who, being the host, welcomed the guests. He said that everyone is quite interested in the situation in Czechoslovakia and asked Comrade Dubcek to inform those present about it. Comrade Dubcek answered that he thought that the discussions would pertain to economic and other forms of cooperation among socialist countries and that although he did intend to provide information on the situation in Czechoslovakia he did not think at all that the meeting would immediately begin with this item.

The statements made by the individual delegations were quite heated. Let me try to describe them in a couple of sentences.

The first speaker was Comrade Brezhnev. He immediately launched into the Czechoslovak situation, and quite extensively recalled various occurrences and negative manifestations in the press, radio and television, which dealt not with socialist democracy but with something entirely different, with Massarik,<sup>7</sup> etc. The address presented by Comrade Brezhnev was quite heated and sharp but, as it seemed to us, or perhaps to me alone, it was not insulting to the Czechs, for this was the starting thesis. Comrade Brezhnev began his speech by quoting from the statement of a Czech leader who had said that the Soviet Union had indeed lost a great many people in the battles for the liberation of Czechoslovakia but also that many Czechs had sacrificed their lives to the same effect. Comrade Brezhnev discussed this at length and included personal recollections. This was natural, for at that time he was the contact with the forces fighting on Czechoslovak territory, while Svoboda<sup>8</sup> was commander-in-chief. The essence of his speech was that there were worrisome manifestations gravely threatening the preservation and development of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

Furthermore, at the beginning of his address and, in my view, entirely properly, Comrade Brezhnev described the reason for which he was in Czechoslovakia in December. He proved that he could not assume anything and he had no knowledge as to whether Novotny had reached an agreement with someone or had not.<sup>9</sup> Comrade Brezhnev spoke quite heatedly. However, he was not insulting to the Czechs. He rather dramatized the situation, saying that no one knew who was in charge, that some action was needed, that something had to be done.

The next speaker was Comrade Gomulka.<sup>10</sup> His statement was quite similar to Brezhnev's. Initially he spoke calmly but then lost the thread of his speech. He was carried away and he started talking about things which, clearly, he had been unwilling to discuss and which, perhaps, he regretted subsequently. The main idea in the calm part of his speech was that "in Prague the counter-revolution has been turned loose." In other words, he considered the situation in the sense that counterrevolutionary events were taking place in that country and that action was needed. The Czechs were not in charge of events and, something which was emphatically heard in all speeches, they had lost control over the mass information media which had fallen into the hands of hostile elements and a dangerous counterrevolutionary situation had developed. Subsequently, his speech became more heated and he began to say things which were insulting and personally hurtful. His entire speech implied that until January Czechoslovakia presented no problem whatsoever and therefore those who were present at the meeting should tell the others what they wanted. Unfortunately, that is how his statement could

be interpreted. Furthermore, Gomulka added the following: in 3 months' time history will show who made the major error, whether it was Novotny or Dubcek....

Gomulka was followed by us, in a somewhat different tone. We did not say that there already was a counterrevolution but pointed out that a situation had developed, with a variety of manifestations. We expressed our faith in the development of socialist processes and trust in the fraternal Czechoslovak Party, and that all of this was its internal affair. However, we too were an interested party; things of concern to us were taking place in that country, things which should be opposed and perhaps the Czechoslovak friends could tell us something about it.

This was followed by Comrade Ulbricht whose speech, in my view, was quite good. He spoke of the theses, of some stages in the Czechoslovak path to socialist development and of matters on the basis of which he clearly explained the reasons which had led to the present situation. In this connection, he drew quite interesting parallels by pitting the positive experience of the GDR against the Czechoslovak practices. He began by discussing the ideological errors made in the course of the work; the steps leading to the victory of socialism had not been systematic; numerous petty owners had lost their property; in the GDR, in this respect an entirely different experience existed in both town and country. Comrade Ulbricht described actual matters and problems which, in the course of their development, could already be described as errors. These errors must be corrected, he said, after which the cause of socialism in Czechoslovakia would no longer be threatened. He too, like the others, mentioned that the various statements heard on the radio and television were not contributing to the success of the matter.

The Bulgarian statement was almost like ours. It was calm in tone, political in spirit. It was a good speech. The Bulgarians said that they trust the Czechoslovak comrades but that alarming trends existed.

After hearing the five fraternal parties and considering their speeches, the conclusion could be drawn that the views could be separated into two groups: according to some, there was a counterrevolution in Prague; according to other, there was no counterrevolution but merely a variety of manifestations. I believed that the situation was extraordinarily similar to the prologue to the Hungarian counterrevolution, and expressed the hope that it would not continue like it but would take the opposite direction.

The Czechoslovak comrades who, coolly and calmly heard these speeches, were worthy of respect and recognition. The variant they chose was the following: Dubcek no longer spoke, and all important questions were answered by the four comrades who accompanied him. Their tone was somewhat different and they showed some differences in their assessment of the situation, which was noted. Comrade Cernik<sup>11</sup> began his speech

with what he described as a very good situation, because of the very high social activism. In the past, he claimed, the situation was quite bad, because the people had remained passive.

The Czechoslovak comrades said that in their country there was socialism and the most important and decisive elements of the events which were taking place were socialist elements. However, they acknowledged that they had lost control over the mass information media, which was an unhealthy and dangerous phenomenon. They then said the following: yes, a certain danger does exist but they are aware of it, they are confident of their success and beg of us to trust them, for they are fighting for socialism. At the same time, politely and, in my view, properly, they rejected claims and accusations with which they could not agree. In my view, Biljak<sup>12</sup> said, claims to the effect that history will prove who has made greater errors, whether Novotny or Dubcek, the Czechoslovaks could neither accept nor agree with this. Others as well rejected individual statements, not rudely and without insults. They stated, however, that they felt like defendants in court.

The fact that they mentioned this was quite proper. Comrade Gomulka presided over the end of the meeting. In conclusion, without abandoning his views, he said something in the following spirit: let now everyone go home and let the Czechoslovak comrades try to make use of the remarks they have heard, and let us hope that the situation will improve. Brezhnev said: The participants in the meeting entirely trust our fraternal Czechoslovak Party. With this the meeting came to a close.

Also worth describing is the story of the communique. A draft communique was prepared. Most of it dealt with the situation in Czechoslovakia. The participants described in the communique the situation and what should be done. This draft was distributed. We did not know who had written it and we did not participate in the writing nor did the Czechs. Kolder<sup>13</sup> said: "If this is included in the communique, this will be the last nail driven into our coffin. This should not be accepted."

During one of the intermissions, we were sitting at the bar with the Czechoslovaks, talking. We said, and this was voiced by Comrade Fok,<sup>14</sup> that in our view such a communique should not be adopted. In general, it was unsuitable, for it constituted a direct and open intervention in domestic Czechoslovak affairs. It could cause serious harm. However, we also said that nonetheless something should be included in the communique because if we were to say nothing the entire world would laugh at us considering that in such a situation we failed to mention the situation in Czechoslovakia. Their view was that the communique should mention the following: we had been given the necessary information. At that moment, Comrade Brezhnev rushed in the bar and said that the communique would not include a single word about the situation in Czechoslovakia. We said: wait, we have almost convinced the Czechs that something must

be included. We then sat together with the Czechs and Brezhnev and drafted the text of the communique.

I then argued with Comrade Dubcek to the effect that the communique must mandatorily include something, for he needed this. It would be improper for the representatives of the fraternal parties to go back home with the feeling that all had been for nothing, and that what was said made no sense, although guided by the most honest intentions.

Let me mention yet another event worthy of attention, related not exclusively to Dresden. Eventually, Comrade Kosygin showed up in the bar and said: We have decided to create within the Warsaw Pact a military-technical council. I said: wait, this is an entirely different matter, this will not work. Why? Because there are things which must be agreed upon in advance. We should initially discuss this at home and then jointly; furthermore, we should also talk to the Romanians. I did not like this at all, for we had agreed that this question should be studied for a period of 6 months by the ministers of defense.

Our delegation was of the opinion that the timing of the Dresden meeting had been right. The meeting was held after Novotny had been relieved from his position, for which reason the impression could not be created that we were interfering in their internal affairs. This meeting could be rated useful. Ignoring differences in evaluations and paying no attention to the not always sympathetic tone, the six parties expressed their viewpoint on the events in Czechoslovakia. We heard one another and this was useful. This should have influenced everyone: the representatives of the other parties were influenced by what the Czechoslovaks had said while the latter had been influenced by the statements of our parties. We also noted that we should better understand the Czechoslovaks and that they should inform us better, for within our own parties we were being asked about what was taking place in Czechoslovakia, and that the Czechoslovaks should take into consideration that we were guided by the most honest communist intentions. We reached the conclusion that the meeting was useful. In retrospect, remembering Comrade Dubcek's speech, it was his best speech after January....

I do not know the extent to which I was able to convey that in the course of the Dresden meeting we informed Comrade Brezhnev of the views of our own Politburo and its fears and concerns expressed in the course of the meeting. We said that, taking into consideration the suggestions of the Soviet, Polish and other parties, we were prepared, in the interest of maintaining unity, to participate in the meeting regardless of conditions or the place. Comrade Dubcek then suggested that the meeting be held in Dresden, and that it involve the participation of the heads of the state planning commissions. In the course of the discussions, during the intermission, Comrade Dubcek said: yes, we have said that it would have been better to hold this meeting after our Central Committee plenum.

The question of the Romanians was not raised directly but was merely hinted at. We said that it would have been better to hold the meeting without the Bulgarians, in order not to create the impression that the Romanians were being pushed aside. The meeting should be described as a conference of countries bordering Czechoslovakia. To discuss today what would have been better at that time would smack of philosophizing. Let me frankly say that neither did we risk raising the question of inviting the Romanians.

[Kanyo] Was the Dresden meeting a success or a failure?

[Kadar] It was a great success, in my view. This became clear during the very first days of May, when Kosygin telephoned me and asked that we meet in Moscow. It appeared that they wanted to discuss with us the results of the meeting with the Czechoslovaks. However, there were no representatives of the CZCP in Moscow.<sup>15</sup>

Brezhnev informed the heads of the Soviet, Polish, GDR, Bulgarian and Hungarian Parties about the meeting with Dubcek, Smrkovsky<sup>16</sup> and Biljak. The meeting was not satisfactory. The heads of the CPSU were concerned by the fact that the Czechoslovak border was open and that the opposition forces in the country were taking ever greater liberties and that anti-Soviet statements were already being heard. In the final account, all of us agreed that the exercises of Warsaw Pact troops could yield positive results both within the country and abroad.

In the course of the discussions, Brezhnev raised the question of taking decisive measures should no positive changes take place in Czechoslovakia.

[Kanyo] How did you react to this?

[Kadar] There were those who approved. We, however, said that we should not engage in hasty actions. In Dresden the discussion was held on a louder tone of voice, which we had no right to do.

[Kanyo] Did the others agree with you?

[Kadar] No.

[Kanyo] This was followed by Dubcek's state visit to Budapest and the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Treaty was extended. This had the look of a political demonstration.

[Kadar] That is not what we thought. These matters had been planned in advance and, therefore, they had to take place. Naturally, it may have seemed to a marginal observer that this was a demonstration. In the middle of June, the Warsaw Pact forces held their exercise in Czechoslovakia. We were not sure that this was necessary. We believed that the Czechoslovaks should be helped and that without them we would be unable to accomplish anything.

[Kanyo] What followed?

[Kadar] It appears that later the CPSU leadership sent a letter to the CZCP. The Soviet Party expressed the opinion that the situation in Czechoslovakia was further worsening. This took place after the publication of the "2,000 Words." The events accelerated. In our letter we suggested that the Dresden meeting be repeated. We expressed our solidarity with the CZCP and the party's leadership. The meeting was held in Warsaw but was not attended by the Czechoslovak comrades. Their absence worsened the tension even further. During the preceding meeting in Komarno<sup>17</sup> we tried to talk them into going to Warsaw. They ignored our view. We told them that they had put the Hungarian party in a difficult situation and that it was now a question of our entire movement. If our paths would separate, who would they follow? Dubcek and Cernik cried and kept repeating that they could see that all doors were closing in their face.

[Kanyo] How did the Warsaw meeting go?

[Kadar] It did not bring much happiness. There were those who looked at us as strike breakers for the reason that on the eve of it we had met with Dubcek. Nonetheless, we reported to the others about our discussions in Komarno and suggested that we act in such a way as to meet with support in Czechoslovakia, in our countries and in the communist movement. However, at that time these arguments were not considered. The ranks of supporters of armed intervention increased.

[Kanyo] What could be argued against it?

[Kadar] The Hungarian experience of 1956. In this connection, we mentioned the historical responsibility of the CPSU. The Soviet comrades promised that they would ring up Dubcek from Moscow to agree on a new bilateral meeting. This was followed by the Cierna nad Tisou and the new multilateral meeting in Bratislava, in the first days of August. We believed that everything should then become normal and the communique which all of us signed was a good one. However, our happiness was premature.

#### Editorial report:

(Janos Kadar submitted a report to the MSZMP Central Committee at its 7 August Plenum on the 3 August Bratislava meeting. He said that initially the delegations of the five parties had conferred in the absence of representatives of the CZCP Central Committee Presidium; subsequently, Dubcek and his colleagues were present. An entirely satisfactory communique had been drafted, emphasizing the leading role of the party, noting the significance of national characteristics and, naturally, the unity and cohesion of those present. "In Bratislava, therefore, unity was restored and priority was given to political means. In turn, we were prepared to help the Czechoslovak comrades," Janos Kadar said. The Central Committee accepted the report and approved the views and activities of the representatives of the Hungarian Party.)

[Kanyo] Agreement was reached at the Bratislava meeting. Why do you nonetheless believe that your happiness was premature?

[Kadar] Because soon after the Bratislava meeting Moscow rang us up. We were asked to engage in bilateral talks. Yalta was suggested as the place of the meeting. As instructed by the party leadership, I and Comrade Karoy Erdei went. We met with Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin and Nikolay Podgornyy.

[Kanyo] Why were you asked to go to Yalta and what was the purpose of the bilateral talks?

[Kadar] I believe that they wanted to meet with us separately and to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia, for they had realized that we maintained good relations with the Czechoslovak leadership, our ties were direct and comradely, and they hoped that we might be able to influence them. The Yalta talks were focused on normalizing the situation in Czechoslovakia and settling disputes through political channels. With this in mind, we once again agreed on a meeting with Dubcek and his colleagues in Komarno, on 17 August. However, the meeting did not yield the desired results.

[Kanyo] What happened after that?

[Kadar] Immediately after the Komarno meeting, possibly the very next day, the representatives of five fraternal parties met in Moscow. On behalf of the CPSU leadership, Brezhnev reported to them about the Czechoslovak events and provided his analysis in the spirit of the ideas shared at that time by the Soviet party leadership. That analysis included a severe condemnation of the CZCP Central Committee Presidium and, personally, Dubcek, and drew the conclusion that the possibilities of having a political decision had been exhausted and that it was only armed intervention that could rescue the socialist system and that it was only with its help that an even greater danger could be avoided.

[Kanyo] Did everyone agree with this analysis?

[Kadar] No. We believed that, at the least, one should try to avoid an armed intervention and that we should resort to it only if no other options remained, and there was no other solution. However, as subsequent events indicated, at that time no one was already listening to us.

[Kanyo] It is rumored that you opposed the plan for armed intervention.

[Kadar] I do not know whether it matters or not but, in any case, we agreed with it only when it became apparent that there was no other solution.

[Kanyo] What was the decisive argument in favor of Hungary's participation?

[Kadar] I do not recall any type of decisive argument. However, even if there had been one, obviously, it was the fact that the Czechoslovak comrades had not allowed us to take steps and they themselves failed to take steps

with a view to avoiding the catastrophe. In Moscow it had become obvious that we, with our recently initiated reforms, were alone. The majority of socialist countries opposed us.

[Kanyo] Is it true that Leonid Brezhnev personally tried to persuade you to accept the majority view?

[Kadar] I do not recall this. I do recall, however, that at a certain point in the discussion he indeed asked us not to oppose the joint steps. He said something like "Janos, all you have to do is send a single subunit and you will be given all you need!"

[Kanyo] Was this, then, the decisive argument?

[Kadar] It would be senseless to believe that we engaged in such petty bargaining at the expense of our Czechoslovak neighbors. It was precisely we who had done so much to save the situation.

#### Editorial reference:

(Janos Kadar's report, delivered at the 20 August 1968 MSZMP Central Committee Politburo session, i.e., the same day that the troops entered Czechoslovakia, supports this statement. The essence of his speech could be interpreted in the sense that the political options had been exhausted and that the situation was assessed similarly by the supporters of the left-wing in the Czechoslovak Party leadership.

(Their plan was to address a meeting of the CZCP Central Committee Presidium at its 20 August Session and announce to the country's population that they were openly requesting military assistance.

(According to available documents, the representatives of the MSZMP in Moscow spoke out, indeed, until the last minute, against taking a military action. In the course of the discussion, in particular, Janos Kadar emphasized that Czechoslovakia cannot stop being a socialist country. The MSZMP was ready to take any possible step but only after it had been determined that all political options had been exhausted.

(He reminded the participants of the events of 1956 and also cited as an example Poland, noting that the situation in Czechoslovakia did not resemble these events yet, nonetheless, the CPSU was trying to apply the Hungarian prescription.

(He also pointed out that the CPSU has not shown restraint toward the CZCP. He expressed his disapproval of the methods used in organizing the international meetings and cautioned that the agreements which had been concluded should be observed by everyone. However, none of this worked. The CPSU leadership had already made its decision and the others did not question the need for the planned intervention, for which reason the MSZMP had no choice other than to join in this controversial decision.)

[Kanyo] Not only in Hungary but in world public opinion circles the view spread that you had not approved the military action and expressed your view by not attending the meeting of the PZPR, which was held 3 months later.

[Kadar] What could I have said there: whatever had taken place could not be undone. Not everyone knew that our efforts had ended in failure, which I sincerely regretted and not only I but the entire party leadership.

[Kanyo] Instead of you, at the Polish Party meeting, the MSZMP was represented by Bela Bisku.<sup>18</sup>

[Kadar] Such was the Politburo's decision.

[Kanyo] It cannot be claimed that intervening in Czechoslovak affairs was universally approved. To this day many are those who consider the decision wrong.

[Kadar] In any case, the Yugoslav and Romanian governments were among the first to condemn the action. Nor was it supported by many European fraternal parties, while those who supported it found themselves in a difficult spot.

[Kanyo] To the best of our knowledge, yet another meeting was held in Moscow at which the events were analyzed and further steps were discussed.

[Kadar] Yes, to the best of my recollection, by the end of August Enyo Fok and Zoltan Komochin<sup>19</sup> and myself went to Moscow. We spent 4 days there and met with the Soviet party leaders. At that time, if I am not mistaken, they were discussing ways of correcting the situation with the help of Gustav Husak,<sup>20</sup> Alois Indra,<sup>21</sup> and Vasile Biljak. They told us of this. In their view, given the existing situation, the most suitable was Gustav Husak and they rated his ability highly.

[Kanyo] What was your opinion?

[Kadar] Naturally, we were in favor of any sensible resolution which would contribute to consolidation. However, we told Brezhnev: Husak is our neighbor and we know him as a decent person. Why should we certify to this, let this be done by the Czechoslovak people.

[Kanyo] In your view, was there a connection between the situation in Czechoslovakia and obstructing of the reform process in Hungary?

[Kadar] There are various influences and reciprocal influences in international processes. One cannot deny that these events adversely affected us and reform initiatives which had appeared in other socialist countries.

[Kanyo] What would you have done today, had you had another opportunity to decide?

[Kadar] The question is inapplicable. It was necessary to make a decision then, and the present situation cannot be compared to the one at that time. Relations among parties and countries have changed entirely. Generally speaking, I was not alone in making decisions. On the

other hand, it is a good thing to bear in mind that history always corrects errors. What we were unable to do at that time, for the familiar reasons, is taking place on an organized basis not only in our country but in the other socialist countries as well, above all in the Soviet Union.

[Kanyo] Are you referring to perestroyka?

[Kadar] To both perestroyka and glasnost. It is true, thinking about it, I cannot agree with everything taking place in the Soviet Union. However, in my view there is no point of discussing this any longer and, in any case, you could not print it. Or could you?

[Kanyo] With your permission, we could, perhaps for the reason alone that if we are discussing perestroyka, its concept includes respect for individual views. If you consider it possible, we shall include this as part of the interview.

[Kadar] If such is the case, let me add a few more things. I may seem immodest if I point out that the reform is not a new invention nor is it any kind of miraculous means. We mentioned the need for reform as early as 1957, at the initial meetings of the leading party authorities. We said that the party can no longer lead with the old methods, that the government and the economic leadership should be independent of each other and that this independence should be guaranteed. It is true that we had to wait 10 years before the reform process could develop. However, it was precisely then that everything we discussed in connection with the Czechoslovak events occurred and that, subsequently, in our country as well the reforms were obstructed. Later, albeit cautiously, we continued with the restructuring of the economy but failed to obtain adequate support in this matter.

[Kanyo] Furthermore, I think that our plans met with substantial opposition on the part of the then Soviet leadership, for instance, and while others were working on the theory of developed socialism.

[Kadar] Indeed, there was opposition because of which, regrettably, we lost a great deal of time.

[Kanyo] Was this not the reason for the resignation from their high positions by Enyo Fok, Dyerd Atsel<sup>22</sup> and Rezhyo Nyersh<sup>23</sup>?

[Kadar] At that time there was a sharp discussion taking place within the leading party authorities as to how far we could go, which also led to organizational steps.

#### Footnotes

1. CZCP Central Committee first secretary from January 1966 to April 1969. Expelled from the party in 1970. Presently chairman of the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic.

2. CZCP Central Committee first secretary from September 1953 to January 1968.

3. At that time Hungarian deputy minister of foreign affairs.
4. The meeting was held on 5 February 1968 in the building of the party gorkom in Komarno. Subsequently, it was continued in Komarom.
5. Then BCP Central Committee first secretary and chairman of the Bulgarian People's Republic Council of Ministers.
6. Then SED Central Committee first secretary.
7. Czechoslovak diplomat and politician. Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs 1945-1948; committed suicide March 1948.
8. Czechoslovak president 1968-1975.
9. Referring to the fact that in December 1967, when the question of replacing him as CZCP Central Committee first secretary arose, Novotny invited Brezhnev to Prague without clearing the matter with the other members of the Czechoslovak leadership.
10. Then PZPR Central Committee first secretary.
11. Chairman of the CZCP government 1968-1970.
12. First secretary of the Slovak Communist Party Central Committee January-August 1968. Subsequently (until 1988) CZCP Central Committee Presidium member and secretary.
13. CZCP Central Committee Presidium member and secretary 1962-1968.
14. Hungarian Council of Ministers chairman 1967-1975.
15. The meeting took place in Moscow from 6 to 8 May 1968. It analyzed the 4 May meeting of representatives of the CPSU and the CZCP.
16. Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly 1968.
17. Meeting held on 12 July 1968 on Dubcek's request.
18. MSZMP Politburo member and secretary 1962-1978.
19. MSZMP Central Committee Politburo member and secretary 1965-1974.
20. In 1968 deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak government, subsequently first secretary of the Slovak Communist Party Central Committee. Elected first secretary of the CZCP Central Committee April 1969; CZCP Central Committee general secretary 1971-1987.
21. CZCP Central Committee secretary 1968-1971; subsequently (until 1989) chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly.

22. One of the leaders of the MSZMP closest to Kadar; MSZMP Central Committee secretary for culture, science and education 1967-1974.

23. One of the "fathers" of the Hungarian economic reform; MSZMP Central Committee secretary 1962-1974. Currently chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party.

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## THE RENOVATING PARTY

### The Party As I See It; KOMMUNIST Precongress Survey

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[Text] Following are further answers to the precongress survey made by KOMMUNIST (see Nos 5 and 6, 1990). Let us recall the questions:

**1. How do you see the ways the CPSU can come out of the crisis and the new aspect of the party? What to retain and what to abandon? What targets should the renovated party set for itself?**

**2. What type of internal party relations should there be so that the voice of the rank-and-file party members could be heard clearly? How do you conceive of the correlation between democracy and centralism in party activities and life under the conditions of renovation? Could we ensure party unity with the free formation of factions, and platforms, and how to achieve this?**

**3. What is your idea of the party's place and role in contemporary society? On what basis should relations be structured with governmental bodies, social organizations and mass movements? How do you envisage a democratic control over the ruling party?**

**Vitaliy Ivanovich Musin**, party committee secretary, Moscow Plant for Computing-Analytical Machines:

1. The very fact that the party is in a state of crisis, I believe, is no longer doubted by anyone. This is confirmed by the lack of clear objectives and tasks in the current "operating" CPSU Program. The standards of party life, as codified in the present statutes, frequently simply hinder the activities of party members and party organizations.

Naturally, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform is much more updated compared to the mentioned documents. However, it too has shortcomings. It takes poorly into consideration the work done by the party organizations on party problems. The draft offers no analysis of the current state of affairs within the state and of anticommunist ideas which have become widespread; it contains many generalizations. It would be extremely difficult to engage in ideological debates on the basis of such a document.

The party is virtually nonexistent as a unified political organization: the Politburo and the Central Committee make their decisions without seeking the advice of party members. For example, who has studied, and how, the view of the party members on introducing in the country the institution of the presidency? Many among those who promote nationalistic and antisocialist views hold party cards. The majority of social scientists are working not on problems of the future but on interpreting and supporting the views expressed in the speeches of the general secretary. I believe that all of this proves that so far the party has not come out of the crisis.

In this situation, a great deal depends on the resolutions which will be passed at the 28th CPSU Congress. Its delegates must consist of party members who will concentrate on the drafting of the programmatic documents which will enable us to convert from an authoritarian to a democratic party in which decisions will be made with the participation of the party masses. Above all, it is necessary to broaden as rapidly as possible the rights of the primary organizations which, for the time being, are considered the party's foundation on paper only. What specific rights should they have? This is discussed in my answer to the second question.

2. Strange though it may sound, we must begin with making relations within the party, as in any voluntary association of like-minded people, comradely. We, communists, were the first to forget what great meaning was initially invested in the address "Comrade!" Today, as we speak of the party's revival, we must think of restoring comradely relations in the full meaning of the term.

At their conference last December, the party members in our plant reached the conclusion that the party cannot exist without taking into consideration the opinion of the party masses. It is only by involving all party members in the formulation and adoption of the most important decisions that the party will be able to achieve the changes it has suggested within society.

We must also adopt the following rule: the CPSU Statutes are the only document which regulates the activities of party members and party organizations. Instructions should only be explanatory or act as recommendations. Incidentally, already now the plant party committee and the party bureaus in the various subdivisions are implementing this principle.

As we see it, granting autonomy to the primary party organizations means the following:

Giving them the right to an independent and final say concerning the acceptance of party members, letting the superior authorities deal with processing the party documents, on the basis of excerpts from the minutes of party meetings;

Grant them the right independently (without the need for approval by the superior party authorities) to impose disciplinary reprimands which the superior authorities

could review should they be appealed (mandatorily informing the members of the primary party organization of their motivations);

Grant the right independently to determine the number of party workers of a given organization who may be relieved from other duties;

The number of party meetings in primary party organizations should not be regulated;

The superior party authority must mandatorily give an explanation to the party members whenever they pass a resolution overthrowing the one passed by the primary party organization.

The autonomy of the primary party organizations and their independence of the economic authorities are impossible without revising the principles on the basis of which the party budget is made. This must take place from top to bottom, with complete openness. In our view, the primary party organizations should have the right to handle most (no less than 60 percent) of their dues; they must independently set the salaries of full-time party workers and bonuses to party members; they must determine the expediency of having retired and other low-income CPSU members pay membership dues. The budgets of rayon and city party authorities must be set at the respective conferences. The elected authority must have the right, within the limit of the appropriated funds, to determine the size of the personnel of the apparatus, their wages, transportation and office costs, and other expenditures.

In the current arguments on changes in internal party relations, no one is neglecting the principle of democratic centralism. This principle is being criticized from all sides although, essentially, there has been no serious study of its essence. Yet, it seems to me, numerous publications have attacked bureaucratic centralism. So far we have not worked under the conditions of democratic centralism.

A close study of the activities even of social democratic parties which claim to reject democratic centralism, would indicate that their internal life is based on a combination of democracy with centralism, manifested in observing, to one extent or another, party discipline and granting the central authorities the right to head the political organization. We should not be deprived of this principle. The fact that we have adopted this principle cannot be denied. However, it must be democratized. At their party conference the plant party members submitted the following suggestions:

Introduce universal, direct and secret elections of all superior party authorities and secretaries of party committees on all levels, with alternate candidates (including for the position of general secretary);

Simplify the mechanism for recalling both managers and members of any elected party authority, on the initiative of the primary party organization;

Introduce the practice of holding general party debates, referendums and conferences;

Formulate the principles on holding party referendums concerning giving a vote of confidence to any head of a party agency or its members;

Legitimize the mandatory free discussion of the most important party resolutions passed on all levels, prior to their adoption;

Codify the right of minorities to set up factions in defense of their own positions within the elected authorities and at meetings of primary organizations, to submit reports and call for a discussion of alternate draft resolutions;

Establish the degree of party responsibility for the lack of specific written answers to questions, suggestions, and appeals by party and nonparty members and for ignoring publications in mass information media;

Eliminate party organizations within party apparatus and have their personnel enroll as members of labor collectives;

Establish on each level (rayon, city, etc.) two reciprocally independent party authorities: executive and supervisory; grant the control authority the right to convene extraordinary congresses, conferences and meetings, and the right to settle arguments among party authorities on different levels.

Let me explain the way our party members consider any possible factionalism. In the course of formulating resolutions and defining the party's political line, the existence of platforms and factions within it must be allowed, thus taking into consideration the various opinions of CPSU members. A jointly passed resolution must be mandatory for all factions whose members will retain nonetheless the right to continue to defend their ideas and criticize results. However, if a faction is considered as being part of a political party, with its own views and organizational center and struggling against the party but remaining within its ranks, such a faction is not needed by any political organization.

3. In my view, under the conditions of a multiparty system, the CPSU should be the equal of other political groups. This does not mean that the Communist Party itself will create other parties and support them materially, as some party members have demanded. An authoritative governmental commission should determine the extent of CPSU ownership of buildings and premises. The rest should be transferred to the state as its possession.

The time has come to abolish all existing benefits and privileges enjoyed by party workers, and pay salaries to party workers based on their contribution; the time has come to eliminate the very system of cadre nomenclature. Unless we realize that under the conditions of a multiparty system we must change, our party will have no future.

Under the new circumstances, the party must not impose its way of solving various problems both involving governmental structures and social organizations. However, it can and must use its right to criticize, propagandize, publish articles in the press, and submit proposals aimed at improving the legislation.

**Nikolay Mikhaylovich Amosov**, director, Heart Surgery Institute, USSR People's Deputy:

1. We have come to a situation in which KOMMUNIST is asking the opinion of nonparty people about the party.... This is as it should be. We, the nonparty people, are the "consumers" of party policy and account for nine-tenths of society. It is true that we always "approved," but it is equally true that everyone knew how much hypocrisy was there in that approval. No, personally, I did not sin. I neither spoke nor praised. However, I kept silent and did not end up in a camp.... This too is a sin, for as a physician and, to a certain extent, a scientist, I knew something about the situation.

I shall not discuss the crisis of confidence, for a great deal has been written about it. However, more than 80 percent of the people's deputies are party members. Is this a contradiction? It is not. The people are losing their confidence in the party but not in the party members as individuals, and even not in the idea of socialism. But this is for the time being! It so happened that since 1932 I have always been in charge of something or other, from heading a shift of 20 people at an electric power plant in Arkhangelsk to chief of the Heart Surgery Institute in Kiev, which employs almost 1,000. I can confirm that the percentage of efficient and good people who are party members is, on an average, higher than among the nonparty people. Strong and capable people wanted to work and it was very difficult for them to prove themselves outside the party. However, we should not have delusions concerning their "idea-mindedness." Unless the CPSU changes and unless party membership is no longer a prerequisite for a career, many people would drop out.

The party crisis is a crisis of our system. This no longer needs proving. Material standards are low and freedoms are few and what is there to be pleased about? If we compare the possessions of an average Soviet family and an average family in the West, it will not be a question of a few but of hundreds of percentage points. Such is the material result of 70 years of socialism. This is also the source of the crisis: the moment we lifted the iron curtain we were horrified.

What were the reasons? The theory of man and society was not based on science. Utopia and fantasy were the initial postulates on which everything was built. The possibility of educating the people was accepted as unlimited. All that mattered was to organize proper propaganda. It was necessary to dismantle the old coercive machine and build a new more powerful one, and to redistribute ownership and power and replace God with materialism. Since people are not the same by nature,

this was the way gradually to equalize them and pass on this equalization to our descendants, and there will be heaven on earth. The gulag was a guarantee of its permanence.

I do not know whether the party is interested in my opinion of it. I hope, however, that the party workers may find useful the knowledge I have gained after 25 years of studying the problem of the intellect of the individual and society. Since the party intends to appeal essentially to the human mind, it should be able to anticipate its possible reactions and know what dictates them.

Largely inherent in man is the herd instinct and a great but by no means infinite possibility of training him in order to achieve changes in his biological needs. Man's mind is limited, for there is a limited number of general and detailed situational models in the brain. Man is subjective, for optimality criteria are not permanent feelings. He has the ability for self-organization in the course of his activities. This is manifested, for instance, in creativity: the creation of models, which contain social ideas. All of this, put together, makes the mind not the least an ideal instrument for optimal control of man as we would like him to be.

Let us consider biological needs. They are based on instincts, and I am confident that they determine many of the human actions which we have become accustomed to consider as the influence of society. Intercourse, self-expression, leadership and obedience, and empathy and emulation come not from society but from nature. They may be found in all herd animals. Even more so, I believe that even art has its biological origins. For example, it is found in animals when they play, as they simulate real actions in an unreal performance, not for the sake of food or a fight but simply for pleasure. In reality, this is the way they hone both their emotions and their motions. There is an integral behavioral regulator, which is the aspiration to achieve what is maximally pleasant and minimally unpleasant in all needs. This indicates the level of happiness and unhappiness. The center which nature has assigned to it is in the brain cortex.

All civilization is the result of inventions. Technical inventions lead to the production of goods while social inventions produce ideas on how to divide ownership and power. In the course of this process someone is inevitably harmed: the weak, the stupid, the obedient or the recalcitrant. This is followed by opposition, suggestion of new ideas and organizing in groups. It leads to struggle or compromise and the establishment of a new order. The time sequence may be clearly traced: increased productivity, wealth, education, population, equality, tolerance, cultural interpenetration, and reduction of instinctive hostility toward strangers. From time to time, however, efforts are being made to eliminate the

"arrow of time:" aggressiveness triggers hotbeds of hostility; envy and jealousy trigger consumerism. The practices of the industrial society have developed compromises between private ownership and the social protection of the poor and limits to freedom and restrictions. However, they have also triggered an ecological problem in the course of which the power of the mind clashes with instincts.

It is as though our socialism has dropped out of global evolution. A society structured regardless of human qualities triggered huge losses and led to stagnation and deformations in human relations which are difficult to correct. There was a destruction of the main and natural labor incentive—ownership—and the main foundation of morality—belief in the existence of eternal principles and commandments. We developed an amazing economy from which the consumer, the main controller of quality, was removed. The labor product created by every working person was replaced by a plan figure. For the sake of attaining this figure it was the bureaucrat and not the owner paid symbolic money. The result was the obstruction of technical progress, low quality of goods, thievery and irresponsibility. Moral losses are much more difficult to compute but are nonetheless substantial: breakdown of the family, crime, collapse of the labor ethic, alcoholism and, above all, a general lack of principle and a vanished basic honesty.

All of this is most directly related to the topic of this discussion. Parties are founded on the basis of the biological needs of the people united on the basis of a common "platform." The type of an organization depends on its objective and the conditions under which it functions: struggle requires centralization, discipline and the absolute power of the leadership; progress demands freedom of opinion. Correspondingly, the requirements concerning the leader differ, whether extolling a superior leader or electing a first among equals.

Social organizations age, like people, although they have a greater capacity for renovation. To this effect they require the flexible reaction of party theoreticians to changes in the social situation. The CPSU leadership has partially demonstrated such qualities by formulating new ideas. Priority was given to steps of global significance, which help mankind to survive. This must be followed by universal human values and a reconciliation with religion on the basis of morality. Global revolution and the class struggle of the proletariat have been asked to resign, replaced by a compromise of interests. Cooperation with other countries and parties is being welcomed. The word "convergence" has almost been mentioned. A multiple party system and pluralism have become legitimate. A variety of types of ownership has been allowed.

For the time being, however, platforms within the party are not accepted as the standard, and the principle of democratic centralism remains strong. Let us hope that, eventually, democratic elections and limited terms in holding a position will make their way in party practices.

They are a reliable cure from the terrible disease which afflicted the party for many long years. Leaders on different levels, concerned with their superiority, selected assistants who were stupider than they were. This is a law of biological leadership. With such a system, after two or three generations, the level of intellect and the morality of the leaders becomes lower than the level of the "basic stratum" of the rank-and-file members of an organization, which was what we noticed in the CPSU.

So, the party is being renovated. Let us hope that with a multiparty system and the rejection of privileges and the loss of the proclaimed right to power, the remaining members will be truly like-minded (I would like to add also, idealistic). The science of social management must be furthermore added to the new ideals and the statutes. I believe that the party is already mature enough to guide and encourage such a science.

Its political organization will acquire the very necessary information to the effect that biological needs account for no less than three-fourths of human behavioral motivations. The educational process changes no more than 20 to 30 percent of such motivations. People differ greatly in terms of capability, strength of character and importance placed on their demands. The strong are different from the weak by a factor of 3-4. Some 10 to 20 percent of the population consists of strong leaders. However, it is precisely to them that mankind owes at least one-half of its progress. In man egotism is three times stronger than altruism. Curiosity and interest substantially increase with education. However, it is only in a small group of people that they could assume priority as labor motivations. Receptiveness of new beliefs depends on differences between them and the customary beliefs. If the difference is great the concept is negative and man simply does not hear the arguments of his opponent. The acceptance of new ideas sharply declines with age, while mental conservatism increases. Furthermore, distant objectives cannot be strong incentives. The lower the cultural standard, the stronger become immediate interests.

In short, in developing its ideology the party must be concerned with having this ideology not conflicting with human biology. I realize that this may sound unusual, but the CPSU already has some experience in ignoring the features of human nature. It would not be good for the party once again to follow this path.

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#### Responses to Our Publications

905B0022P Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7, May 90 (signed to press 20 Apr 90) pp 110-112

[Text] O. Volobuyev, S. Kuleshov and V. Shelokhayev: "Party History Science: Prerequisites for Development." KOMMUNIST No 16, 1989.

**N. Dementyev, doctor of historical sciences, Simferopol:**

The arguments cited in this article agree with my own and I find in them an official, to some extent (considering that this journal is the organ of the CPSU Central Committee! Finally, here as well there has been a thaw!) as confirmation of my accuracy....

For some 20 years I taught CPSU history. In working with archive documents, I realized the huge gap separating objective reality from available publications on CPSU history. The latter frequently falsified events of Soviet history, embellishing it, and avoiding answers to most important political questions.... A long time ago I realized that CPSU history, as taught in higher and secondary schools, was no science whatsoever. At best it was pseudoscientific policy.

The understanding of this fact made my life more difficult and caused problems in my relations with my colleagues. Some of them not only refused to think, consider, compare and analyze events and facts but even boasted of their support of the existing stereotypes, presenting them as the "inviolable permanency of views" and "loyalty to the ideals of communism." Finding myself a "black sheep," on my own initiative I abandoned the teaching of CPSU history and taught a course on the history of feudal Russia.

It was only perestroika, which also affected the science of history, that enables me today, once again, to address myself to the problems of the history of Soviet society, and once again to undertake their scientific interpretation. A great many difficulties remain in this area. However, the fact that this type of problem article has been published in the party press is quite significant. Personally, I find this a confirmation of the extension and intensification of perestroika and an important reassuring factor.

**O. Mityayeva, Moscow State University professor, Moscow:**

I would like to express my support of the critical evaluation in the article of the order issued by the chairman of the State Committee for Public Education, which calls for replacing CPSU history with "sociopolitical history of the 20th century." This discipline has neither a subject for research nor sufficiently specific sources. Its eclecticism is obvious. The suggestions made by the authors of the article offer a number of other options. Obviously, the most acceptable to the students and most interesting would be a course on "political history of the fatherland," which would study the country's economic, revolutionary and cultural traditions and their development, results and future. With such a course the history of our country would be presented as a multiple-factor and multidimensional process.

In formulating a number of concepts of the science of party history, which should be reviewed, the authors of the article firmly reject the term and content of the concept of "party of a new type." I do not entirely

understand this. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that he and his fellow-workers, having formulated from the very beginning the slogans of political struggle, were in favor of a party of **revolutionary action**, which did not intend to engage exclusively in the dissemination of revolutionary theory.... "We need new parties, different parties," he appealed at the Second Comintern Congress. "We need the type of parties which would maintain permanent and effective ties with the masses and which would be able to lead these masses" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 237).

A great deal in the science of party history is changing. Speculations which were aired not for the sake of but despite historical requirements, thus creating a disparity between words and actions and resulting in the severe consequences experienced by the country today are being eliminated. The formulation of questions applicable to the teaching and study of CPSU history and the role of social sciences in VUZs is necessary and interesting. The journal cannot fail to cover such problems. Problems which deal strictly with party building will, obviously, be almost exempt from the "political history" course. The essence, however, is important and must be interpreted, taking into consideration the specific historical conditions which marked the appearance of a variety of standards and forms in party history.

**M. Varshavchik, doctor of historical sciences, and B. Korolev, doctor of historical sciences, Kiev:**

We agree with the authors of the article to the effect that it is not necessary to go on studying CPSU history as it was presented in the past. However, we do not consider acceptable their suggestions pertaining to new courses.... We believe that the assessment of the course in political history of the 20th century as being a kind of symbiosis encompassing Soviet history and recent and most recent history and the history of the international communist and worker movements, introduced by order of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, is somewhat hasty. Are the authors right when they accuse the authors of such a course of eclecticism? We believe that they are not. The aspiration to interpret domestic history in connection with the history of all mankind and to depict the achievement of universal human values in the course of the historical experience of our country deserves, in our view, approval.

We shall not conceal, however, that the higher school also includes many opponents of the introduction of the new course, mainly among the older and experienced CPSU history teachers. This is understandable, for the party history course has been taught in VUZs for nearly 40 years, which makes the inertia of preserving it quite strong. The reasons of its supporters are different. Some, for instance, point out that eliminating the old course could be perceived as a kind of surrendering the positions to those who deny the historical merits of the CPSU. Others may assess a conversion from a course in

CPSU history to a political history of the 20th century as a virtual "retreat from the principles" which "cannot be abandoned."

In no way does the introduction of the new course mean that the historical experience of the CPSU has lost its significance.... Today the attention of the party itself and of many people, both at home and abroad, are looking at the positive experience of the Leninist Party, under the guidance of which our country became a powerful state, as well as at the bitter experience of its errors. However, in the light of the new thinking and the interpretation of the past in formulating guidelines for the future, it seems proper to consider this experience as not isolated from the broader processes of political development but instead to study it within their context.

**L. Semennikova**, doctor of historical sciences, Moscow:

We have come a long way in defining the nature and content of CPSU history: from an aphoristic "Marxism-Leninism in action and development" to expanded and extremely theory-oriented concepts of an independent science, with its own subject and methodology and special social functions, and including a number of specific areas of knowledge, such as the study of historical sources, historiography, logic and study method....

All of this developed in the course of decades and seemed inviolable. However, our time sheds an entirely different light on many phenomena. Let us ask ourselves the simple question: Could the history of the CPSU, a party which, for nearly three quarters of a century, was ruling and performing power functions, be considered an independent science, separate from the country's history? The answer, in my view, is clear. The excessive work on CPSU history and the aspiration to make it a separate science developed historically and may be explained with a number of reasons. Let us note among them the undemocratic nature of the political system which, we hope, will become a thing of the past, the monopoly status of the CPSU in the areas of ideology and politics, and the priority granted to narrowly understood ideological and political motivations in the gaining of historical knowledge.

Unquestionably, party history will play an important role in research work in the future as well, for the CPSU has played an exceptional role in our history. Many more volumes will be written on the organizational, political and theoretical activities and internal development of the party. These problems will remain topics of particular concern and attention for party scientific and training centers, for the party must study its own history profoundly and in detail, and draw lessons from it. However, with all this it would be hardly expedient to continue to try to maintain the status of CPSU history as an independent science with all the necessary attributes or to try to invent yet another "party history science," allegedly different from CPSU history. Would it not be better to concentrate the efforts of historians on surmounting the crisis which is apparent in the entire set

of studies of 20th century domestic history (and of CPSU history as part of it), which is becoming increasingly more urgent and is affecting, above all, the conceptual foundations?

**A. Zevelev**, doctor of historical sciences; **V. Kior**, candidate of historical sciences; and **V. Ustinov**, doctor of historical sciences, Moscow:

The theme of the article is the claim that CPSU history is not a truly scientific discipline. In this case, the authors bypass the problem of the subject of the science and its object, i.e., the problems on the basis of which alone we can draw a conclusion about the accuracy or inaccuracy of singling out any given area of knowledge as an independent science or scientific discipline. They replace this with a set of "strong," "superinnovational" and fashionable labels which, furthermore, are quite unclear....

Nor do we find convincing the arguments of the authors in favor of diluting CPSU history within the other social sciences, because of the crisis phenomena existing within it. The presence or absence of crisis phenomena or an inadequate development of its development cannot be the foundation for the elimination of any science. In order to resolve the question of the right of a science to exist we must properly interpret its history, place and functions within the system of scientific knowledge and the practical needs of social development.

It is accurate to speak of the need for serious development of the study of sources of CPSU history under contemporary conditions, instead of claiming groundlessly that party history sources are not being studied. The background of sources cannot be reduced merely to those found in party archives and special repositories and, on this basis, describe it as "noodles to hang on the ears of social scientists."

The symbiosis between CPSU and USSR history and recent and most recent history and the history of the international communist and labor movements, about which the authors of this article write in assessing the course in sociopolitical history of the 20th century, is indeed unnatural. However, nor could we agree with their suggestion to dismember CPSU history and redivide it among disciplines, such as party building, political science and political history of the USSR, and teach the history of the fatherland in the technical VUZs with a particular emphasis on the history of culture. There is nothing very new in such suggestions and there are more than enough far-fetched concepts in such an organization of a training course.

It would be proper to study not the sociopolitical history of the 20th century but the role and place of the CPSU in the sociopolitical history of society. This presumes the study of historical experience on the level of problems, taking mandatorily into consideration the specific historical situation in which this experience was acquired.

**From the Editors**

Regretfully, we have been able to publish by no means all of our readers' responses, and only excerpts at that, concerning the fate of party history science and the forms in which it can be studied and taught. As we can see, the opinions expressed are quite disparate and the debate has still not exceeded the limits of the frame within which the problems were set. However, the nature of the responses is encouraging: a conversion from emotional evaluations to the study of the nature and content of this area of knowledge, without which the history of Soviet society as a whole would be inconceivable, has become clearly apparent in the debate concerning party history.

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**Not Just About My Generation; Writer's Notes**

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[Article by Vyacheslav Kondratyev]

[Text] I recall the evening of 9 May—close to the end of the 1940s—when a comrade and I were standing in the vicinity of Red Square, listening to the toasting of the great leader which had lasted from the first celebration volleys to their end. There were shouts: "glory to the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the maker of our victory," along with other exclamations in the same spirit. The shouts were powerful, heartfelt, sincere and devout.... My friend said:

"Could 'vox populi vox dei' be right?"

My thoughts were roughly similar, for at that time our doubts concerning the former supreme commander-in-chief and the thunder of the crowd on the square which were glorifying the leader and having a hypnotizing effect, were still vacillating and unclear. Could this, indeed, be "vox dei?" At that time we did not understand that there is a difference between people and crowd and that the voice of the crowd is not always the voice of the people, and even less so "vox dei." At the front, shouts "for the homeland, for Stalin!" with which the political officers, party organizers and Komsomol organizers used to cheer us up were accepted by us as natural and familiar political slogans from prewar times, for which reason, when we repeated the first part, not always and not all of us added the second, replacing it with a simple "hurrah," realizing that these two concepts were not compatible and that one could go to his death only for the homeland but not for any given person, whoever he may be.

In general, however, during the war years the cult of Stalin intensified, which was natural: in war and in difficulty one cannot do without a person in whom one must believe. Furthermore, the victorious end of the war elevated the leader, in my view, to the peak of glory....

The sobering up took place during the first postwar years, which were difficult and complex for us, the war veterans. At that time we did not speak of a "lost generation," believing that such a generation could not exist in our country. Alas, it did exist and will always exist after any war, even a "small" one, as became obvious today, after the "Afghan" one. Like the characters in Aldington's and Remarque's novels, we felt that we were unnecessary, damaging. This especially applied to the war invalids who had been granted miserable pensions on which they could not survive. These unfortunate people, even those missing legs and hands, had to present themselves every year to the Medical-Labor Expert Commission to prove their disability, as though within that time they could have grown other legs and hands. What was such an idiotic procedure if not unconcealed mockery? When visiting an official establishment and proudly proclaiming that we had fought and, therefore, deserved something, we were answered boorishly that everyone had fought; to a certain extent this was true, although not quite, for by no means had everyone fought. We were deprived of the monthly benefits paid to holders of military awards and the annual free train ticket granted to holders of military orders. The sums were miserable: 5 rubles for the "For Courage" medal, and 15 rubles per month for a "Little Star." Nonetheless, the fact that even those few pennies had been taken away from us, was insulting....

In my view, the greatest insult to frontline veterans were the words of our former supreme commander-in-chief, who had described us as "little cogs." At the front we did not feel as such; to the contrary, we felt that the fate of the homeland was in our hands and we behaved accordingly, feeling ourselves citizens in the full and true meaning of the term; now, we were cogs and nothing else. This was bitter and insulting. At that point, we started thinking.... Furthermore, the returned prisoners of war were telling us that "our father" had rejected them and rejected the assistance of the International Red Cross, by saying that he had no prisoners, he had traitors. Those people died of hunger in the camps while prisoners of war from other armies which had fought against Hitler could receive parcels and even letters, whereas the Russians were doomed to a hungry death. Some of them could not endure and agreed to join Vlasov's army in the hope that, somehow, they would extricate themselves.... We, who had fought, knew perfectly well that to be taken prisoner was quite frequently a matter of accident and bad luck, that there can be no war without prisoners and how could the supreme commander not realize this?

I started this discussion about our war generation with our attitude toward Stalin, for, to this day, this attitude constitutes a kind of watershed dividing not only people of our own age group but even those who are older or younger. Sad though it might be, it turned out that Stalin had deeply entered not only the awareness of many people but, in my view, their subconscious as well. This was probably the greatest myth in the history of mankind, to which no reverence of a monarch or any dictator

could be compared. Germany put an end to the myth of Hitler more decisively than we did to ours. Clearly, this was related to the defeat of that country in the war. We, however, had won, and the myth was strengthened, for all the victories were credited to the "great leader," whereas the defeats in the first years of the war were blamed on anyone else but the supreme commander. After the victory, great efforts were made to forget the defeats. Literary workers were advised to write about the war, starting not with its first days but with the battle for Stalingrad. That is the reason for which there is so little military writing about 1941 and 1942....

After NEDELYA had asked me to write comments on the mail to the editors following the publication of Yevtushenko's poem "Stalin's Heirs," I received many more letters of abuse than letters agreeing with my views. Following the publication of my comments, V.P. Astafyev wrote to me the following: "...You are consoling them and yourself in vain, for all of us are his 'heirs,' and had we not been, neither he nor his watch dogs would exist.... All of us, all of our genes, bones and blood were imbued with the times and the air created by Stalin. To this day we largely remain his children, although it is shameful to admit this even to ourselves. Thank God that we no longer are afraid, but are merely ashamed."

Yes, all of us are his 'heirs,' to one extent or another.... We may ask, amazed, how come? There is nothing astounding here, for there were those who, under Stalin, lived well and to whom the Stalinist times were their "starry hour," people who, to this day, are receiving high pensions earned for having been executioners. Let us also remember that for every million of inmates there also were 1 million of informers, some of whom are still among us and doing well. There were those who, during Stalinist times, were given ranks and titles and who, under him, reached quite high positions in their careers. The dictatorship not only punished but also promoted, for which reason Viktor Petrovich is right: Stalin is within us, Stalin is among us, and the air of the Stalinist age is still in the country. That is being said by Astafyev, who saw how "people were being shot to death in Igarka, who knew about the resettling of the 'kulaks,' and which, may we never even dream of it, resulted in the building of Norilsk." I must join him in that, having seen the was the kulaks were dealt with in the Russian countryside in the 1930s, and being familiar with the "Black Marias," stopping at the entrances of Moscow houses and, together with my father, seeing his friends detained, looking achingly at the thousands of guard towers along the entire Trans-Siberian Railroad, being in touch with prisoners in Primorye, where our regiment accepted from them the road they had built from Voroshilov to Posyet, and listening to their stories about this building, where dozens of prisoners lay buried under each picket, yet trying to forget all of this when the war began, when the fatherland was in danger.... At that time we tried to forget everything, everything, so that we would not be hindered in our fighting. Clearly, we succeeded....

What can I say about those among us who remained unaffected by collectivization or the repressions? They found the propaganda of the string of our great victories in all areas entirely convincing and believed in them. If the war in their case ended well, without being taken prisoner or being sent to a penal battalion, to those men the 20th Congress was truly a terrible shock which turned all previous concepts upside-down: God on earth crumbled and, with him, so did their former life and its meaning. To reconcile themselves to this was infinitely difficult and, to some of them, impossible. Their state of mind could be expressed in the words of a character in F.M. Dostoyevskiy's novel: "What kind of staff captain can I be if there is no God?" That is what happened to them: God turned out not to be God and who were they now, they who had believed in him more than in themselves (poems have been written on this theme).

In addition to what I said, Stalinism, also represented a time during which everything seemed extremely simple and clear. Man did not have painfully to think about himself, society or the country. His thinking was done by the leader who would indicate clearly, in short sentences, the main thing which each one of us had to perform. In the West there was a foreign enemy who was dreaming only about how to destroy the Land of the Soviets; here, in the homeland, there was also an enemy but he was inside, introduced by the foreign enemy. In order to oppose the external enemy we must strengthen the country; meanwhile, we must mercilessly deal with the internal enemy. Everything was extremely clear.

That is why, incidentally, the postwar years turned out to be so difficult for us, when we began to doubt the leader. This introduced in our lives an unaccustomed complexity with which we had been unfamiliar in prewar times. Everything was complicated by the 20th Congress, even in the case of those who were already beginning to think, and to whom Stalin was no longer the "genius of all times and nations." The de-Stalinization under Khrushchev was halfway, partial, for which reason, obviously, many members of our generation did not welcome the "thaw" as enthusiastically as others, who were younger, people such as Yevtushenko, Voznesenskiy or Rozhdestvenskiy. In 1956 we were in our 40s and had the experience of the war. We had seen that despite the exposure of Stalin the system would remain the same and that, quite quickly, the cult of Stalin would be replaced by a new mythology. The only thing for which we were grateful to Nikita Sergeyevich was the rehabilitation of political prisoners and their release. This was indeed a great act.... However, even at the beginning of the "thaw" it was not possible to criticize the actions of the government and the same taboos remained, not to mention criticizing Khrushchev himself. I remember how frightened my colleagues-painters became when I loudly said that Nikita had traveled with his muddy boots across an art exhibit, suppressing anything that was daring and progressive in it. In brief, no true freedom appeared at that time and the only thing pleasing and somewhat reassuring was that Article 58 had become a thing of the past.

Our hardships after the war also were due to the fact that we found it incredibly difficult to develop any kind of clear outlook, for we knew very little: about the revolution, the Civil War and, in general, the history of Russia. We were unfamiliar with any of the philosophical system existing in the world and, if we knew about them, it was only from one viewpoint. We lived in a vacuum filled exclusively with the ideological fog of Stalinism. There was a great deal of the system which we rejected but we could not even imagine anything different and, let me note at this point, that in 4 years of war which, for some of us, lasted 6 or 7 years we, naturally, had fallen terribly behind in our intellectual development, for neither in the army before the war nor at the front had we actually read anything. We had come out of the war with a decade-old baggage which, incidentally, we had also thoroughly scattered and forgotten during the war.... Furthermore, life was so difficult materially that all we could think of was to survive, to find some kind of place in life and somehow to earn our daily bread. I do not know about others, but such was the case with me and the majority of my comrades.

In general, it is both painful and bitter to speak about a generation for which the brightest, purest and most outstanding part in its biography was a terrible war although we called it Great Patriotic. Eighteen to 20-year old boys rushed like moths into the fire and burned in it, frequently even without accomplishing anything. I cannot forget, and I have already written about him, the fate of my friend and fellow soldier the poet Ilysha Lapshin. He was the first among us to submit a petition to be sent to the front, for he was a "poet and must be in the war." He kept applying for 2 years and, in 1943, died while crossing the Dnepr. Here is his last poem:

"...The war will end and the craters will be covered with green, idyllic, grass, and the lark will loudly chirp on what was once the front...."

Before even truly getting into the fighting, the poet was already predicting the type of front nostalgia which would be felt by our generation:

"At night, we shall flinch and jump, and we shall tenderly look at our mess kits, and our hands will tremble as we touch a rusty bolt...."

Alas, Ilysha did not live to experience this. By the time that front nostalgia started within us his bones had already rotted....

For 2 years I have been receiving letters from a former naval officer who managed to escape from German capture six times, who experienced all the pains and degradations and who then fought as a private with the scouts. In every one of his letters he mentions a case he remembers, and all of his letters are always about the war.... In one of his latest ones, he wrote: "I am now trying to decide who won the war, who specifically 'made' the victory? Officially, the first place is given to the leading and guiding force (which rallied, organized, inspired, and so on), followed by the Soviet people,

naturally, inspired by the party. Also naturally, Zhukov and other military leaders, strategists, and many other.... My view, however, is the following: the war was won and brought to a victorious end by the sickly, tired boys with their oversized greatcoats.... Here are two stories which prove that it was those boys who were the backbone of history...." Yuriy Ivanovich Kachanov then described those two stories which, regrettably, I cannot include here for lack of space, although they are indeed staggering....

The postwar period introduced into our lives not only difficulties but also disappointments: those among us who were peasants were hoping that the kolkhozes would be abolished, or else that there would be a certain loosening in their management; the intellectuals hoped that the repressions would come to an end, for Stalin had realized the loyalty of the people; everyone hoped for something but these hopes were not realized. I do not force to stress my memory to recall how many of my comrades or simply acquaintances drank themselves to death after the war and how many committed suicide, the most recent one to do so did it this year. Like Lapshin, he had crossed the Dnepr in 1943. At that time he was lucky, and the evil bullet caught up with him 47 years later.... How many among us failed, could not organize their lives. This is a truly "lost generation." Naturally, I am referring to those who truly fought, on the front line, and not in the headquarters, far behind the lines. To the trench soldier the deep rear was anything beyond the medical battalion, where life was entirely different, "some were at war and some were at home." On one occasion I had the opportunity to see this for myself.

I remember, the battalion commander summoned me and, mockingly, pointed at someone's forgotten kit bag, saying: "This is a combat assignment, sergeant. Take this kit bag to our political department and see to it that nothing is missing." The political department was 30 kilometers back, it was winter and freezing.... I walked along the road, covered some 5 versts, and tried to hitch a lift. The fourth or the fifth vehicle that passed by took me on. I held the bag suspended, so that nothing in it would break. I reached Staraya Toropa and walked for a long time the streets until I found the house where the political department was quartered. Naturally, I was chilled to the bones but nurtured the hope that I would be thanked and would be given a drink out of the 10 bottles which I was taking to the superiors. But no. I could see through the half-open door a warm mess hall and a big table covered with food and a tin with pressed caviar. A fat red-faced regimental commissar took the bag and, without even thanking me, slammed the door.... An old woman, the home owner, led me to a warm corner where I could spend the night and asked: "Did they feed you anything, son?" She shook her head, left and then returned with a small container of moonshine and a piece of bread.... Such was my first acquaintance with the political department, which did not altogether inspire me to further military exploits. I frequently recalled that case, when Brezhnev, the former political

department bigwig, was proclaimed in our country to have been the main hero of the war. I already knew the way they lived and their attitude toward the rank-and-file although, naturally, not all of them were like that....

Incidentally, I now recall a detail of front life. Everyone probably knows that at the front the officers received the so-called supplementary ration: a light tobacco or cigarettes instead of makhorka, biscuits and a little bit of butter, generally speaking, trifles. Commanders who shared their supplementary rations with the soldiers lasted longer at the limber, and fewer of them were killed. I do not know how to explain this but that was a fact.

But let us go back to the "lost generation." ...I believe that this term would apply not only to our own, to those who fought. Probably anyone who has lived under a totalitarian regime belongs to a lost generation. A few among us succeeded in living as individuals without committing a shameful act, living without compromise. How could a person who is not free realize his potential?...

So then, the reader will ask, is it that we spent all of our lives for nothing? Perhaps one could answer that "happy is he who has seen the world in its fatal moments," and that "we wanted no other life." This, however, would be untrue. Even this twilight-like life gives us happy occasions and we should thank our destiny that we were neither among those who died in the "people's war" nor among those who perished during the war Stalin waged on the people. They, and they are in the millions, in general had no chance to live life to its natural end. Naturally, it would have been better to live a life without revolution, terror, war, Stalin and Hitler. Alas, man chooses neither the time nor the place of his birth. We were born during troubled and hard times, and we were born in Russia. Subsequently, we took on all that this cruel time brought into our life. I recall now how we said in Stalin's time: "Live to survive and survive to live until...." The rest was implied: to see the end of the leader. So, we lived to see a sharp turn in the history of our country and this should make us happy.

As I think about all this, I inevitably come to the eternal Russian question: "Who is to blame?" At this point I do not wish to be wily: since 1917, Russia's destinies were defined and determined by the Bolshevik Party.... Therefore, it is the party that must be blamed for everything, the reader may say, having guessed the author's idea, somehow derived from his last sentence. How simple everything would have been, had such been the case.... Naturally, from the height of our past experience and, above all, proceeding from the visible and sad results, it becomes easy to blame Lenin and the Bolshevik Party he headed, for having shot down Russian capitalism, as it was taking off, and starting to wreck an empire which, although not all that good, had existed for centuries and which, perhaps badly or slowly, was developing and changing for the better. I repeat, it is easy to condemn.

Probably, however, it is more important to understand the nature of the time which made bolshevism precisely what it was and which, probably, could hardly have been different. The "impatience," about which Yu. Trifonov wrote in the novel with the same title, about the Narodovoltsy, was inherent in the bolsheviks as well: total faith in the fact that man can do anything. This faith stemmed from the age of Enlightenment, a faith in the virtually unlimited powers of man to change the world as he saw fit.

Marx's theory, which appeared in the mid-19th century, according to which the age-old dream of mankind about an ideal social structure and the creation of "heaven on earth" seemed to have been given a totally scientific substantiation, captivated the social awareness to such an extent that it looked like the ultimate truth and created the almost religious belief that this ideal was not distant. It was close, and the way to reach it was simple: socialization of the means of production, which required a proletarian revolution. It was this immediacy and simplicity and, above all, the seeming historical inevitability of this, as proclaimed by Marx, that attracted crowds of supporters. It was at that point that the "specter of communism" started roaming in Europe.

Today, as we reread Marx and Engels, we see both the utopianism and the naivete of some Marxist concepts. In particular, I consider naive their reliance on a fast changing human nature and belief that production socialization will solve all human problems. In that sense, I find prophetic V. Rozanov's words on the revolution: "The revolution has two dimensions: width and length. It lacks the third, which is depth. It is because of this that it will never yield a ripe and tasty fruit, it will never 'end'.... The revolution will always have pangs and its only hope will be for 'tomorrow'. All the 'tomorrows' will let it down and turn into 'the day after'...."

Even the prerevolutionary critics of Marxism emphasized that it had assumed the qualities of a religious doctrine, which explained its strong influence on the masses. Each religion, however, needs its prophets or leaders, for which reason the cult of some individuals is nothing unexpected.... The years we lived under Stalin's "socialism" proved that there is little difference between ideological and religious myths, encompassing absolutely all aspects of social life and of the life of every individual. To oppose them was very difficult. Today we feel terrible when we look at newsreels from the 1930s, when crowds of people, their faces twisted by hatred, demanded the death penalty for the "enemies of the people." What astounds me is that I did not yield to the storm of the propaganda of hatred which was poured on all of us in our youth. I was probably helped by the great Russian literature of the 19th century, which I absorbed since childhood, and the humanistic significance of which has not been lost to this day.

Having lived the same life as everyone else, owning nothing, and totally and entirely dependent on a powerful state, having lived, generally speaking, some kind of

unreal, some kind of temporary life in which there was nothing permanent other than "temporary difficulties," and not confident, even to this day, that someone may not decide to resettle me somewhere (naturally, somewhere I would not wish to be), out of my not owned but cooperative apartment, should someone decide that he likes our home or, conversely, if it bothers someone and should be wrecked, I have reached the seditious conclusion that "the sacred right to private property" is a tremendous historical accomplishment of mankind, which gives every person a totally defined independence from the state. If I buy a piece of land and build a house on it, no one, no one has the right to take it away from me and remove me from that house, I would be confident that this house will be left to my children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and it is this independence that, in addition to everything else, gives me a feeling of the stability and permanence of life, something which we simply did not have. This is probably a good feeling without which life seems somewhat incomplete and purposeless.

I cannot understand the mentality of people who willingly agree not to have anything themselves providing that the others also have nothing. Incidentally, this is a durable mentality. It is time to understand, however, that this is a deception of a populist, I would even say "lumpen," awareness, which has been instilled in our people, for all this time there has never been any equality in our country, as a result of which we cannot go far and will remain poor, as we were and as we are, forever.

Therefore, probably unlike many of my coevals, I lived a life without any illusions or faith that soon everything will be good and that we shall build a seemingly superb world, but which, alas, is just the utopian dream of mankind. Nor did I believe that an "iron hand" could shove mankind into a happy future. An "iron hand" can push us only into a dead end, as we are witnessing today. The study of Indian as well as great Russian philosophy convinced me a long time ago that just ends cannot be achieved through immoral means. Yet, however sad this may be, it was precisely such immoral means that we used in order to achieve some kind of "paradise," built on blood and violence! The violation of universal ethical standards cannot take place with impunity either for an individual or a society. Yet, we frequently violated such standards, which could not fail to result in moral poverty and in a society running wild. One of the reasons for our interethnic conflicts has been the virtually total absence of moral standards, moral restraints, for which reason it is so easy and simple to resort to violence. Such was the society with which we came to perestroika and it is this society with which we must carry out perestroika which, naturally, complicates and hinders our progress.

Well, we are reaping what we sowed during the revolution and the Civil War, when we said that everything was permitted for the sake of attaining our revolutionary objectives and wishes. This "everything was permitted," which so frightened and concerned Dostoyevskiy, is unforgivable from the viewpoint of universal human

morality but which, nonetheless, could still be explained, not justified but merely explained, with the extraordinary circumstances of the Civil War and the unbreakable faith of the bolsheviks in the fact that all of this was being done for the sake of good aims but which, unfortunately, continued during the days of peace and until Stalin's death and did not end until recently, when the "struggle" with the dissidents was being waged with the help of those same Stalinist methods and with almost identical cruelty: 7 years in a camp and 5 years in exile, which could only lead the country into a moral impasse.

Whereas somehow one can understand Lenin and the bolsheviks who were basically idealists, in the case of the party as it is today and the tremendous number of its leaders of different ranks of the times of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, who were by no means idealists, we have the right to formulate quite clear accusations, for whatever it was that we "achieved," was while they were running the country, and it is they who bear the terrible burden not only for the errors, as they may believe, but for the real crimes committed against the people. What if not as a crime could we qualify taking the country to a point at which there is virtually no area of our life which has not broken down and is in a most pitiful state. This implied knowing how to turn one of the richest countries in the world into a pauper, and talented and hard working people into mindless lumpen performers! Yes, one had to know how to do it! The upper party echelon had never shared with the people, with the ordinary party members, their difficulties. It was not hungry or poor and, above all, it was never responsible for anything. That is why it seems quite strange to all of us that instead of sincere repentance and admission of past incompetence, the party and state apparatuses on all levels have raised their own salaries without having been able to do anything specific in the sense of improving the people's life. It takes also some skill to be able to do damage to oneself at the worst possible time....

To this day we are unable to get rid of the habit of adding to any concept the definition "socialist:" in our country even pluralism is not any kind of pluralism but socialist (how not to recall the sad memory of our "socialist realism"); economics and values are also mandatory socialist. To this day, however, no one has explained to the people what is socialism. Meanwhile, at their own expense the people experienced all the "charms" of life, and it is difficult to reach the people with such endless incantations of loyalty to something which, in fact, did not exist.

During the very first year of perestroika I was dismayed to see that on the holiday of the revolution we once again raised slogans which, in truth, were fewer but nonetheless raised without understanding, having seen how all sorts of appeals have made the people cry and the way this obsolete propaganda method had long stopped being effective. This proves that the party is totally unable to abandon its home-grown obsolete work methods. One should not be dismayed but saddened by the fact that,

having proclaimed perestroyka, in frequent cases and to this day the party continues to use the means created by Stalinism.

The party will not be trusted until it firmly rejects a great deal of its old baggage and finds truly new ways.

I do not support the idea of the party disbanding itself, as was suggested by M. Chulaki (see MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 18 February 1990). I call upon the party to provide a full and exhaustive evaluation of all that was accomplished in the country under its leadership in more than 7 decades, and totally and irreversibly to abandon the elements of ideology which are imbued with intolerance, class hatred, cruelty and unwillingness to respect human rights. I see today in the party fresh intellectual forces which are able to formulate entirely new concepts of perestroyka, free from obsolete dogmas. One must understand that the "specter of communism" no longer roams either over Europe or the world, not least thanks to the fact that we so "brilliantly" proved the "advantages of socialism." Our effort to implement the idea of an ideal state turned into antiutopia, which frightened the entire world and which discredited the very idea of communism to such an extent that its revival in its previous shape is, in my view, no longer possible.

We must also say, without beating about the bush, that for many decades the country was ruled though immoral means. In defending themselves and their rule, frequently the bolsheviks exaggerated the level of "necessary defense," waged the Civil War with unforgivable cruelty, destroying entirely innocent people merely because they belonged to a certain stratum, as though they were to be blamed for the fact that they had been born in families of so called "exploiter classes," totally disregarding or unconcerned by the fact that they were eradicating the cultural stratum of Russia, the restoration of which has not been accomplished to this day. Naturally, war is war and violence in war is inevitable on both sides. However, this is poor consolation and no justification whatsoever for anyone.

Let me touch upon yet another amazing phenomenon of our time: the historical retribution which befell on almost all active participants in the revolution. All parties with a social democratic or socialist orientation began to be systematically destroyed starting with 1918. Then came the turn of the old bolsheviks. Then Stalin crushed the peasantry, without which the bolsheviks would not have won in the Civil War, while the workers led and lead a pitiful existence, living much worse than their Western fellow-workers. The most tragic aspect of all of this is that the results we achieved are by no means consistent with the suffering and sacrifices of the people. This is a permanent ache in the heart of every Russian....

I repeat, however, I see the solution not in disbanding the Communist Party but in its renovation and decisive rejection of obsolete dogmas and utopias and its separation from the surviving conservative segment which, as time has indicated, can neither change nor restructure

itself and which is bound to drag the party back, to that same past it cherishes, when it could live so carefree and without responsibility.

I would very much like to trust this new stratum of party workers who initiated the perestroyka and who took an unprecedented historical step by which a ruling party voluntarily surrendered its power to the soviets, abolishes Article 6 of the Constitution, thus depriving itself of the right to singly rule the society. This would be difficult to overestimate. Although economic successes were minor, great things were accomplished in the area of international relations, where one can truly see the new thinking, and in the assertion of glasnost, as well as the fact that the party seriously announced the creation of a law-governed state and a society of true citizens. I see in the progressive segment of the party the necessary intellectual potential which will be able to carry the entire party into the vanguard of perestroyka and implement its assignments. Naturally, perestroyka, which began almost spontaneously, lacked a profoundly developed strategic concept which only now, after trials and errors, has been manifested and, not without faults and without the necessary clarity, nonetheless accomplished some successes, clearly not without difficulty and struggle.

Against a background of the euphoria caused by the multiparty system, I may seem regressive. For the time being, however, I do not see any other real forces in the country which could accomplish something specific in our almost hopeless situation. Possibly, in a while, when the new economic system begins to work, new parties could be founded, peasant or of any other variety; however, until the situation in the country is stabilized, it seems to me that other parties could only complicate matters. Furthermore, if the CPSU Program is sufficiently radical, realistic and structured truly on the basis of acknowledging the priority of universal human values and human rights, and thus fully embodies the people's expectations, it is unlikely that any other party could offer something more positive or more attractive. Naturally, however, if the party's decisions are halfway, with constant references to an obsolete ideology, the people would inevitably turn their back to the CPSU and give preference to any other party which is more radical and decisive.

The drastic and firm rejection of utopian ideology is necessary, in my view, also because utopian ideas never die in the mass consciousness. They can always break out again, under the right circumstances. At that point it is entirely likely that any kind of new leader-reformer could once again inspire the masses with the ideas of a hasty building of heaven on earth, in a single step; it is not excluded at all that at such point once again the bloody red wheel will roll over mother Russia, suppressing more than simple millions of people and throwing the country back an entire century. Furthermore, without the rejection of obsolete dogmas we would be unable to carry out radical economic reforms and

would thus prolong the agony of the regime and economic dislocation. We can no longer hold on to the customary labels. Today we do not need ideological labels. We need the type of economy which could feed the people and fill up the degradingly bare store shelves. As to what it will be called, this is a secondary matter.

I am writing this on the eve of the 45th anniversary of our victory in the Patriotic War, a holiday which "with tears in our eyes," is a holiday-memory of those who went to war and died "missing out on love, without smoking their final cigarette to the end," and we shall never forget those boys and girls who rushed into the flames of war with great feelings of love for their fatherland and the fierce readiness to lay down their lives for it.... But nor shall we forget the undistinguished and cowardly way in which our "leader" used this youthful enthusiasm, not sparing those young lives at all, plugging with their bodies all holes and breeches which had opened because of our crying lack of preparedness for war and the inability of many of our military commanders to wage modern warfare, when without any artillery preparation, armed only with 1891/1930 model rifles and a "hurrah," they threw brigades and divisions to retake occupied Russian villages and when because of the panic of the command and the lack of communications among the units, in the very first months of the war millions of soldiers and commanders were captured by the enemy....

Why is it that these days, on the eve of the celebration of victory, all of us face the inevitable most difficult and most complex question: Could the war with Germany have been avoided and prevented, considering the situation and deployment of forces which existed at the start of the 1940s? Judging by the conclusions reached today by historians, the possibility is not excluded: the war could have been avoided or, in any case, could have been started under circumstances more favorable to our side.

This makes all of us, war veterans, who did not forget the terrible pictures of battlefields, when in front of each little Russian village there were mountains of bodies of people killed in bloody and unprepared offensives, all the more painful and insulting.... It was only many years later that I found out that alongside our brigade there were two other infantry brigades. At that time we did not notice them. They reached the front lines before us and after a few days of fierce combat were virtually wiped out. Later we saw them dead, we saw them at dawn before the battle and it was behind their bodies that we sought cover....

Two weeks later, in our brigade as well there were companies of 20 to 30 men (of 150!) and the front lines were so thin that a heavy bombing by eight Junkers, who unloaded their bombs on us, caused no casualties. Literally half an hour later, no less than a hundred people, all of a sudden, came to us from the rear, hurling themselves at collecting leaflets dropped by the Germans. God forbid if any one of the soldiers had taken even half a leaflet, to roll up a cigarette. He would have been court

martialed. That is how much our supreme commander trusted his soldiers! These stupid and ineffective leaflets, as the Germans themselves acknowledged, were terribly feared by our special troops. It was this lack of trust in us, hungry and cold, under constant enemy fire, repelling with minor forces, with a handful of soldiers, the tireless German attacks, tired beyond belief but fighting almost to the breaking point of our forces, that insulted us to the depth of our souls.

If we speak of the role of the party in the war, we must give suitable credit to our company political officers and company, battalion and Komsomol organizers. Together with the soldiers they lay in wooden shelters or hastily made dug-outs and they were the first in an offensive to reach the battlefield, marching ahead of us, giving us, as we used to say then, personal examples. Forty years later I was located by the senior political officer, the former party organizer of our battalion, who had led into battle the second company to assist ours, which was already bending under bullets and mines on the battlefield. For a long time he was unable to raise the forces, fighting along with the Komsomol organizer, in full sight of the Germans. As to why he was not killed or wounded at that time, he was simply fantastically lucky.... When we met he told me that the battalion commissar had threatened him with death by firing squad if he failed to lead the company. The commissar himself, we never saw on the front line even once.

I already spoke of the saintly boys and girls. Also fighting, however, were people older than us, fathers and grandfathers. They fought more skillfully, more soberly, they did not rush ahead, also holding us, youngsters, back, for they were better aware than we were of the value of life. There was one among us, a 40-year old, who frequently emphasized to me that one must respect one's life, even at war. The middle commanders who had come from the reserve also fought well—engineers, teachers and members of other intellectual professions. They cared more for the soldiers than cadre commanders. They could assess the situation faster and more skillfully and made more accurate decisions, thus making a tremendous contribution to our victory. They were also respected by the soldiers. To this day I remember and quite warmly mention our deputy chief-of-staff, Lieutenant Chirkov who, virtually every day came to us on the front line simply to talk with the soldiers and cheer us up, hungry and tired as we were. Our cadre captain, an "excellent worker and peasant Red Army man," battalion commander, showed up on the front lines only once and, inexperienced as he was, in dress uniform. Naturally, he was noticed by the Germans who lobbed at him a couple of dozen mines. We, the trench soldiers, had become accustomed to this and this did not frighten us particularly. The battalion commander started rushing around, throwing himself in one or another crater, thus immediately losing all the respect of the soldiers....

Yes, we waged this war quite cruelly toward our own people, frequently ignoring human lives and occasionally

caring more for the equipment than for people, for the equipment was scarce and the people were many.... The lyrics from B. Okudzhava's song, from the movie "Belorussian Railroad Station," "we do not care about the price," characterizes quite accurately the mood in the war, when each victory was achieved "at all cost." It was this "all cost" that led to our huge casualties. It seemed to us at that time that no other way was possible, war was war, although we realized that the Germans were fighting carefully, trying to avoid unnecessary losses.

However, to our generation the war was the main event in our lives, the very main event! That is what we think to this day and we do not intend in the least to "write off" everything great which was accomplished by the people during those terrible and difficult yet unforgettable years. The spirit of all those who fought was too high and the patriotic feelings were too pure and deep.

This does not strictly apply to those who fought. The entire nation was brimming with patriotic feelings, including our mothers who, without complaint, surrendered their sons going to their deaths. I was lucky, although this was a bitter kind of luck, being with my mother before going to the front, in the small Borodukhino Village, near Maloyaroslavets. I was unable to hide from her the fact that I was in an infantry unit, and she knew what this meant. I remember, however, how courageously she behaved: she shed not a single tear in parting, yet we parted on five different occasions, for we would be raised at night and would march into the winter darkness, to the front, with its lightning, not far from us but... would be send back, only to rise again, when the alarm would sound the following night, and to part once again.... Could I understand then the pain and the despair of mother when she parted with her only son with no hope whatsoever that he would return.... Alas, our mothers are no longer alive but I have no right not to mention them during the 45th anniversary of our victory. Their hopes, their sadness and their faith in us were also a contribution to our victory. We knew that we were loved, that people were waiting for and trusting us and that we shall win. Without this spiritual support of the entire nation, including our mothers, our wives and fiancees we would not have been able to overcome all the horrors and difficulties of the war which befell us. Without our girls, to whom we did not refer as fiancees but simply as our beloved, who waited for us, who wrote cheering letters to us at the front. The idea of being thought of as a coward by them seemed more terrible than death. Were they not also a contributing particle of our victory? How not to mention those who waited, who were loyal but who did not get their men back, and who then lived a hard and lonely life....

On this anniversary everyone, everyone must be remembered, those who did not live to see that day and those who are alive, for what they accomplished was unparalleled, it was great and must never be forgotten.

It is regretful and insulting that our statement that "no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten" has remained, so far, like many of our other appeals, nothing but words, for to this day the nameless bones of soldiers are rotting in fields and forests and the majority of disabled soldiers and veterans of the Great Patriotic War are ending their lives with miserable pensions, as though it was not by their military exploits that Russia was kept alive and preserved....

Nonetheless, we are proud of those years and the front nostalgia wears everyone of us down and this is not because these were years of our youth, which is always mentioned with pleasure, but because, I repeat, at that time we felt ourselves citizens in the true and highest meaning of this word. This was a feeling we never again experienced.

Naturally, we fought not for Stalin, although many of us shouted his name and should not be blamed for this. We fought for the fatherland, for Russia. Generally speaking, I believe that ideology did not play any particular role in the war. What are 24 years in the thousand-year old history of the nation.... The source of our victory lies in the eternal love of the people for their homeland, which is transmitted with the genes. Actually, Stalin himself realized this shortly before the war, when he began to talk about the "great ancestors," quite justifiably relying on age-old Russian patriotism more than on ideology.

This is a time when the civic feelings which were dampened within us or, more accurately put, were extinguished by the regime, have burst out with new strength, and once again we begin to feel that the fate of the fatherland is exclusively in our own hands and that we shall be able to do something for its rebirth.... They will not be dampened or extinguished, for there will be something to hope for. We do want to hope and we shall....

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## CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

### Between Two Utopias

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[Review by A. Frolov of the book "Posle Kommunizma" [After Communism]. A book not for publication. By S. Platonov. Molodaya Gvardiya, Moscow, 1990, 255 pp]

[Text] For a long time social thinking in our country remained, and still is, divided into two uneven camps. On the one hand, we have a professional social science, which has staunchly holding its positions on the bastions of scientific institutions and councils and VUZ departments. On the other, we have the large army of enthusiasts working alone, most of them without any special

humanitarian training or connection with the leading schools and trends, yet motivated by the selfless aspiration to find the truth and even more so, by a great hurt for the sad situation of the homeland, increasingly sinking into the mire of stagnation, not without the help of the official social sciences.

Relations between the two camps have always been tense. The independent theoreticians challenged the official ones, demanding if not recognition at least a distinct appreciation of their ideas. However, they knocked at tightly shut doors, at best receiving vague promises and, most frequently, advice as to how they should train and only then claim to say something new in the field of theory. Let us point out that such advice was not altogether groundless, for if we were to paint the sociological portrait of the typical investigator of new social ideas, we would see, as a rule, a specialist with technical or natural science training, who handles professionally (and frequently successfully) the study of complex natural and technical systems and who decides to apply his views in this area to the functioning of the social organism. As a general rule, such a transfer is a gross methodological error which reduces to naught all subsequent mental efforts. You will find in any scientific institution or editorial premise a corner where thick manuscripts are gathering dust, manuscripts which contain the results of such efforts. They are covered with all kinds of diagrams and designs, tables and classifications which merely confirm how little the delicate social substance yields to technocratic treatment.

Social life does not fit within any mechanical, cybernetic and other systems. This, I repeat, is the general rule. However, it itself must not turn into a preset system: the paths of knowledge are quite twisty. We realize this after having read the book under review, which we recommend to the attention of the readers. This is one of the first published works in the country, based on informal social science.

The unknown and, regrettably, now deceased author (S. Platonov is, clearly, a pseudonym which combines the names of the two ancient philosophers—Socrates and Plato—he revered the most), as we learn in the introduction of the compilers of the book, was a modest systems analyst and mathematician working in the field of defense. Few were those who suspected his "second life" as an amateur social scientist dedicated to the painstaking interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory and ways of development of socialist society. Basically he did not aspire to a broad publication of results but dressed them primarily in the form of extensive reports addressed to the country's higher party and state leadership. The compilers also claim that, starting with 1983 and until his untimely death in 1986, S. Platonov was well received in the "high spheres" and thus was able to make a contribution to preparations for perestroika.

It would be difficult today to determine the specific influence which the author's ideas had on the course of perestroika. It is difficult because in the last 5 years,

increasingly perestroika has become entangled in surmounting unpredictable individual objective and subjective difficulties. S. Platonov was interested in more general problems of a global-strategic order. In any case, his suggestions in this area should be worthy of attention.

Thus, as a systems analyst and mathematician, S. Platonov shares in the main technocratic prejudice: he considers overall social life as changes in a most complex and huge mechanism. This is the major shortcoming of his historical-philosophical concept. In this specific case, however, a shortcoming unexpectedly turns into a major virtue and even a decisive advantage. By interpreting society with all of its historical systems which have existed so far as a machine, he was able to understand both the overall hostility of this machine to man, who found himself within this system in the situation of a "cog," an elemental force which secured its rigid functioning. Having realized this, he bluntly spoke not of the need to "improve," "redo" or provide a "scientific management" of this machine but of the need to dismantle it. It was thus that, in the mind of a technocrat, who had not lost respect for man, we find refracted Marx's idea of eliminating alienation and going beyond the limits of mankind's "prehistory." Digging even deeper, toward the Hegelian roots of Marxism, we can find also the theoretical origins of this approach: in Marx "prehistory" is also that same Hegelian "mechanism," which forms the prime foundation for the higher phases of development. S. Platonov formulates the essence of the transition to them as follows: "Man becomes Man in the true meaning of the term only when he stops being an element of any uncontrolled socionatural force" (p 174).

The author distinguishes among three basic groups of such "elemental socionatural forces," three strata located one above the other, of alienation in human activities: technology, organization and economics. A specific relation dominates each of these three areas. Respectively, they are energy, information and value. As a whole, this historically developed system forms the foundation, the structural timber through which man comes out of his primitive-animal condition but which also paralyzes his development. "Strictly speaking, alienation means that a person who is unfamiliar with the laws which govern the movement of value, information and energy himself, throughout his entire prehistory, is only their slave, agent or grain of sand included in their circulation. Within technology man plays the little honored role of a horse pulling a water wheel, the role of the generator of muscular energy. However, although contemporary society has by no means relieved man as yet from this primitive lot, it tends to surround with a romantic halo the figures of the engineer and the banker, although both of them are no more than agents in the processes of the generation of information and value, enslaved by the alien forces of organizational and economic laws" (p 99).

In the eyes of the author, the objective nature of social laws is their alienation, spontaneity and secrecy. This is

a rather arguable concept which stems from empiricism and the tectology of A.A. Bogdanov and other concepts which were influential in the 1920s and which proclaimed the end of political economy with the advent of the era of the conscious management of the economy. Hence the contradictions within the author's concept.

According to S. Platonov, surmounting said forms of alienation of human activities is the only task of communism understood, after Marx, not as an ideal condition but as an actual movement, as a process of elimination of private ownership. After communism—hence the title of the book—there should come the epoch of Humanism, the kingdom of freedom, lying, in Marx's words, "on the other side of the sphere of strictly material production." The end objective of communism, as a process of elimination of private ownership, is the destruction of labor as an alienated form of human activities and, subsequently, the entire pyramid of technologically and organizationally alienated relations on which labor rests. This means that it is necessary to reduce production relations among people to natural relations among objects and put man above material production, freeing him for activities consistent with his dignity "in attaining the Truth, asserting the Goodness and creating Beauty..." (p 70).

That, actually, is the entire idea of the book. Its content is a more or less detailed development of the problems which arise along this way and the study of the trends leading to the elimination of private ownership both under "socialism in a certain sense" within which we live as well as under contemporary capitalism. In this case the author reveals a number of perspicacious thoughts, providing a mass of original and, we believe, accurate observations. Nonetheless let us note merely the main problem.

S. Platonov was well-familiar with the distinction between formal elimination and true restriction of private ownership and between confiscation, expropriation, etc., and actual socialization. Furthermore, he believed that our society—"state-monopoly socialism"—has not come even by an iota closer to the desired objective throughout its existence. The reason was that, to use the terminology of the author, state monopoly cannot master economic relations, for it considers them as organizational relations. For that reason the productive forces in a contemporary economy are useless to it. For example, state monopoly treats activities which are actually hired socially useful labor, essentially as a slave labor, officially regulating its individual aspects, and prescribing to it on a centralized basis, from above, a variety and quality of what it considers useful goods. As a result, it obtains as a response indifferent and underproductive labor. A considerable share of the output turns out to be totally unnecessary to anyone and the labor invested in its production becomes socially useless (see p 209).

In this case, let us not praise the author for his perspicacity, for the picture is quite clear. What does he

suggest? Perfectly aware of the senselessness of "organizational" or, as we would say today, command-administrative methods when we are dealing with the economy, he nonetheless is in no hurry to praise economic methods, although he recognizes that they lead to higher labor productivity and improved well-being of the people. He is profoundly skeptical about economic relations regulated by the law of value for, as in the past, they enslave man preventing him from dedicating himself entirely to truth, goodness and beauty. The only solution to this clash, according to Platonov, is the elimination of alienated economic relations by fully converting them from the realm of spontaneity to the conscious and regulated level, not with the help of the present "apparatus" organizational methods but with the help of an hierarchy of regulating "standards," which are automatically based on the initial concept of the economic mechanism of a "powerful man-machine system." In approaching this topic, the author notes, in particular, that the history of development of systems of automatic planning of regulations, are already some 30 years old in the West; in the second half of the 1970s information on the most advanced works in this direction disappeared from the press, in the same way that in the 1930s the "Uranium problem" vanished from open-source publications. The hint is significant....

What can we say at this point? We are familiar with the claim of the basic impossibility of computing within a national economy the production of everything, "to the last nail." This, naturally, must be qualified and this is outside my range of competence. However, there is yet another aspect of the problem which needs a philosophical-historical interpretation.

I know a talented mathematician who dreams of creating an automated system for the planning and management of economic life of society, which will be structured on the basis of such impeccable algorithms reflecting the objective laws of social development that it will no longer matter who precisely will be "at the wheel," for the system will work by itself. After reading a number of pages of Platonov's book I cannot ignore the impression that he spent long hours in talks with my acquaintance. It is not excluded that this is what may have actually happened. Therefore, I reach the conclusion that both my friends have that same social ideal which unexpectedly coincides with the ideal of their most sworn theoretical enemies, the market-romantics, who sacredly believe that the curve of the law of value, if all administrative obstacles are eliminated from it, would by itself lead our society out of the quagmire. This is an ideal of an automatic-prosperous development of society **without the participation of man**. Extremes merge and, with them, the cycle of the technocratic excursion into the area of the social sciences is closed. Being able to reach an understanding of the contradictions between the development of man and the social machinery which makes this development possible, technocratism nonetheless goes back and seeks a solution to the contradictions by creating yet another machine. Where is the guarantee

that these new "powerful man-machine systems" will not enslave man yet once again? To this question there is no answer.

Nonetheless, a certain important result has been achieved. On the way from one utopia to another, Platonov sensed and tried to resolve that most essential problem of the philosophy of history, which the inspired singers of social automatism, whether market or cybernetic, do not even suspect. This is the old problem of reaching a relative integrity and completeness of human development not in the indefinite future but "here and now," in the limited conditions which depend on a given set of material means at the disposal of man—a problem of achieving the infinite within the finite. The initial point for its solution is found in the theory of Marx and Lenin on the historical process as a development of the independent activities of popular masses. Platonov followed that path but could not reach the end. This makes it even more important for this end to be reached by others, for people like Platonov are today the politically most active part of our intelligentsia and it would be quite useful for them to consider the experience of their comrade.

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### Chronicle

905B0022S Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 7, May 90 (signed to press 20 Apr 90) p 128

[Text] A frank exchange of opinions on topical problems of the life of the party and the country was held at a meeting between KOMMUNIST editors and propagandists and the party aktiv of the Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex Imeni A.N. Tupolev. Toward what socialism are we advancing and what are the present features which distinguish it from bourgeois democracy? Is a split within the CPSU inevitable and, if so, into what type of parties? Where can we find the funds for resolving the problem of motherhood and childhood, to which the country's president drew the attention in his message to the Supreme Soviet? Does the journal intend to provide a one-sided evaluation of the past? Such were merely some of the questions which were discussed. The participants in the meeting approved the content of the anniversary, the Leninist, issue of the journal and its new layout.

A meeting was held with the collective of the Moscow Western Harbor, the personnel of library No 268 and students of School No 72 in Moscow's Kievskiy Rayon, on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth and the publication of the anniversary issue No 5 of KOMMUNIST. In the course of the discussion of its materials, the participants in the meeting were interested in the attitude of the journal toward Lenin's legacy and the importance which the editors ascribed to problems related to the interpretation of Soviet history, the theory of socialism, the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the events in Eastern Europe.

Meetings between KOMMUNIST editors and the collective of teachers and students at the Military-Air Engineering Academy imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy are becoming regular events. The latest such meeting dealt with the significance of the Leninist theoretical legacy today. Great attention was paid to the new aspect and role of the CPSU, the military reform, and party journalism under the conditions of political pluralism.

In the course of a meeting held in the editorial premises, ideological workers of the Vietnamese Communist Party asked about the participation of the journal in the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, the interpretation and analysis of the processes triggered by perestroika in the Soviet Union and the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the renovation of society, and the development of theoretical problems of the building of socialism.

The editors were visited by Gary Hart, the noted U.S. political and social personality. Problems of perestroika in the USSR were discussed. The guest, who is currently working on a book on this topic, was interested in the origins of the ideology of reform, the social base of perestroika, the course of political and economic renovation and the condition of relations among nationalities. Problems of Soviet-American relations were also discussed, including on the level of the prospects for the substantial development of scientific and cultural contacts.

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